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Abstract 
Scepticism that human activities are altering the global climate in seriously damaging ways is 
widely regarded as an aberrant position and a deliberately manufactured phenomenon. The 
charge against sceptics is that they try to undermine the credibility of mainstream climate 
science in a ploy to delay progressive climate policies, and thus protect the vested interests of 
fossil fuel stakeholders. Sceptics are also considered beholden to political conservatism and 
conservative lobbies, which fear that the climate change agenda is being set by socialist and 
Green interests and that climate policies would undermine the neo-liberal capitalist status 
quo. Many observers blame elite sceptics for persistent public scepticism on the climate 
issue. This study tests these constructions of climate change scepticism through a grounded 
investigation of the underlying worldview assumptions of sceptics, their conceptual 
repertoires, and the thematic focal points of their rhetoric. A sample of sceptic texts from 
Australian sceptics is qualitatively investigated, as well as subjected to computerised textual 
analysis with a view to identifying characteristic concepts and themes. The study reports 
(Chapter 4) that climate change scepticism occupies a broad conceptual space which is best 
understood when distinctions are made between core and concomitant classes of scepticism, 
subordinate centres of scepticism, and various lower order objects of scepticism. It proposes 
taxonomies to capture the variety of beliefs and intensities of belief amongst sceptics. It 
advocates the adoption of semantically accurate and neutral labels for different sceptic 
persuasions. Next, the underlying worldview assumptions of sceptics are described (Chapter 
5) and associated with the cultural archetypes posited by grid-group Cultural Theory. It finds 
evidence that sceptics are rooted in the individualist worldview, that some are leaning 
towards the hierarchist view, and that all sceptics stand antithetical to the egalitarian view. 
This is followed by a grounded computer assisted analysis of the key concepts and themes in 
the text sample (Chapter 6). Consistent with the evidence of an individualist/hierarchist 
cultural rationality amongst sceptics, the grounded analysis reveals that sceptics support 
climate responses that privilege neo-liberal capitalism. However, it also reveals a strong 
concern for sound science and good governance, and that many sceptics consider the style of 
the scientific debate and climate related political decision-making a major stumbling block, 
over and above their epistemic challenges of the physical science. The study next (Chapter 7) 
zooms in on the climate policy views of sceptics, again through a computer assisted textual 
analysis, and finds evidence of two distinct approaches, a puritan approach that insists on 
consistency between the perceived lack of conclusive physical evidence about the causes and 
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impacts of climate change and climate policy, as opposed to a pragmatist approach that 
acknowledges the inevitability of a carbon constrained future but wishes to direct climate 
policy towards a more nationalistic, careful and measured response pattern. The policy views 
of seven high profile sceptics, each from a different professional background, are analysed in 
depth (Chapter 8) in order to corroborate the evidence presented by the computer assisted 
analysis. It finds that many sceptics are ideologically close to an innovation response to the 
climate problem, which emphasises energy security and technological solutions to the climate 
problem. Sceptics are found to be opposed to a green response, which proposes 
interventionist macro-economic policies aimed at restructuring the prevailing economic 
systems.  The study concludes (Chapter 9) that the sceptic phenomenon is much more 
heterogeneous than generally understood or acknowledged, and that much of the sceptic 
rationale rest on relatively neutral notions of due process and responsible governance. It 
argues that observers need to be mindful of the finer nuances in sceptic thought, how to 
differentiate between entrenched sceptics and the doubtful and agnostic ones, and how to 
frame science and policy communications so that they resonate with sceptics’ unique set of 
worldviews and assumptions. 
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SCEPTICISM ABOUT ANTHROPOGENIC CLIMATE 
DISRUPTION: 
A CONCEPTUAL EXPLORATION 
1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Real crisis – real doubt 
The world is moving towards an unprecedented physical and human crisis. The ever increasing 
addition of greenhouse gases to the atmosphere from human related sources, the most 
prominent of which is carbon dioxide from the burning of fossil fuels, is slowly but relentlessly 
contributing to the heat content of the climate system. This has already led to measurable 
changes in the climate system, with scientific projections showing dramatic impacts on a 
decadal timeframe. Of severe concern is the projected melting of polar and glacial ice and 
consequent sea level rise, as well as the heating of the oceans and consequent impacts on marine 
life and rainfall patterns. The ecosystem impacts of global warming will be accompanied by 
severe economic and human impacts. The climate threat will require both mitigation and 
adaptation measures which could exact severe economic tolls on nations. Human populations 
in poor and low lying areas will be particularly hard hit by the physical changes accompanying 
large scale global warming. This scenario is the essence of the mainstream science based 
climate view (S. K. Allen et al., 2013; IPCC, 2014; National Academy of Sciences, 2009; 
NOAA National Centers for Environmental Information, 2015; Pachauri, Reisinger, & Core 
Writing Team, 2007; Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research, 2007), which will 
henceforth be termed the core anthropogenic climate disruption (ACD) thesis.1 
                                                          
1 A note on terminology: Many of the key concepts in the climate debate are contested and often used 
imprecisely. This study adopts the following terminology: 
a) ‘Climate disruption’ is preferred over the more generic ‘climate change’ and ‘global warming’ 
to avoid the obfuscation that sometimes accompany these labels. The label ‘global warming’ 
does not capture the many non-warming climate responses to increased atmospheric 
concentrations of greenhouse gases, such as increased storm intensities, sea level rise, changed 
rainfall patterns, etc. It “implies something gradual, uniform, and benign”, which is the opposite 
of what is really happening to the climate (Holdren, 2007). The label ‘climate change’ does 
capture the non-warming impacts, but is easily, and conveniently for some, confused with 
natural climate variability. The term ‘disruption’ is chosen because it more accurately describes 
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It is one of the enduring puzzles in the study of human responses to the climate issue that 
despite the ever increasing scientific clarity about the extent, causes and impacts of climate 
change, as well as the apparent scientific consensus about these matters, a small but vocal 
counter-lobby persists and a consistent component of the general population continues to reject 
or doubt the ACD thesis. The observation has been made that scepticism amongst the public 
has remained surprisingly constant over time, despite firmer and more alarming scientific 
evidence about the precarious state of the climate system, despite some moderation in the 
scepticism of fossil fuel corporate players (Jacques, Dunlap, & Freeman, 2008, p. 365; Pooley, 
2010; 2000), and despite a rebalancing in major media reporting that has given greater weight 
to the impending dangers of climate change (Doulton & Brown, 2009, p. 201; Taylor & Nathan, 
2002, p. 329). Virtually no aspect of the climate issue is uncontested, one way or the other, by 
detractors of the mainstream (orthodox) climate thesis. They contest the basic science of ACD, 
the expected impacts of climate change, and the most appropriate policy response. 
This study re-evaluates ACD scepticism and explores the views of elite sceptics in order to 
gain a deeper understanding of the ideas that drive sceptical thinking. The study takes stock of 
                                                          
the multiple, inter-related, severe and uneven impacts that the trend of global warming will 
have on the environment and humans. It has been adopted by some scholars (Holdren, 2007; 
Romm, 2010). Adding the term ‘anthropogenic’ to the label helps to clearly distinguish between 
human induced climate change and natural climate variability. The specific compound 
anthropogenic climate disruption (ACD) has been adopted by Lack (2013, p. viii). 
b) The term ‘mainstream’ refers to the scientific opinion of the IPCC, major national science 
academies and leading climate scientists who are in agreement about the trend, cause and 
impact of climate change. Equivalent terms are ‘establishment’, ‘orthodox’ and ‘consensus’. 
c) The labels ‘scepticism’ and ‘sceptics’ refer to those who remain unconvinced of the core claims 
of the mainstream climate thesis, namely that there is unambiguous evidence of significant 
human impact on the climate through the mechanism of heightened levels of atmospheric 
greenhouse gases that would in a decadal timeframe cause significant natural impacts like sea 
level rise, rising mean surface temperatures, ocean acidification, changes in severe weather 
events, etc. It is not to be confused with the general norm of scientific scepticism – i.e. the 
practice of scholars constantly scrutinising each other’s research; subjecting each other’s work 
to review and criticism. The labels enjoy wide currency in scholarly, media and popular 
discourse, and several prominent writers belonging to the category self-describe as ‘sceptics’ 
(Painter, 2012, p. 196). The study later argues for more nuanced terminology, but use the terms 
from the outset in the interest of familiarity to the reader. 
d) The label ‘sceptic elites’ denotes individuals who have developed and taken public a considered 
position on the climate issue.  They are people of status, by virtue of qualification, profession 
or leadership background, and can be considered the de facto exponents of ACD scepticism. 
They come from diverse backgrounds, including scientists, think-tank analysts, journalists, 
politicians, business leaders, clergy, activists and hobbyists, and they have varying degrees of 
expertise in the field of climate science, as noted later in the description of the sample. The 
category includes both the originators of sceptic critique (individuals with a scientific 
background) and the propagators of sceptic critique (the public advocates). 
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the prevailing characterisation of scepticism and sceptics, and tests this characterisation against 
the sceptic discourse itself. 
This opening chapter now proceeds to spell out the context of the study. First, it reminds readers 
of the complexity of the climate issue and how that very complexity causes confusion and 
disagreement. Second, it registers the way in which sceptics and scepticism have been 
constructed by observers and why these constructions might impede a more nuanced 
understanding of the phenomenon. Third, it states the particular research objectives of the 
study, and finally it outlines the areas where value could be added for observers and climate 
policy practitioners who are concerned with meeting the sceptic challenge. 
1.2 Complex problem – complex reactions 
The climate problem inherently contains characteristics that virtually guarantee polemic and 
contestation. It contains in itself all the complexities, vagaries and contradictions required for 
miscomprehension and misjudgement. The following passage by Weber (2010, p. 332) 
captures how climate complexity and personal experience, judgements and worldviews 
interact, like in a closed loop, to create and sustain uncertainty about the extent and impacts of 
a changing climate: 
Climate change, as a slow and gradual modification of average climate conditions, is a 
difficult phenomenon to detect and track accurately based on personal experience. 
Insufficient concern and trust also complicate the transfer of scientific descriptions of 
climate change and climate variability from scientists to the public, politicians, and policy 
makers, which is not a simple transmission of facts. Instead, worldview and political 
ideology, two elements of the cultural context of decisions, guide attention toward events 
that threaten the desired or existing social order, and shape expectations of change, which 
in turn guide the detection and interpretation of climate events. 
Connor (2010, p. 256) explains that climate change is a process that is almost designed to create 
apathy or scepticism (in that it is not readily perceptible, and has a long time frame of 
occurrence and many distant effects). Renn and Fischhoff  make the same point, pointing to 
the complexity and randomness of the climate system itself: “laypeople have difficulty 
recognizing climate change because of the variability of the systems and the oscillation around 
a long-term trend”; and, “similarly, it is difficult for communicators to provide intuitively 
verifiable evidence about climate change and related impacts” (Renn, 2011, pp. 154-155). The 
threat of climate change is particularly difficult to grasp and prone to uncertainty and 
misunderstanding because often the changes are intangible, and many of the impacts of a 
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changing climate are dispersed and delayed (Anderegg, 2010a, p. 28; Connor, 2010, p. 256). It 
really is a case of where the very nature of the problem mitigates against people reaching sound 
conclusions about the risk. Psychologists have described it as a phenomenon structured in such 
a way that it “bypass(es) our innate capacity to evaluate risk” (Marshall, 2011). 
Policy practitioners and observers have described ACD as a wicked, super-wicked and 
diabolical problem. Nicholas Stern, the author of the UK commissioned Stern report on the 
economic costs of ACD, popularised the notion of the climate as a wicked problem. He argued 
that the climate problem is exceptionally difficult to address because of the interplay between 
the enormous scientific and technical complexities of the issue and, at the same time, its far-
reaching environmental and economic implications (Stern, 2006). Others who have highlighted 
the intrinsic difficulty of responding to ACD include Garnaut (2008, p. xviii), the author of the 
Australian equivalent of the Stern report, who described ACD as a diabolical problem, and 
Hulme (2009b, p. 334) who described it as a problem that “does not lend itself to a solution—
whether to elegant solutions or even clumsy ones”. 
For some observers there is no particular need for the climate issue to be excessively complex 
in order for it to induce controversy and political jostling. Renn (2011) believes “(t)here is 
always room for counter-evidence and scepticism”, which can be exploited by those with an 
interest in thwarting climate mitigation actions. He says such “interested parties can build upon 
this inevitable random component of climate change to deconstruct the claims of the vast 
majority of climate analysts or at least trigger some doubts about the validity of these claims”. 
Pendergraft (1998, p. 644) sees the familiar patterns of value and power conflicts repeated in 
the climate issue: 
Making and implementing environmental policy is often controversial, costly, and 
ineffective because ﬁrst, interests conﬂict: virtually any governmental policy results in 
some dislocation or redistribution of wealth or power. Second, even if a goal is consensual, 
conﬂict can arise from divergent notions of what is real, what is right, and what is equitable. 
Everybody wants a healthy biosphere but how healthy it needs to be and at what cost to 
whom are at the heart of controversy. 
Nevertheless, there is recognition that the climate issue presents unique and particularly 
difficult challenges. Scholars like Levin et al. (2009, 2012), Lazarus (2009) and Conklin (2005) 
propose that whilst many societal problems are very difficult indeed, ACD entails deeper and 
more intractable problems. Building on the theoretical concept of wicked problems (see Rittel 
& Webber, 1973) these scholars claim that ACD has additional layers of complexity, which 
elevates it to the status of  a super wicked problem. Levin et al. (2009, pp. 6-7) add the following 
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additional characteristics of wickedness to the climate problem, all to do with the difficulty of 
designing a response to the problem: 
- time is running out, which means that the longer it takes to respond to the problem, the 
harder it will be alleviate its effects; 
- there is no central authority to make binding decisions that apply to all actors implicated 
in the problem; 
- those who need to solve the problem are also causing it, which implies a serious conflict 
of interest for the major greenhouse gas emitting nations; and 
- policy-makers tend to discount the future impacts and costs of the problem, often under 
the pretence that future impacts and costs are uncertain, and that future generations 
would be better equipped, both technologically and economically, to manage the 
problem. 
Finally, it has to be recognised that managerial deficiencies might have contributed to some of 
the opposition to climate policies and some of the suspicions and misinterpretations of the 
science. Roger Pielke Jr. is one of the leading voices against the way policy-makers chose to 
frame the climate problem, in particular the way that climate science has been used to justify 
certain policies. He believes climate policy suffers from exceptionally narrow scientific 
justification for climate action at both international and national levels (Pielke Jr., 2010a). He 
argues that the scientific focus on the detection of the human element in climate disruption and 
the singling out of one greenhouse gas (CO2) has short-circuited effective policy making 
because the physical science can so easily be misinterpreted and misrepresented. For instance, 
the targets set for emission reductions and atmospheric CO2 concentrations have been 
contested, with some arguing that the science behind the targets is contestable, and that the 
targets are meaningless in the absence of a comprehensive and binding joint global effort. 
Similarly, linking ACD with increased frequency and intensity of extreme weather events has 
been contested, with some arguing that extreme weather events are simply part of an 
unpredictable climatic system. Pielke Jr. argues that the focus on CO2 emissions has deflected 
attention from solutions with both climate and non-climate benefits around which cooperation 
could be more easily achieved, like improved use of land, energy efficiency and development 
of new energy sources.  
Another managerial deficiency that contributed to mistrust of the science stems from the 
conduct of scientists and their advocates. The so-called Climategate exposé vividly illustrated 
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the degree of animosity between mainstream climate scientists and their sceptic rivals. In 
November 2009 more than a 1000 internal emails were stolen from the server of the Climatic 
Research Unit (CRU) at the University of East Anglia in the UK and subsequently released on 
the internet.2 ACD sceptics immediately seized on the opportunity, by highlighting certain 
phrases, to argue that the climate scientists colluded to manipulate climate data and suppress 
criticism of the mainstream thesis in peer-reviewed journals. Probably the most controversial 
email conversation thread related to an email by the Director of the CRU, Prof. Phil Jones, in 
which he wrote to a colleague that he had used a ‘trick’ to ‘hide’ a decline in proxy temperatures 
from tree ring analyses. It was, however, later shown to be merely an unfortunate choice of 
words, and that the ‘trick’ was no more than the accepted practice of scientists to sometimes 
merge different datasets in order to derive a single trend (Foley, Scaroni, & Yekel, 2010). 
Official investigations by the University of East Anglia (Oxburgh et al., 2010; Russell et al., 
2010), The UK House of Commons Science and Technology Committee (UK Parliament 
House of Commons, 2010; UK Parliament House of Commons Science and Technology 
Committee, 2011), the Pennsylvania State University (Assmann, Castleman, Irwin, Jablonski, 
& Vondracek, 2010; Foley et al., 2010) and the US Environmental Protection Agency 
(Environmental Protection Agency, 2010) all found no evidence of scientific misconduct, but 
did point to the scientists’ lack of transparency and uncooperativeness with their critics as 
problematic. 
Reflective analyses of the Climategate saga by scholars emphasised the harm done to the 
mainstream climate cause by the conduct of some of the key mainstream scientists. Lahsen 
(2013) delivers a particularly critical assessment of the conduct of the scientists. She argues 
that the scientists actually helped to amplify the sceptics’ campaigns by not being critical 
enough of each other’s work, and by not conceding the limits or social construction of scientific 
knowledge. She argues for greater transparency and engagement with countervailing scientific 
opinions. In fact, she believes that by moving away from what she calls an idealised notion of 
science (a counterintuitive experience for many empirical scientists), polarisation on the 
climate issue might be reversed: “Critical analyses of the mainstream can thus serve to show 
the strengths of peer-reviewed science and the importance of scientists’ earnest attempts to 
approximate the Mertonian [scientific] ideals” (Lahsen, 2013, pp. 555-556). Bricker (2013) 
comes to the same conclusion. He argues that sceptic critics of ACD were not only motivated 
by their ideological bias when they concluded that Climategate demonstrated scientific 
                                                          
2 For one of the most objective and detailed accounts of the Climategate exposé, see Pearce (2010). 
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malpractice (albeit this was thoroughly refuted in the subsequent commissions of inquiry), but 
that the poor rhetorical response by the accused (the scientists implicated in Climategate) 
reinforced their perceptions. He believes it is vitally important that scientists should not refrain 
from engaging the erroneous and far-fetched claims of ACD sceptics, what he calls a “strategy 
of silence”, but rather engage in “public argument” to ensure the debate is correctly framed 
(Bricker, 2013, p. 234). It is therefore clear that, even from within the ranks of the mainstream, 
there is concern about the practices of some mainstream exponents and that sceptics’ criticisms 
should not be dismissed out of hand. 
This study argues that the multiple layers of complexity and complications as outlined above 
are relevant in any evaluation of what motivates scepticism at the elite level. It is shown later 
in the study that the scepticism of an individual is rarely confined to a single aspect of the 
climate issue. Individuals more typically harbour an array of reservations, some concerned with 
the observational evidence of ACD, some with the conduct of the scientific establishment, and 
some with the proposed responses to the climate problem. A highly textured picture of ACD 
scepticism is thus painted, which is, in no small way, due to the very complexity of the problem. 
Overall, conceptualising ACD as a particularly and necessarily difficult problem encourages a 
more neutral assessment of the countervailing forces and voices in the climate debate. In the 
context of an exceptionally complex problem, it should not be surprising when policy-makers 
encounter stiff opposition to their well-intentioned plans. In such a context it should also not 
be surprising to find alternative interpretations of what climate science is and should be telling 
policy-makers.  Interpreting ACD as a super wicked problem probably militates against grand 
or paradigmatic policy responses, like binding multilateral emission agreements or national 
carbon pricing regimes, and most likely favours policy options that tackle the problem less 
directly and has an evolutionary element to it. I will return to this implication in Chapter 8, 
SEVEN SCEPTICS, where I consider the common denominators between the views of leading 
sceptics and an emerging non-sceptical school of thought that advocates more practical, 
incremental, diversified and local responses to the climate problem. Chapter 9, 
CONCLUSION, reflects on how acceptance of ACD as a super wicked problem might shift 
our approach to dissenting voices, in this case the broad category of ACD sceptics. There is 
room, it is argued, to locate many sceptics and sceptical arguments closer to the mainstream 
position, and to fit some sceptical arguments into a pro-climate action paradigm and narrative.  
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1.3 Constructing an enemy 
The controversy over ACD has generated polarisation and emotion. In the eyes of many 
proponents of ACD, those who harbour doubts and indecisions about the threat of ACD – in 
short, the sceptics – have become public enemies. Given the gravity and apparent urgency of 
the climate problem, those who resist the climate agenda are often portrayed as committing a 
grave offence against their communities, and humanity at large. For many, doubt and 
indecision in these matters is indefensible and unconscionable. For these reasons the sceptics 
have come to represent a distinct category, and an easily recognised one. Observers consider 
them scientific outliers (Boykoff, 2013; Boykoff & Olson, 2013, p. 278), and tend to bundle 
together the mild sceptics, who are doubtful, uncertain or agnostic, and the entrenched sceptics, 
who emphatically and methodically reject or dispute the core ACD claims. 
It is not surprising, therefore, that scepticism and the sceptics have been intensely scrutinised 
over the years with a view to unravelling the puzzle of their dissent. In this endeavour, 
observers have constructed the phenomenon in predominantly two ways. Firstly, sceptics’ 
behaviour has been interpreted as externally instigated and sponsored by the companies and 
captains of the fossil fuel reliant industries, who would like to delay emission reduction 
measures in the interest of protecting their economic niches. Secondly, the sceptics’ behaviour 
has been interpreted as internally motivated by cultural and ideological biases. Both these 
constructions suggest an element of manipulation or obfuscation on the part of sceptics; that 
some ulterior motives might underlie their obstinate resistance to the reality and gravity of the 
climate threat. 
The activities of sceptics in the context of vested economic interests seeking to delay emission 
reduction measures, have been documented by numerous scholars and observers (Gelbspan, 
1997, 1998, 2004; Hamilton, 2006; Hoggan, 2009; Leggett, 2001; Oreskes & Conway, 2010; 
Pooley, 2010). These are stories of the manipulation of scientists, the media, the public and 
policy makers by self-interested corporate players to confuse the public debate about climate 
change and prevent or delay decisive action against climate change. These accounts of the 
climate controversy focus on the agents of scepticism, and how they manage to drive and 
maintain shifts in public opinion. The emphasis on the agency of sceptics inevitably creates the 
impression that scepticism has very little to do with the science of climate change and 
everything to do with the agendas of fossil fuel corporates and conservative elites. According 
to this narrative, scepticism is contrived - a deliberate and orchestrated campaign by sceptics 
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and their sponsors to further their particular agendas. Many scholars and observers rely on this 
narrative to explain the obstinacy of presumably intelligent people. 
In relation to the ideas (ideologies and worldviews) responsible for scepticism, scholars have 
detected a distinct anti-environmentalist and conservative bent in sceptic thought and tactics. 
Hamilton (2010a, 2010b), Jacques et al. (2009; 2008), McCright and Dunlap (2011; 2010), 
Oreskes (2010) and numerous others argue that the fight over the climate issue has become a 
proxy for a deeper ideological contest between progressives and conservatives, or, to put it in 
environmentalist terms, between those in favour of a new human-nature contract and those 
defending the old. Some accounts trace the origins of anti-environmentalism and ACD 
scepticism back to the end of the Cold War and the Bush administration (Luke, 2000). It is 
argued that conservatives saw environmentalism as the great new threat to their worldview of 
“progress and mastery over nature” (Hamilton, 2010a, p. 100). Jacques argues that deep 
anthropocentric values drive conservatives to defend the dominant social paradigm – modernity 
more generally. Their values predicate a human/non-human dichotomy which is threatened by 
the emergent environmentalist ethic that accords intrinsic value to physical nature and 
propounds unity in the human-physical nature project. “Contemporary conservatives”, in 
Jacques’ terminology, are thus marshalling “environmental scepticism” to function as a 
“rearguard” to their cherished values. In the Jacques view, “environmental scepticism” is a 
significant threat to efforts to achieve the sustainability of human societies (Jacques, 2006). 
Hamilton argues that “the strong association between political ideology and beliefs is a 
peculiarly American phenomenon”, but has “spilled over” into Australia, where “scepticism is 
also strong and (is) promoted by a number of conservative think tanks” (Hamilton, 2010a, p. 
111).  
A values/worldview/ideology connection with scepticism has also been proposed from other 
theoretical perspectives. In this treatment of the phenomenon values/worldviews/ideologies act 
as primordial schemas that shape climate views, thus underpinning the relative durability and 
stability of the sceptic phenomenon. The implication in this view is that scepticism results 
organically from cognitive and social processes, affording it a more neutral status. A popular 
framework in this vein is the so-called grid-group Cultural Theory3, which postulates a cultural 
map consisting of four core cultural rationalities. These rationalities can be used to identify, 
                                                          
3 The label Cultural Theory (capitalised) refers here to the theory of culture pioneered by inter alia 
Mary Douglas, Aaron Wildavsky, Michael Thompson and Richard Ellis. The so-called grid-group 
cultural map is the central analytical device in Cultural Theory. See p.30 for a discussion of the theory. 
10 
 
describe and explain the diversity of positions taken by people on complex and controversial 
social questions (Hood, 2000, p. 7), including the climate issue (see Thompson, 2003; 
Thompson, Rayner, & Ney, 1998; Verweij, 2001). Grid-group Cultural Theorists claim that 
ACC scepticism is a defence of what it calls an individualist rationality, which states that 
humans pursue progress and prosperity through ingenuity, resilience and mastery of nature 
(Connor, 2010, p. 254). Sceptics, therefore, have an underlying interest in defending the free-
market economic system, or preserving “business-as-usual” (Verweij et al., 2006, pp. 826-827). 
From the anthropological vantage point, conflicting cultural worldviews are the invisible hands 
that guide debates over public issues (Kahan & Braman, 2006, p. 155, emphasis added). The 
climate controversy is, therefore, another arena for the “enduring clash between policy actors 
adhering to alternative ways of life” (Verweij et al., 2006, p. 225). Hoffman makes a similar 
point: “We must acknowledge that the debate over climate change, like almost all 
environmental issues, is a debate over culture, worldviews, and ideology” (Hoffman, 2012, p. 
32). Sceptics and other opponents of active climate intervention policies are typically guided 
by their individualist worldview inclinations. 
1.4 A fresh look 
These constructions of the sceptic phenomenon have come to dominate interpretations of 
scepticism and the activities of sceptics (described in detail in Chapter 2, THE SCHOLARLY 
CONSTRUCTION OF ACD SCEPTICISM). My argument is that there is cause for a fresh 
look at scepticism, particularly at the elite level. The reach and compass of sceptics’ 
worldviews and their material motivations should not be uncritically accepted or assumed.  
The first concern about the characterisation of elite sceptics relates to the presumed meaning 
of ACD scepticism, and who can be classified as sceptics. Scholars and observers generally 
have an inclusive definition of scepticism and sceptics when they reflect on the phenomenon. 
Many see scepticism as both the categorical rejection of the main claims of climate science and 
doubt about the claims. In addition, scepticism about any core claim of the mainstream science, 
and any criticism of the institutional or procedural environment of the scientific establishment 
are often lumped in the same category. Overall, it is argued here, diversity amongst sceptics 
has not been adequately investigated. Scepticism is a very broad analytic category with, at 
times, different meanings attached to it. There are many and diverse entry points for 
disagreement about aspects of the science and about society’s response to the issue. For 
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instance, disagreement about the science of climate change can occur at any of three levels, 
namely trend evidence, attribution evidence, and impact evidence. Depending on which 
aspect(s) of the science sceptics attack, there can be huge variation in the beliefs and intensity 
of belief between respective sceptics. For instance, a person who is sceptical about the expected 
impacts of climate change may accept that humans do contribute to global warming through 
their CO2 emissions. This position is diametrically opposed to the extreme sceptical view that 
greenhouse gas emissions from humans has no or negligible impact on the climate. Both are 
sceptics, yet they disagree about a fundamental aspect of the science. Another complicating 
factor is that people may not have a clear opinion about the science, but nevertheless feel wary 
about some mainstream claims and/or the personalities driving the mainstream view. Such 
people are empathetic to the sceptic position and the main sceptic proponents. Thus the 
category of scepticism encompasses a wide range and variety in viewpoints and orientations. 
It is worth mentioning that sceptics are found in a variety of institutional locations, and many 
don’t interact with each other. They are drawn from a wide range of social and professional 
groups (e.g. academics, politicians, journalists, political and economic analysts, lobbyists, 
business executives, small business owners, farmers, professionals, hobbyists/retirees, etc.) and 
individuals from these groups are not all politically active or dedicating themselves to the 
sceptic cause. For many, their sceptical contributions to the debate simply represent reflective 
and critical citizen engagement in an open and free society. The sceptics with a climate science 
background see themselves as part of the scientific community, doing what is expected of them, 
namely to question and critique the analysis of their peers. 
A small number of sceptics do maintain a limited network, such as in the context of the series 
of US based Heartland Institute conferences on climate change, the next of which is scheduled 
for June 2015. For the most, however, the examples of sceptics cooperating and coordinating 
their activities are confined to the occasional media appearance, rally (like during an election 
campaign) or speaking tour (like the Australian tours of Christopher Monckton). In the 
Australian context, the two sceptic initiatives that purport to unite sceptics, the Australian 
Climate Science Coalition and the Carbon Sense Coalition, have no links or relationship with 
either the influential Institute of Public Affairs, or the number of small groups supporting the 
sceptic cause, like the Australian TEA party, the Australian Libertarian Society, the Australian 
Patriots Defence Movement and the Australian Defence League. There is, therefore, cause to 
reflect on what the category means and how it is variegated. Chapter 3, A CONCEPTUAL RE-
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EVALUATION OF THE CATEGORY, re-examines the prevailing conceptualisation of the 
category, and proposes novel taxonomies to capture the extant variety within the category. 
There is also cause to review elite scepticism considering the adversarial implication of the 
prevailing narrative. Many observers consider scepticism a deliberately manufactured artefact 
of an ideologically driven battle (to defend conservative/anti-environmentalist/free market 
values). In this scheme, scepticism is cynically and tactically cultivated and deployed in support 
of an ideological agenda. The ACD dispute is thus viewed as a proxy for a more fundamental 
struggle over the way in which society should be ordered. The adversaries are the 
anthropocentrists defending the dominant social paradigm (consumerism, economic growth, 
free markets, individualism, limited government) versus environmentalists/ecocentrists 
fighting for a new social paradigm (human/nature harmony, environmentalism, sustainable 
development, limited growth, social equity). In this view sceptics are easily thought of as a 
singular group with a fairly singular ideological agenda, which might too simplistic. Chapter 
5, CULTURAL MARKERS, and Chapter 6, DISCOURSE MAP, reflect on whether the 
material/economic and ideological/cultural constructions might mask the extent to which more 
mundane considerations actually underlie the daily cut and thrust of the debate. Valid as the 
ideological and material explanations might be, it is important not to negate alternative 
motivations of scepticism at the elite level. Could it be that a good number of sceptics are self-
reflective enough not to allow their ideological and material interests to cloud their reading of 
the science? Could it be that they might be genuinely concerned about the quality of the science 
and would be open to the mainstream climate thesis if the evidence became stronger? Could it 
be that a good number of sceptics became distrustful of mainstream climate science primarily 
because of the way the science has been framed and the way the scientists and their advocates 
have conducted themselves? These are vital questions if we are to accurately and fairly 
characterise sceptics and adjudicate on their intentions. 
Another area for deeper analysis of the sceptic phenomenon relates to the possible biasing 
effects that sceptics might (or might not) experience from their values/worldviews. Empirical 
research has established the relative cultural and value homogeneity of lay sceptics. It is then 
conjectured that sceptic elites would be, like laypersons, subject to the same cultural biases and 
psychological defence mechanisms that predispose them to resist the claims of mainstream 
climate science and its implied policy imperatives. Yet, there is no empirical evidence at the 
sceptic elite level that would confirm this. On the contrary, there is reason to suspect that the 
layperson is more likely to simply follow, often intuitively, the opinions of their trusted public 
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personalities. Marshall (2009) points out that “having neither the time nor skills to weigh up 
each piece of evidence” the lay person “fall(s) back on decision-making shortcuts formed by 
our education, politics and class”. The intellectual, in contrast, would be expected to carefully 
consider their arguments and to guard against biases. Many sceptics display this reflective 
capacity and insist that their counter-arguments are scientifically justified. Many have also 
stated openly that they would change their positions if more conclusive evidence, in their 
estimation, came to light that would dispel their doubts and concerns. Sceptic elites are 
evidently educated, and presumably comprise self-reflective and independently minded 
individuals. If not, they would hardly have stood up against conventional wisdom in the public 
square. Quite simply, scepticism is differently constructed at the elite and lay levels. There are, 
it is argued here, legitimate unanswered questions about the diverse motivations of a range of 
elite sceptics. This study touches on these questions in Chapter 5, CULTURAL MARKERS, 
which examines the types of worldviews/values in the sceptic discourse, and Chapter 6, 
DISCOURSE MAP, which examines the sceptic discourse for the presence of other, non-
ideological, drivers of scepticism. 
A final concern about the characterisation of sceptics centres on their climate policy 
preferences. Scholars and observers read the close association between certain high profile 
sceptics, and certain groups and organisations opposed to climate mitigation policies as 
implying a unity of purpose that logically extends to all sceptics. However, the fact that some 
sceptics are visibly connected to campaigns, groups and organisations opposed to climate 
policies does not imply all sceptics share their agenda. Recognition that sceptics in fact consist 
of many different types and intensities of scepticism raises a legitimate question about their 
presumed unity of purpose in opposing progressive climate responses. Indeed, sceptics often 
use their reservations about the main claims of mainstream climate science as justification for 
opposing proposed and existing climate policies. Yet, many also object to the style and 
processes of policy decision-making, sometimes exclusively so. In addition, climate policy 
disputes transcend the sceptic/non-sceptic frame. Many sceptics find themselves attracted to 
what has been called the innovation agenda, i.e. players who want to address the climate 
problem by focusing on energy security and technological solutions. Ideologically, sceptics 
stand much closer to the innovation network than the so-called Green network, which wants to 
macro manage national and global economies towards low carbon consumption and production 
behaviours through carbon emission pricing mechanisms. These nuances in the climate policy 
arena suggest that sceptics’ opposition to climate policies might be more complex than 
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generally recognised. This study reflects on the variety of sceptics’ policy views in Chapter 7, 
POLICY MARKERS, and Chapter 8, SEVEN SCEPTICS. 
1.5 Research questions 
This study re-examines the elite sceptic discourse in a grounded fashion in order to test the 
general characterisation of sceptics and to expose, where warranted, nuances in sceptic 
persuasions that have hitherto been unrecognised or neglected. The study does not dispute 
malfeasance on the part of some elite sceptics, but questions the tendency to extend this 
characterisation to a broad range of sceptics. The Australian elite sceptic cohort is the subject 
of this investigation, with a view to testing the general construction of elite scepticism.  
Four research questions guide this research, each aimed at identifying and describing 
heterogeneity in a unique dimension of the phenomenon (sceptic beliefs, concept/semantic use, 
cultural orientation and policy position). The research could be described, by way of analogy, 
as a mapping exercise, where each research question zooms in on a unique locale of scepticism 
and aims to plot the relative positions of sub-groups and individuals within that locale.  
RQ1: Belief locale: How can ACD scepticism be conceptually demarcated? 
Subsidiary questions: What does the broad category ‘scepticism’ mean? What classes and 
centres of belief can be distinguished in the broad category? How can sceptic beliefs be 
variegated according to the intensity with which they are held? 
RQ2: Cultural locale: What worldviews/ideologies are evidenced in the sceptic discourse? 
Subsidiary questions: What cultural worldviews are espoused in elite sceptic discourse? What 
assumptions do sceptics hold about human nature and physical nature? Are sceptics unified in 
their worldview orientations? 
RQ3: Concept/semantic locale: What are the semantic and conceptual features of the 
sceptic discourse? 
Subsidiary questions: What is the semantic/conceptual range of elite sceptic discourse? What 
themes dominate the discourse? 
RQ4: Policy locale: What policy views are evidenced in the sceptic discourse? 
Subsidiary questions: What substantive policy preferences are expressed by elite sceptics? Are 
elite sceptics fixed in their policy views or are there pragmatic tendencies amongst them? 
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To answer these questions, this research evaluates existing scholarly work and investigates the 
written discourses of elite Australian sceptics over a six year period. It follows a textual 
approach and makes use of computer assisted textual analysis tools. (The research design and 
analytical tools are discussed in the Chapter 3, METHOD.) 
1.6 Contribution of the research 
The research reported here has both analytical and instrumental benefits. At the analytical level, 
the study extends existing scholarship on the sceptic phenomenon to elite sceptics. Very limited 
research is available on the argumentative logics of the elite sceptics. An impromptu search on 
Google Scholar with the keywords ‘climate change’ and ‘scepticism’ reveals that 15 of the first 
20 hits are articles related to the manifestation of scepticism in the public mind, its reportage 
in the media or the reasons for the persistence of scepticism, and none related to analysis of 
elite sceptics’ views or the scepticism-policy nexus. As far as is known, this study is unique in 
its systematic and detailed investigation of a substantive sample of texts from elite sceptics 
with a view to deconstructing their climate rationalities. The sceptics investigated here span a 
comprehensive range of occupational backgrounds and types and intensities of scepticism.  
A further analytical benefit derives from the critical nature of study. The study queries some 
received wisdoms about ACD scepticism, in particular the general characterisation of elite 
sceptics as contriving a climate controversy in service of their particular ideological and 
material self-interests. Many scholars view the scepticism of elites as an artefact of material, 
political and ideological forces, and that the evidence dispute is a mere smokescreen for these 
forces to play out (see Gelbspan, 2004; Hamilton, 2006; Hoggan, 2009; Leggett, 2001; 
McCright & Dunlap, 2010; Oreskes & Conway, 2010; Pooley, 2010). The story of climate 
change scepticism is one of self-interest and manipulation, of how a scientific controversy was 
fabricated to confuse the public and decision makers, and delay decisive action against climate 
change. The logic in this storyline is that sceptics are actually defending, knowingly and 
unknowingly, vested economic interests (those with a stake in the continuation of a fossil fuel 
based energy economy) and the prevailing neo-liberal free-market paradigm (which includes 
the notions of individual freedom, small government and economic growth). While such 
observations about climate change scepticism and sceptics may be justified in some cases, they 
have come at a cost. Sceptic elites of various persuasions and motivations have come to be 
understood as disingenuous. Engagement of sceptics has become clichéd – married to the idea 
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that there simply must be extraneous reasons for someone to doubt the mainstream climate 
view.  
An interesting duality often emerges from the literature, whereby sceptical lay-people or the 
general public are conceived as being captive to ideological and value structures, as having 
limited agency over their cognitive and social processes, as being unable to negotiate a 
complex, intangible phenomenon like ACD, and as susceptible to manipulation, whilst 
sceptical elites are judged more harshly. The study queries the manipulator-manipulated 
storyline and critically wonders why the lay sceptic is afforded the benefit of a socio-
psychological or cognitive excuse but the sceptic opinion leader not? Perhaps the collective 
scholarship has overestimated the unity of purpose and contrived aspect of elite scepticism? 
Questions like these could only begin to be answered after one has grappled with the full 
complexity and heterogeneity of the sceptic phenomenon. No attempt is made here to develop 
new theory that could explain sceptic behaviour. Instead, the limits of existing theory are 
explored. 
The research will bring more conceptual clarity to the category ACD scepticism. The category 
sceptic or scepticism is so inclusive that it hardly describes any tangible social grouping. The 
category is particularly elusive because it does not group individuals and views on the basis of 
a shared set of beliefs, but rather on the basis of opposition, for any number of reasons, to 
prevailing wisdoms and practices around the climate issue. Almost everyone who has 
expressed unease with some of the scientific evidence or with some aspect of the processes 
followed by the scientific establishment has been labelled sceptical. 
The argument here is that a broad-brush treatment of scepticism and sceptics can lead to 
misinterpretation of sceptics’ critiques. Sceptics very rarely confine their critiques to the 
physical evidence of climate change. They often, and expectedly so, extend their arguments to 
all sorts of climate related topics, such as the bureaucratic and political contexts of the scientific 
enquiry, the advocacy undertaken by mainstream proponents, and the decision-making 
processes around climate policy. The dilemma is that although sceptics’ extended arguments 
are commensurate with their readings of the science, they are not the only proprietors of these 
arguments. Many non-sceptics, particularly amongst right-wing partisans but not exclusively 
so, are equally concerned about perceived detrimental influences on climate knowledge 
production processes and/or climate policy decision-making. It is important, therefore, to place 
the respective types of sceptic critiques into proper perspective. 
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The category ACD scepticism is also somewhat meaningless from the perspective of the 
sceptics themselves. They resist classification as a group purely on the basis of sharing a critical 
stance to mainstream climate science. Some continue to see themselves as part of the 
mainstream, merely sounding caution about the findings and practices of colleagues, whilst 
many of those who perceive themselves as marginalised prefer to think of themselves as lone 
voices, rather than part of a community of likeminded dissidents.  
A major danger with the prevailing public and scholarly narrative about ACD scepticism is that 
it might feed stereotypical perceptions of the phenomenon, and over-simplify it as an us-vs-
them conflict. Most mainstream adherents view the sceptic challenge as a grave threat to the 
credibility of climate science because it is perceived to undermine the science, rather than 
enhancing it. There is a strong school of thought amongst mainstream proponents that sceptics 
should be starved of public exposure so that they are not able to mislead the public about the 
reliability of the scientific evidence. The problem with this kind of approach is that sceptics 
invert the charges against them to argue that the scientific community has closed ranks, and 
that the scientific processes are no longer transparent and open to scrutiny. There is a need, 
therefore, to consider if and how sceptics’ critiques might be used constructively to 
demonstrate rigour and due process in climate science. 
The tendency amongst exponents on both sides to draw stark battle lines between what they 
perceive as credible experts and fraudsters, sound science and junk science, and respectable 
scientific establishments and pseudo-scientific lobbies, is problematic. Robust debate is 
important to clear the scientific air, but when the debate is viewed as a battle between right and 
wrong, between competent and incompetent, and between reputable and disreputable, the 
opposing side is reduced to a one-dimensional stereotype. 
A consequence of a more nuanced/refined understanding of ACD scepticism is that it might 
facilitate calm, respectful and thoughtful debate. Important insights to carry into any 
engagement with sceptics would be that they are not all the same, and that they draw on 
legitimate cultural capital. Such a treatment of the sceptic phenomenon would help observers 
and political practitioners to recognise that even if sceptic positions might appear irrational and 
irresponsible, they are not necessarily duplicitous or cynical. From this view ACD scepticism 
is neither unexpected nor abnormal – no different to any other domain of social life in that it 
reflects the fundamental conflict between people adhering to “primary ways of organising, 
perceiving and justifying social relations” (Verweij et al., 2006, p. 819). And even when faced 
with vitriolic sceptical opponents who remain entrenched in their views, an informed and 
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respectful response would be more likely to command the respect of the audience and hopefully 
encourage reciprocal respect in the long run. This study is, therefore, exploring the potential 
for a limited and qualified de-pathologising of ACD scepticism in order to help depolarise the 
national debate and facilitate more inclusive engagements with sceptics at various levels. 
An important instrumental benefit that could flow from a more nuanced/refined understanding 
of ACD scepticism at the elite level is that it might help others to devise effective climate 
communication strategies. Elite sceptics are a small group, but they speak for a significant part 
of the population. Their views have public traction because it resonates with the cherished 
values and worldviews of some members of the public. Intimate knowledge of the concepts 
and arguments that elite sceptics employ, their motivating logics, and their preferences, might 
give communicators the necessary tools to better connect with the public constituency for 
which the sceptical elites speak. Sceptic arguments should not be left unchallenged, and a deep 
understanding of sceptics’ core assumptions and argumentative logics would help mainstream 
analysts to prepare effective counter arguments. 
1.7 Outline of the study 
Chapter 2, THE SCHOLARLY CONSTRUCTION OF ACD SCEPTICISM, takes stock of the 
existing literature on ACD scepticism and how the phenomenon has been constructed. It also 
records emergent constructions that point to a more neutral interpretation of the phenomenon. 
Chapter 3, A CONCEPTUAL RE-EVALUATION OF THE CATEGORY, reviews existing 
scholarship on the ways in which the category can be disaggregated. The chapter proposes 
novel taxonomies to more precisely capture the extant variety in the category. Chapter 4, 
METHOD, provides the rationale for the grounded textual analysis undertaken in subsequent 
chapters. It describes the method of computer aided textual analysis employed by the 
proprietary software Leximancer. The technical difficulties and requirements of machine 
generated data are outlined in the chapter. With the aid of data generated by Leximancer, 
Chapter 5, CULTURAL MARKERS, examines the types of worldviews/values in the sceptic 
discourse, Chapter 6, DISCOURSE MAP, examines the range of concepts in the sceptic 
discourse. Chapter 7, POLICY MARKERS, and Chapter 8, SEVEN SCEPTICS, examine the 
range of sceptic views on existing and potential climate policies. A short summary of the 
findings and reflection on their significance follow in Chapter 9, CONCLUSION. 
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Most of the research reported in this study has either been published as peer-reviewed articles 
or is currently being reviewed for publication. Chapters 4, 5 and 7 are substantively based on 
three published articles (Van Rensburg, 2012, 2013, 2015), whilst chapters 3 and 6 draw on 
articles currently under peer review. Much of the original organisation and styling of the 
respective articles are preserved in these chapters in the interest of readability and to preserve 
the self-contained nature of the arguments. Some minor duplication occurs between the 
introduction and literature review in Chapters 1 and 2 of this study, and the cognate sections of 
the article based chapters, since the contexts and objectives of the research are the same. 
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2 THE SCHOLARLY CONSTRUCTION OF ACD SCEPTICISM  
2.1 Introduction 
Scholarly literature on scepticism about anthropogenic climate disruption (ACD) takes a 
critical view of the phenomenon. It is overwhelmingly constructed as an aberrant position. 
Scholars generally view the mainstream climate thesis as indisputable and seek explanations 
for why some people fail to see or acknowledge its patent truth. The literature shows three 
strands of explanation, which could be broadly classed as political, social and intra-personal.  
1) The political explanation centres on the actions of the individuals and organisations 
that are in some sense understood to be politically motivated. This explanation 
constructs ACD scepticism as a deliberate misrepresentation of climate science 
(contrived scepticism) for the purpose of political, economic or personal gain. 
2) The social explanation untangles the raft of cultural dispositions, ideologies, 
worldviews and social affinities that subconsciously distort people’s judgement 
about the reliability of climate science, its communicators, and the perceived 
dangers of unmitigated global warming. 
3) The intra-personal explanation focuses on the cognitive barriers to accepting 
mainstream climate science.  
These explanations are generally understood to be mutually supportive and reinforcing. 
Scholars describe a mesh of influences that contribute to people’s opinions about the climate 
and human impacts on it. For Weber (2010, p. 332), psychological, cultural, social, political 
and environmental influences come together to shape people’s perceptions and actions in 
relation to the climate issue. Dessai et al. (2004) refer to multidimensional and complex 
“psychological, social, moral, institutional and cultural processes” that influence people’s 
perceptions of the climate, and Bell (1994, p. 38) conceptualises the influence of mental scripts 
and fixed frameworks on people’s interpretation of climate change risks. Importantly, scholars 
are very critical of the agents of ACD scepticism, i.e. those who actively voice and promote 
the ACD sceptic position. It is widely assumed in the literature that the public interventions of 
prominent sceptics is a serious complicating factor, and that their actions feed the latent 
political, social and intrapersonal influences that impede the general public’s acceptance of 
mainstream climate science. 
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One way of making sense of the many influences contributing to ACD scepticism is to 
distinguish between what could be called push and pull influences. Push influences are 
antecedent (often latent) to scepticism, while pull influences occur incidentally, 
opportunistically and sometimes more visibly. The push influences are the ideologies, 
worldviews and values that bias people in favour of or against one or the other reading of the 
science or policy options, as well as the psychological biases and cognitive heuristics that 
mediate and reshape people’s acceptance and interpretation of climate science. The ideological 
and psychological biases are understood to reinforce each other in the case of ACD scepticism. 
The pull influences include events and actions that propel controversy at given points in time, 
like the active efforts of individuals and organisations to promote doubt about the science and 
campaigns against climate mitigation policies. Other pull influences have been sensationalist 
media reporting, at times, of a perceived scientific dispute; turn events like the so-called 
Climategate email revelations; the global financial crisis, which displaced the priority accorded 
to climate issues for a time; and extreme weather events like extreme droughts, heatwaves, 
major floods, hurricanes, or exceptional heavy snowfalls. 
The push influences account for the constancy of the phenomenon over time. It is remarkable 
how scepticism has persisted over time, despite the fact that scientific conclusions about the 
underlying causes of climate change, empirical observations about climate change trends, and 
prognoses about future climates have been consistent, and have been expressed with increasing 
certainty and alarm in consecutive major scientific reports. Scholars believe that this constant 
scepticism can be explained if scepticism is understood as arising from stable and deep-seated 
personal values and beliefs. In the words of Pendergraft (1998, p. 645): 
When actors share a particular deﬁnition of reality, or cosmology, and seek a way of life 
consistent with that view, they are predisposed toward particular deﬁnitions of threats and 
how to react to them. Ways of adapting to exogenous change are guided and biased by 
worldviews. 
In this understanding, sceptics are predisposed to questioning mainstream climate science 
because it challenges their worldview and values. Sceptics would, typically, filter and interpret 
incoming scientific information in such a way as to support their pre-existing value and belief 
systems (Bell, 1994, p. 38; Leiserowitz, 2005). 
The pull influences stem from political and economic actors who act upon the perceived threat 
to their interests posed by the broad coalition supporting climate mitigation actions. These 
actors have exploited the underlying ideological fault lines to build support for a counter 
climate narrative, and thus thwart pro-active climate actions. In particular, individuals and 
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organisations associated with fossil fuel exposed industries and businesses are singled out in 
the literature as key drivers in maintaining a controversy about the climate issue. Much 
scholarly effort has gone into exposing the distractive and at times manipulative actions of 
sceptic scientists, front groups and think tanks acting with the support fossil fuel dependent 
corporations (Gelbspan, 2004; Hamilton, 2010a; Hoggan, 2009; Oreskes & Conway, 2010). 
The fossil fuel lobby theory still carries much weight in scholarly and popular literature, 
although it has become clear that delays in pro-active policy making is not dependent on 
corporate instigation. In recent times fossil fuel interests have retreated somewhat from their 
early strong involvement in the issue, and media reporting of perceived controversy has waned. 
This chapter provides a detailed overview of the main scholarly approaches to ACD scepticism, 
with an emphasis on the push influences that help sustain ACD scepticism. The theories related 
to such influences are central to the overarching research question of this study, namely what 
concepts and logics are driving ACD scepticism at the elite level? If one is to critically evaluate 
the motivational logics of elite sceptics, it is necessary to take account of the range of push 
influences that contribute to ACD scepticism. 
The first theoretical lens discussed is the ideological understanding of ACD scepticism, if only 
because it is the most frequently cited explanation of the phenomenon in public commentaries. 
The ideological lens encompasses explanations that focus on anti-environmentalism as an 
ideological driver that is linked organisationally to a political counter-movement. 
Subsequently, the cultural explanation is discussed, with specific reference to the theory of 
socio-cultural viability. This theory has been applied very specifically to ACD scepticism and 
is referenced repeatedly by scholars in works related to the phenomenon. The theory of social 
amplification and attenuation of risk is also briefly outlined because it provides a powerful 
explanation of how culturally derived predispositions achieve such carriage in public life. Next, 
the psychological perspectives on ACD scepticism are outlined. These help explain how 
individuals come to accept and sustain counter-factual information. The chapter then provides 
an account of how scholars integrate their theoretical understandings of ACD scepticism with 
their interpretation of the activities and campaigns of sceptics. Scholars often construct ACD 
scepticism at the elite level as a contrived phenomenon where individuals and fossil fuel related 
corporate interests are deliberately manufacturing doubt about ACD. This account is important 
because the arguments and logics of elite sceptics that are detailed in this study need to be 
critically measured against scholars’ construction of deceit and manipulation by sceptics. Next, 
the view that scepticism displays psychologically pathological behaviour is registered. This 
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view reinforces the frequent characterisation of scepticism as an aberration. Finally the chapter 
registers the contributions by scholars who provide a more charitable insight into ACD 
scepticism and question the accuracy not only of the aberrant view of ACD scepticism, but also 
the wisdom of an adversarial stance towards sceptics and their views. The chapter concludes 
with a reflection on tensions and weaknesses in the existing scholarly literature and how the 
study attempts to complement and extend the literature. 
2.2 Ideological lens 
2.2.1 Political conservatism 
Political conservatism offers a way of thinking and looking at the world that is very conducive 
to sceptical thinking about climate science. Müller (2006) proposes four dimensions of political 
conservatism, each of which can be shown to support a sceptical attitude towards the climate 
issue. Firstly, the sociological dimension posits that conservatives tend to protect the existing 
social order. The threat of climate change seriously challenges the existing order in that it 
questions the viability of the consumerist lifestyle and the capitalist drive for perpetual growth 
and accumulation of wealth.  The second dimension, methodological, posits that conservatives 
favour evolutionary change that works “with what is already there”. In contrast, many 
exponents of the climate threat argue for a radical and quick economic transformation to reduce 
fossil fuel dependence, which is anathema to the conservative mindset of careful, considered 
change. The third dimension, the dispositional, posits that conservatives favour the familiar, 
the tried, the near and the actual over the unknown, the experimental, the distant and the ideal. 
Meeting the threat of climate change is, most likely, going to require unfamiliar and untried 
measures that would only prove their benefits in the future. The fourth dimension, the 
philosophical, posits that conservatives are committed to realising a substantive set of values 
centred on the idea that hierarchy and inequality are natural and necessary qualities of social 
life. These ideas are directly challenged by some aspects of the climate crisis. For many, the 
climate problem is the manifestation of inherent failures, imbalances and injustices in the 
prevailing economic and social order. Many environmentalists, in their campaigning around 
the climate issue, argue that the only way forward is to place humankind in a new and better 
relationship with nature and with one another. Taxing the over-consuming wealthy minority 
and resourcing the poor to meet climate threats are familiar environmentalist themes that stand 
in direct contrast to the conservative values of individual reward, merit, growth and continuity. 
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Dryzek (1997) conceptualises society’s response to ecological issues as competing discourses 
that range from the radical left to extreme conservatism. The dominant discourse in his 
taxonomy is the so-called Promethean discourse, which is premised on the idea that earth’s 
resources are unlimited in the sense that they can be endlessly recycled and put to new uses, 
and that the production of goods and services can continue indefinitely. In managing the 
ecological problems that inevitably occur as a result of the Promethean dream, Dryzek proposes 
four response discourses that range from so-called Green radicalism to the very moderate (in 
terms of its deviation from the status quo) Environmental problem solving discourse. Howes 
(2005) associates ACD scepticism with the Promethean discourse, which underpins a 
conservative neo-liberal ideological orientation. 
Bulkeley (2000) also maps the climate debate terrain as a left-right discourse contest. She 
aggregates the competing discourses into two: a resource-based discourse coalition vs a 
greenhouse action discourse coalition. Those with an interest in preserving the status quo would 
fit in the resource-based coalition. She is careful, however, to point out that these discourse 
coalitions are not purely based on competing worldviews, but are highly contingent on the 
political circumstances at any given point in time. For instance, in the Australian context she 
showed (Bulkeley, 2001) how it was possible in the late 1990’s and early 2000’s for the 
resource-based discourse coalition to adopt a more environmentally friendly position through 
a process of discursive policy learning. For a time it seemed that a ‘no-regrets’ policy approach, 
where mitigation measures were seen to bring economic as well as social and environmental 
benefits, might move the discourse coalitions towards greater consensus on the climate issue. 
The fact that it did not is probably testimony to how deep-seated and enduring the ideological 
drivers of people’s beliefs about ACD are. 
The implications of an economistic approach to dealing with the climate issue quickly reveals 
the fault lines along which ideological schisms were bound to emerge. In his pioneering 
economic analysis of the climate issue, economist Nicholas Stern (2006) defines the climate 
problem as a negative externality of massive proportions, as a prime example of market failure. 
In economic parlance, a negative externality occurs when the economic actions of one party 
imposes a cost on another without the other choosing that cost or being part of generating that 
cost (as in the classical air pollution example). An economic system that does not account for 
negative externalities in the pricing of goods and services is inherently unbalanced, and because 
the prices of goods and services do not accurately reflect their full cost, such an economy would 
be inefficient in allocating its resources. The climate problem displays all the features of a 
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negative externality, but at a level of complexity and scale not seen before. The remedies of a 
negative externality are the same, however, regardless of the size of the problem. Stern outlines 
the three core remedies as follows: 
- taxation (discouraging emissions through imposing the full social cost of the emissions 
on the emitters); 
- regulation (restricting the volumes of emissions through limits, targets and bans); and 
- assigning property rights (creating a market for emissions where net emitters have to 
buy emission credits, and net emission savers can sell such credits). 
The first ideological problem of seeing the climate problem as a negative externality, is that it 
assumes market failure. It therefore challenges the conservative notion that there are sound 
reasons for the relative success of the existing order and that tampering with these should not 
be undertaken light-heartedly. More importantly, the response modalities implied by a negative 
externality involves large scale economic restructuring that can only be accomplished with 
increased levels of government authorisation and control. This invokes the spectres of 
redistribution of wealth, large and intrusive government, and interference with individual 
freedom, all of which conservatives would consider anathema to excellence and progress. 
The conflict between conservatives’ commitment to the status quo and a particular mode of 
change, and the scientific evidence that current economic practises (embodied in high 
emissions from fossil fuel intensive production processes that feed the demands of rampant 
economic growth) are causing the climate crisis and must be drastically and urgently 
transformed, stands at the centre of social scientists efforts to understand humankind’s inability 
to effectively respond to one of the greatest existential threats it has ever had to deal with.  
There is wide consensus that individuals’ ideological/worldview orientations bias their 
perceptions of possible threats to their values. Many scholars have made contributions in this 
area, with system justification theory as perhaps one of the leading explanations. For example, 
Feygina et al. (2010) found that those who favour the prevailing system tend to be more 
sceptical of or downplay environmental threats, and are less committed to pro-environmental 
action. Kahan (2012) proposes that people are subconsciously trying to fit their understandings 
and knowledge to their preferred goals, which means, in the case of climate science, that they 
would discount data and arguments that conflict with their preferred worldview, and privilege 
data and arguments that reinforce their worldview. Carvalho (2007, p. 237) describes this effect 
in detail in her studies of how ideology influences media framing of the climate issue. She 
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found that ideology works as a powerful selection device in deciding what is scientific news 
(what the relevant facts are) and who are authorities in climate science. 
When looking at the actions of sceptic proponents, it is therefore not surprising that some 
scholars infer the presence of a conservative political agenda, and a submerged one at that. 
They see sceptic proponents as key participants in conservatives’ efforts to roll back 
environmental initiatives. ACD scepticism certainly seems to benefit the conservative political 
agenda and fossil fuel invested corporate interests. Scepticism, it is widely understood by 
scholars, cleverly disguises, at least to the public, the ideological and economic interests of its 
sponsors (Austin, 2002; Buell, 2003; Mooney, 2005). 
2.2.2 Anti-environmentalism 
Some scholars cast the ideological conflict over ACD as a struggle between environmentalists 
and anti-environmentalists, between eco-centrists and anthropocentrists. Peter Jacques, with 
his concept of environmental scepticism, is a leading example. Jacques defines environmental 
scepticism as the “denial of the authenticity of environmental problems, particularly problems 
such as biodiversity loss or climate change that threaten ecological sustainability” (Jacques et 
al., 2008, p. 353). His concept of environmental scepticism consists of several themes, namely 
the denial of the seriousness of environmental problems, the dismissal of scientific evidence 
documenting these problems, the questioning of the importance of environmentally protective 
policies, the endorsement of anti-regulation/anti-corporate liability positions, and the casting 
of environmental protection as threatening Western progress (Jacques et al., 2008, p. 354).  
Jacques sees a grandiose ideological struggle in environmental disputes. The scientific disputes 
over environmental issues are but smokescreens that obscure the true dispute, which is “a 
struggle over society’s dominant core social values that institutionalise obligation and power” 
(Jacques, 2006, p. 77). He believes that the sceptic dismissals of environmental concerns are 
not only aimed at short term profiteering or influencing contemporary legislation, but that much 
more is at stake. He sees a much more fundamental struggle about “the legitimacy of the status 
quo of world politics nestled in our dominant core civic paradigm of Enlightenment liberalism 
that keeps the structure of obligations national and market based” (Jacques, 2006, p. 91). For 
Jacques environmental sceptics are part of the base of the dominant modes of power, even 
though they cast themselves as speaking truth to power. They “guard(s) against paradigmatic 
changes to world dominant social values and institutions that guide the global accumulation 
and concentration of power” (Jacques, 2006, p. 78). The function of environmental scepticism 
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“is to take up the rearguard of an increasingly maladaptive system that is being called into 
question as a threat to human sustainability” (Jacques, 2006, p. 94). Hamilton takes a similar 
panoramic view of the current conjuncture and contextualises “climate denial” as a “last-ditch 
attempt to re-impose the Enlightenment’s allocation of humans and Nature to two distinct 
realms” (Hamilton, 2010b, p. 15). He describes scepticism as a direct outgrowth of 
conservatives’ efforts to counter environmentalism (Hamilton, 2010a, p. 104), which they 
perceive as the latest threat to progress, civilization and the Western way of life (Hamilton, 
2010a, p. 101). 
Jacques emphasises the continuities between anti-environmentalism and conservatism. In this 
he is consistent with the earlier work of Dunlap and Van Liere (1984), which found a strong 
negative correlation between eight dimensions of the “dominant social paradigm” and 
environmental concern. These dimensions are commitment to limited government, support for 
free enterprise, devotion to private property rights, emphasis upon individualism, fear of 
planning and support for the status quo, faith in the efficacy of science and technology, support 
for economic growth, and faith in future abundance (Dunlap & Van Liere, 1984, p. 1015). 
These dimensions represent values consistent with enlightenment liberalism. Dunlap’s thesis 
has been further developed and applied in various collaborations, e.g. with McCright and 
others, time and again showing that environmental scepticism (including ACD scepticism) acts 
as an extension of political conservatism, protecting conservative values and countering the 
environmental movement (McCright & Dunlap, 2000, 2003, 2010). McCright and Dunlap 
(2010, p. 101) attach great significance to the scepticism-political conservatism link, seeing a 
deliberate strategy of conservatives to delay or prevent climate decision-making, thus blocking 
“reflexive modernization” and protecting “the industrial capitalist order of simple 
modernization”. 
Jacques’ own investigation (Jacques, 2006) of a number of leading sceptics (Ronald Bailey, 
Steven Milloy, Dunn & Kinney, Huber) supports the thesis of unison between anti-
environmentalism and conservatism. Jacques analysed the writings of his sample of sceptics 
and came to the conclusion that environmental sceptics see their own stances as representing 
conservative values and, at the same time, see environmentalism as leftist and Marxist. 
Jacques’ category of anti-environmentalism also includes economism, or more precisely, the 
view that social and environmental problems are best mediated through cost-benefit 
approaches. Jacques passes harsh judgement on economists, even those who acknowledge the 
physical science explaining various environmental problems. They are, in the Jacques view, 
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still environmental sceptics because they see environmental problems as “generally not worth 
public concern and therefore action” (Jacques, 2006, p. 79). 
A key concept in Jacques’ and others’ understanding of environmental conflicts is the idea that 
people are orientated either for or against nature. He believes that anti-environmentalism is 
driven by a “deep anthropocentric ethic”, which places humans above non-human nature with 
no sense of community with the rest of nature: “Deep anthropocentricism believes humanity is 
utterly independent of non-human nature, and moral obligation is dependent upon strict relative 
and immediate human benefit, otherwise the ethic sees no obligation for human concern” 
(Jacques, 2006, pp. 84-85). For Jacques, nature only matters to anthropocentrists “in very strict 
instrumental terms” (Jacques, 2006, p. 86).  
2.2.3 Empirical correlations 
The empirical evidence for a link between ideology/worldview and environmental scepticism 
(including ACD scepticism) is strong. Public opinion surveys in countries with noticeable 
sceptic tendencies have confirmed the link over a long period of time. Surveys in the US 
(Borick & Rabe, 2010; Dunlap, Xiao, & McCright, 2001), Canada (Heath & Gifford, 2006), 
the UK (Poortinga, Spence, Whitmarsh, Capstick, & Pidgeon, 2011; Whitmarsh, 2011) and 
Australia (Tranter, 2011, 2012a) have shown strong correlations between conservatism, 
support for the free-market, anthropocentricism, lower levels of concern about the climate, high 
levels of scepticism about climate science, and opposition to climate mitigation policies. 
Surveys that focus on political party identification established the same pattern. An Australian 
survey in 2007 showed that even under circumstances of wide public concern about the climate, 
political party identification remained a strong predictor of climate change belief. Labor and 
Green identiﬁers were almost three times as likely as coalition supporters to believe that global 
warming will pose a serious threat in their own lifetime (Tranter, 2011, p. 89). Subsequent 
polling re-affirmed the partisan divide on the climate issue (Tranter, 2012b, p. 11; 2013). Reser 
et al’s (2011) study of Australian public opinion on the climate issue corresponds with 
Tranter’s findings. For instance, they found that whereas 87.9% of respondents who indicated 
that they would vote Green and 73.6% who indicated that they would vote Labor were “very” 
or “fairly” concerned about ACD, only 48.6% of National Party and 53.9% of Liberal Party 
supporters felt the same. 
The conservative-scepticism link is, not surprisingly, replicated at the level of political elites. 
In the US, conservative think-tanks have been found to be responsible for the vast majority of 
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“environmental sceptical” literature (Jacques et al., 2008), and to have successfully penetrated 
the printed media to promote their views (Dunlap, 2009). A similar trend has been found in 
Australia, with studies showing the involvement of conservative front groups and think-tanks 
in the climate sceptical campaign (Hodder, 2010; McKewon, 2012) and pro-sceptical reporting 
from the generally conservative Murdoch press stable (Bacon, 2011; McKnight, 2010). 
Similarly, conservative political leaders in the US and Australia have been found to be 
generally much more sceptical of the climate threat than their centre-left and progressive 
counterparts (Dunlap & McCright, 2008; Fielding, Head, Laffan, Western, & Hoegh-Guldberg, 
2012). Fielding et al. (2012) found that in Australia, “political ideology (left–right) emerged as 
the most important predictor of politicians’ climate change beliefs”. They found that 
“politicians from more left-leaning or politically progressive parties (Greens, Labor) had 
beliefs that more closely endorse scientists’ beliefs about the causes and impacts of climate 
change and gave greater priority to climate change in their political work. In contrast, 
conservative politicians were more uncertain and more sceptical about climate change and gave 
lower priority to climate change” (Fielding et al., 2012, p. 728). Tranter (2013, pp. 405-406) 
found the same pattern. 92.1% and 83.8% of respectively Green and ALP politicians believed 
(2010 poll) that “global warming will pose a serious threat to your way of life in your 
lifetime?”, as opposed to only 35.8% for Coalition politicians. Interestingly, both Fielding et 
al. (2012, p. 728) and Tranter (2013, p. 412) found that on the climate issue politicians are even 
more polarised along ideological lines than the voting public. 
2.3 Political counter-movement thesis 
Meyer and Staggenborg (1996, p. 1631) defines a countermovement as “a movement that 
makes contrary claims simultaneously to those of the original movement” it is designed to 
oppose. Counter-movements, just like the movements they are opposing, seek to influence state 
structures, capacity and policy. So-called progressive scholars interpret sceptic actors and their 
actions as an example of an organised counter-movement against pro-environmental forces. 
Sceptics and their activities are seen as a conscious and deliberate reaction to the increasing 
movement towards regulation of greenhouse gases, and the resultant limitations on economic 
and personal freedoms that would follow in the wake of far-reaching greenhouse gas emission 
mitigation policies. These scholars believe that sceptical voices have, from the start, been part 
30 
 
of the “broader stream of [a] right-wing political movement” (Buell, 2003, p. 8). As such, their 
actions have been imbued with purpose and agency. 
Freudenburg (2008, p. 2) describes the scientific contestations of sceptics as “a clever and 
surprisingly effective political-economic tactic” to defeat or postpone regulation that might 
threaten the unabated continuation of “profitable but potentially risky activities”. Jacques et al. 
(2008, p. 364) conclude that “[e]nvironmental scepticism is an elite-driven reaction to global 
environmentalism, organised by core actors within the conservative movement. He claims that 
promoting scepticism is a key tactic of the anti-environmental counter-movement, “designed 
specifically to undermine the environmental movement’s efforts to legitimise its claims via 
science”. 
Ideological commitments and political projects thus achieve a snug fit in the case of ACD 
scepticism, and in this, conservative think tanks (CTTs) play a central role. CTTs have been 
described as “professional social movement organisations that have been sponsored by 
economic elites as a means of influencing public opinion and the agendas of political elites” 
(M. P. Allen, 1992, p. 90). Elsewhere they are described as non-profit, public policy research 
and advocacy organisations that promote core conservative ideals such as free enterprise, 
private property rights, limited government and national defence (Schumaker, Heilke, & Kiel, 
1997). That CTTs would become involved in environmental issues was inevitable. Simply too 
many of the core conservative and neo-liberal values were threatened by the thesis that the 
industrial model and consumerist lifestyle of modern society is causing large and damaging 
impacts on the global climate, with the implication that  the status quo cannot be maintained. 
A marriage of convenience ensued between CTTs and a small number of “rogue” scientists, 
who would frame the climate issue as a scientific dispute whereas in reality, for conservatives, 
it was a “war of ideas” (Jacques et al., 2008, p. 355). McCright and Dunlap (2000, pp. 504-
505) argue that the conservative movement mobilised think tanks to re-frame global warming 
as a “non-problem” because they want to protect the “core elements of conservative ideology”, 
as embodied in the prevailing dominant social paradigm. Jacques (2008, p. 352) argues that the 
conservative countermovement against the environmental movement in the US was motivated 
by a perceived threat to American values and interests emanating from the actions and goals of 
the environmentalists. This claim is repeated in other national contexts. Hamilton (2007, p. 
Chapter 10) shows that the US pattern has been exported to Australia with Australian 
conservative think-tanks actively engaging the climate issue, promoting scepticism and 
maintaining active links with their US counterparts. 
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A central tactic of CTTs is the production of an endless flow of printed material and public 
appearances of personalities (Jacques et al., 2008, p. 355). Several studies point to the 
consistent and overwhelming association between scepticism and right wing think tanks. CTTs 
very regularly directly publish climate sceptic books and articles, and the vast majority of 
sceptic writers have some connection with one or more CTTs (Dunlap & Jacques, 2013; 
Jacques et al., 2008; McCright & Dunlap, 2000).  
Counter-movement theory offers a plausible explanation of the motivations and activism of 
Jacques’ broad category of “environmental sceptics“. However, the real test of the counter-
movement thesis is not in its plausibility or its coincidences, convincing as they might seem. 
Care needs to be taken not to read a political agenda into actions that might benefit one or the 
other political group. It remains necessary to interrogate the actors whose actions are 
supposedly part of a political campaign to determine their own motivations and objectives. 
2.4 Cultural lens 
Scholars looking at the climate issue through a so-called cultural lens distinguish between what 
could be termed “cultural worldviews” and “political ideologies” (Kahan & Braman, 2006, p. 
160). In this view cultural worldviews generally refer to those non-political beliefs, attitudes 
and values that influence all people all the time and on all issues, while an ideology would act 
as a container for a particular set of both political and non-political views, subsuming a 
particular set of values and attitudes (Maio, Olson, Bernard, & Luke, 2006, p. 285). In this 
sense, all people are influenced by their cultural worldviews, but not all are “ideologically 
attuned”; not all are equally “politically sophisticated” (Kahan & Braman, 2006, pp. 160 - 161). 
This distinction is important because it avoids the tendency to ideologise all sorts of different 
belief-systems. Any identifiable belief, attitude or value can, in the hands of the over eager 
scholar, become an ideology. McLellan (1995, p. 2) warns against such a tendency by bluntly 
stating that everything is not ideological; some views are more ideological than others; and 
although we are all implicated in ideology, we are not all necessarily captured by it.  
2.4.1 Culture as central organising principle 
Whereas an understanding of ideological cleavages helps greatly to set apart the competing 
principles for human decisions and societal organisation, a concept of culture is necessary to 
understand the root causes of human preferences. Scholars have an intuitive understanding that 
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culture is an important organising principle in human thought and behaviour. Every person 
belongs to a cultural group and develops a self-identity that is derived from and compatible 
with the cultural group with which the individual identifies. This groundedness in a particular 
culture predisposes the individual to either accept or reject views, advice and information based 
on the compatibility of such views, advice and information with his/her cultural tenets. 
Anything that threatens a person’s cultural paradigm or his/her culturally grounded self-identity 
will therefore be resisted and rejected. In the case of climate change, conservative opinion 
leaders have succeeded in casting ACD scientists and proponents (described as alarmists by 
conservatives) as left-wing tendencies and projects. People with a conservative predisposition 
would therefore perceive these alarmists and their climate change mitigation policies as a threat 
to their own cultural paradigm, triggering the tendency to reject or resist the scientific evidence 
as well as the policies required to deal with climate change. The mechanism by which the 
individual comes to rejecting or resisting climate change science and policies is often described 
as a process of sifting views and information through ideological filters. All views and 
information that an individual encounters are, in this view, classed as for, against or neutral to 
one’s own ideological orientation. Any value laden issue, like climate change, would inevitably 
be treated as ideologically relevant by observers/the public and the debate would quickly 
evolve in the direction of a conservative vs liberal contest. 
A concept of culture speaks to alternative assumptions about human and physical nature, and 
how humans stand in relation to physical nature (Pendergraft, 1998, p. 644; Thompson, 1984, 
p. 328); assumptions that one would expect would influence people’s responses when 
confronted with the climate issue. Having observed the remarkable consistency in people’s 
attitudes towards socially contentious and value laden issues like climate change, gun control, 
abortion, etc., Kahan and Braman (2006, p. 148) state that the only explanation for such 
consistency could be that “cultural commitments are prior to factual beliefs on highly charged 
political issues” and that “individuals accept or reject empirical claims about the consequences 
of controversial policies based on their vision of a good society”. They go on to say that cultural 
drivers act as an “invisible hand” that steers opinion and interpretations into specific directions 
(Kahan & Braman, 2006, p. 155). Culture is, by all accounts, a powerful predispositional force. 
The concept of culture is, however, notorious for its diffuse and often vague use in the social 
sciences, and its application to the climate issue is no exception. In practice, scholars tend to 
apply the concept in both its ideational and behavioural (adaptive) meanings. Its ideational 
meaning is often expressed as people’s worldviews or their cosmology, and its behavioural 
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meaning is often expressed as people’s way of life. For most scholars the two dimensions are 
combined, such as in the following expressions: “(culture is) the common way in which a 
community of persons makes sense of the world” (Gross & Rayner, 1985); “(it is a) way of life 
informed by a common cosmology” (Pendergraft, 1998, p. 644); and “(it is) composed of 
psychological structures by means of which individuals/groups guide their behaviour” (Geertz, 
1973, p. 11). In these views, culture is both an idea and the social expression of that idea, both 
a “frame of mind” and “patterned conduct” (Geertz, 1973, p. 10). 
The specific theory of culture that is most often drawn upon to make sense of ACD scepticism 
is the theory of socio-cultural viability, also known as Cultural Theory (capitalised) or grid-
group Cultural Theory. Pioneered by amongst others Mary Douglas, Aaron Wildavsky, 
Michael Thompson and Richard Ellis, the theorists posit people’s worldviews as the key 
organising principle guiding opinions and behaviour. They propose that individuals, when 
faced with a challenge, would be drawn to solutions and strategies that are most consistent with 
the worldviews embedded in the cultural type they belong to (Verweij et al., 2006, pp. 818, 
820-811). From this perspective, a strictly limited number of mutually exclusive fundamental 
worldviews exist, from which the extant and large variety of “ultimate forms of social and 
cultural life” is derived (Verweij et al., 2006, pp. 818 - 819). These worldviews are claimed to 
be stable, always present and influence how incoming information is processed. They are 
responsible for the patterns of opinions/interpretations of facts that people adhere to; they are 
the “invisible hands” that guide debates over public issues (Kahan & Braman, 2006, p. 155).  
2.4.2 Grid-group Cultural Theory 
Grid-group Cultural Theory posits four cultural types: individualists, isolates/fatalists, 
hierarchists and egalitarians. The cultural types are also referred to as ways of life, subcultures, 
rationalities, social solidarities and cultural worldviews (Grendstad & Selle, 2000, p. 28; Kahan 
& Braman, 2006, pp. 149-172; Mamadouh, 1999, p. 396). These types are distilled through a 
cultural map defined by two dimensions of sociality, 4  namely the degree of social 
incorporation/affinity of a person (the so-called group dimension), and the degree to which a 
person’s life is circumscribed by external prescriptions, which is an indication of a person’s 
                                                          
4 Thompson posits a third dimension of sociality based on behavioural preferences (so-called grip), 
which justifies the identification of a fifth cultural type, ‘autonomous’. Such a third dimension does not 
influence the viable combinations of the first two dimensions of sociality and is mostly ignored by 
scholars interested in the motivational explanations offered by Cultural Theory (Ellis, Thompson, & 
Wildavsky, 1990, pp. 16-17; Thompson, 1982, p. 36). 
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preferences regarding social control/regulation (the so-called grid dimension) (Hindmoor, 
2010, p. 443). Elements of the group dimension include a person’s frequency of interaction, 
sense of mutuality, scope of social activities and social boundaries (Mars, 1982, pp. 24-28). 
Elements of the grid dimension include a person’s preferences about insulation, autonomy, 
prescription and competition (Douglas, 1978, p. 16). Figure 2-1 depicts the typology. 
 
Figure 2-1: The grid-group cultural map*  
 
* This representation of the map was derived from Mamadouh (1999, pp. 399-401). 
In the grid-group model a high level of individualism would signify low preference for social 
controls over both the individual and the environment, and a high level of hierarchism would 
signify acceptance of inequality and the socio-economic order, and typically predict low 
environmental sensitivity and an aversion to wholesale socio-economic reform (Kahan & 
Braman, 2006, p. 151; Proctor, 1998, pp. 235 - 236). 
Grid-group Cultural Theorists maintain that the two primary dimensions of sociality and the 
four cultural types they establish, “grasp the fundamental nature of the social being” 
(Mamadouh, 1999, p. 397). They are the cultural baselines that guide and direct human 
behaviour. In Pendergraft’s (1998, p. 646) words: 
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… even cultures in ﬂux must move within the four points of the cultural compass: 
hierarchy, individualism, egalitarianism and fatalism. These universal dimensions, 
transcending temporal and spatial borders, bound a topography upon which the worldviews 
which compete to shape and dominate cultures and societies can be mapped. Using these 
dimensions Cultural (or Grid-Group) Theory provides an analytic framework useful in 
examining the cultural roots of patterned reactions to policy proposals, including those 
relevant to global climate change. 
The cultural types as theoretically constructed can be conceived of as “ideal typical social 
positions” that “account for cultural diversity in the most parsimonious way possible” 
(Mamadouh, 1999, p. 396). Others have called them “templates with recurring manifestations” 
(Hindmoor, 2010, p. 443), “a kind of heuristic in the rational processing of information on 
public policy matters” (Kahan & Braman, 2006, p. 149), “cultural leanings” that influence 
behaviour (Pendergraft, 1998, p. 650), and the “invisible hands” that guide debates over public 
issues (Kahan & Braman, 2006, p. 155).  In essence, they act as dispositional influences on 
individuals (Hindmoor, 2010, p. 445). They help individuals to derive or deduce their 
preferences, opinions and norms in relation to a specific issue (Mamadouh, 1999, p. 397).  
Grid-group Cultural Theory helps explain the consistency with which people respond to 
problems over space and time. This is not to say that their responses are always formulaic. In 
the cut and thrust of policy discourses people “constantly update, revise and re-invent their 
preferred policies in light of the criticisms received” (Verweij et al., 2006, p. 821). The key, 
however, is that they do not change their fundamental assumptions concerning nature, human 
nature, justice, risk, time, space, etc. Verweij et al. (2006, p. 822) state that “the specific policies 
and arguments advanced will constantly change, yet whatever policies are fought over, they 
will continue to represent a small number of competing ways of organising and perceiving 
social relations”. Grid-group Cultural Theory, therefore, predicts that societies will diverge on 
difficult issues along predictable lines. Verweij et al. (2006, p. 821) explain that because people 
argue from different premises that are “anchored in alternative forms of organising, they will 
never agree”. They explain that “the four straightforward organizational principles” occur in 
“varying strengths and patterns of paired alliance”, and ultimately “result in an endlessly 
changing, inﬁnitely varied, and complex social world” (Verweij et al., 2006, p. 820). In sum, 
grid-group Cultural Theory’s claims are taken to be general (explaining a wide range of 
people’s preferences, values and norms), constant (explaining people’s responses under all 
circumstances), as well as universal (applying across temporal, national and ethnic boundaries). 
Refinements of grid-group Cultural Theory in relation to its categorisation of people’s core 
views of human and physical nature are discussed in Chapter 5, CULTURAL MARKERS. 
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That chapter investigates sceptics’ basic assumptions about humans and the physical climate 
system (which serves as proxy for physical nature in general), and how these reinforce or stand 
in contradiction to the respective cultural stereotypes. The theory is again discussed in Chapter 
7, POLICY MARKERS, there in the context of how it can be used categorise competing 
preferences for climate policy responses. That chapter investigates to what degree sceptics’ 
policy preferences correspond with the business-as-usual response pattern, which grid-group 
Cultural Theory associates with the individualist cultural stereotype and predict that sceptics 
would prefer. 
2.4.3 Critique of grid-group Cultural Theory  
Grid-group Cultural Theory has been the subject of much critique over the years, primarily 
because efforts to empirically confirm its validity have met with mixed results. Boholm (1996, 
pp. 66, 80) maintains that “the empirical results produced by the proponents of cultural theory 
tend to be rather meagre”, that the theory “harbors disparate and disintegrated theoretical 
stances”, and that it is marred by “the common faults of functionalist explanation; circular 
reasoning and inbuilt ad hoc causal mechanisms”. The exponents of grid-group Cultural Theory 
also differ in the ways they think it can be applied, with some supporting a rigid/strong version 
and others a flexible/weak version. The rigid version is quite deterministic in that the cultural 
biases of social entities are conceived as pervasive and coherent, whereas the flexible version 
prefers to see cultural biases as contingent on the context of the issue at hand (Mamadouh, 
1999, p. 404). If one is to accept the more flexible interpretation of the theory, where the 
emphasis is less on explaining the behaviour of social entities and more on identifying and 
describing the plurality of positions in a given controversy, there is evident merit in its use (see 
Mamadouh, 1999, p. 405 for multiple examples of the generally meritorious application of 
grid-group Cultural Theory). The approach taken in this study is to allow a systematic, close 
and detailed investigation of elite sceptic argumentative logics, independent of any 
assumptions or expectations of how they would fit with one or more cultural rationalities, and 
certainly not to make any bold causal or explanatory claims about the operation of cultural 
rationalities in the sceptic logic. 
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2.5 Social amplification/attenuation of risk 
Grid-group Cultural Theory provides a framework for understanding the opposing worldviews 
responsible for social disputes. It does not, however, provide concepts for understanding how 
worldviews transmit and what might influence such transmissions. The social amplification of 
risk theory developed by Kasperson et al. (2003) provides such a framework. The theory 
essentially states that “hazards  interact with psychological, social, institutional, and cultural 
processes in ways that  may  amplify  or  attenuate  public responses  to  the  risk  or  risk event” 
(R. E. Kasperson et al., 1988, p. 177). Amplification or attenuation occurs through the 
interaction of “sources of information”, “information channels”, “social stations”, “individual 
stations” and “institutional and social behaviour” (J. X. Kasperson et al., 2003, p. 14). The 
theory, therefore, provides a tool for analysing the role and influence of key participants in the 
debate, whether they are individuals or institutions. 
A key feature of the model is the “rippling” of the amplification or attenuation effect through 
consecutive communicative responses. Individuals, groups and organisational entities will 
respond to the risk or risk event by interpreting it in accordance with their own perceptions and 
mental schemes, would then communicate their interpretations to other individuals and groups, 
who in turn would repeat the same process. Thus, individuals and organisations act as 
“amplification stations” through their own communicative and behavioural responses (R. E. 
Kasperson et al., 1988, p. 181; Renn, 2011, p. 156). The model describes this process in terms 
of the following stages: the initial encounter with the risk object, either through direct 
experience or through the receipt of information about the risk object, followed by a range of 
secondary impacts (flowing from the behavioural responses to the initial signal input), followed 
by “third order impacts” to other parties, distant locations or even future generations (R. E. 
Kasperson et al., 1988, pp. 181 - 182).  
The implication is clear: sceptic elites, as first responders as well as perennial debate 
participants, have the ability to attenuate or amplify signals about climate change, e.g. 
attenuating signals about the potential impact of unmitigated climate change and the benefits 
of mitigation policies, whilst amplifying signals about the uncertainties in climate change 
science and the costs of mitigation policies. Furthermore, sceptics’ (and any other 
respondent’s) responses are subject to a host of devices that virtually ensures strong biases 
emerging, leading to either amplification or attenuation of the risk signals. Kasperson et al. 
(1988, p. 181) list these devices, and they include the filtering of signals (the selective 
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processing of incoming information); the decoding of signals; the drawing of inferences with 
the use of cognitive heuristics; attaching social values to the information; interpreting and 
validating the signals with reference to one’s culture and peers; formulating behavioural 
intentions; and engaging in action or inaction. 
The amplification of risk model places a strong emphasis on the role of symbols in the 
amplification or attenuation of risk signals. Other factors influencing the 
amplification/attenuation effect are signal volume, the degree of disputation of the information 
and the extent of dramatisation. Yet, the symbolic connotations of the information are singled 
out by R. E. Kasperson et al. (1988, pp. 181, 184) as “the most powerful single means to 
amplify or attenuate the original message”. It is this aspect of the theory that is particularly 
relevant to an analysis of sceptic discourse and developing an understanding of the logics and 
motivations that drive sceptics. Whereas grid-group Cultural Theory provides an explanation 
of why sceptics would be inclined to distrust mainstream climate science, social 
amplification/attenuation of risk theory provides an understanding of the raft of processes and 
influences responsible for the entrenched and durable nature of sceptics’ cultural inclinations 
in the face of challenging scientific evidence.   
2.6 Psychological perspectives 
Cognitive psychologists have zoomed in on the distinct cognitive processes that might 
contribute to an individual’s stance on the climate issue. These cognitive processes help explain 
why and how ideology, culture and social amplification/attenuation of risk exercise such strong 
holds on the individual mind. Cognitive mechanisms like cognitive dissonance avoidance and 
assimilation bias have been found to distort the interpretive powers of the individual (described 
in Anderegg, 2010b; Bell, 1994; Boykoff & Smith, 2010; Leiserowitz, 2005; Marshall; 
Poortinga et al., 2011; Swim et al., 2010; Whitmarsh, Seyfang, & O'Neill, 2011), thus ensuring 
that people follow ideological, cultural and other social predispositional influences. 
The central cognitive-psychological process identified by scholars as responsible for sceptics’ 
resistance to the evidence of ACD is cognitive dissonance avoidance. Individuals will attend 
to and integrate information that supports existing cognitive schema, while ignoring or 
rejecting contradictory information (Upham, 2009, p. 14). People, therefore, tend to avoid 
holding conflicting beliefs, or acting inconsistently with their attitudes. If conflicts do arise, 
they will “typically act to reduce the cognitive dissonance by changing their attitude to justify 
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their behaviour, claiming (or perceiving) to have little or no choice in their action, or denying 
any inconsistency” (Upham, 2009, p. 14). Empirical research has demonstrated that people 
resist attitude dissonant information and experiences whilst accepting attitude consistent 
information and experiences (Upham, 2009, pp. 5 - 6).  
Examples of dissonance avoidance are when people choose to avoid the emotionally distressing 
implications of ACD by postponing their judgment of the reality or seriousness of the problem, 
by downplaying the seriousness of the problem (de-problematising the threat), by personally 
making symbolic but ultimately ineffectual pro-environmental contributions, by shifting blame 
and responsibility for solving the problem, by wishfully and naively relying on some future 
technological remedy, or by simply ignoring the  problem (apathy) and thus avoid the 
unpleasant emotions that would follow a realistic accounting of the problem and its 
implications (Hamilton, 2010b, p. 15). 
A key device in the process of cognitive dissonance avoidance is biased information 
assimilation. Biased assimilation holds that if someone has a prior attitude or view about an 
issue, he/she will process and assimilate new information about that issue in a way that is 
consistent with his/her existing position. With assimilation bias a person seeks out and accept 
evidence that supports their existing views, while ignoring or discounting opposing evidence 
(Lord, 1979; B. D. Wood & Vedlitz, 2007, p. 554). Using climate information, Corner et al. 
(2012) demonstrated the effect of biased assimilation. 
Several other cognitive heuristics or shortcuts that facilitate individual biases and 
misjudgements are also described in the literature. Nisbett and Ross (1980) catalogue the 
various ways in which humans err in their judgements, many of which have been applied to 
the climate issue. A person’s social group and peers have been argued to influence his/her 
response to issues/risks. The group(s)/peers the individual associates with bring a certain 
“type(s) of rationality to the issue” (R. E. Kasperson et al., 1988, p. 185). Kahan (2013, pp. 
417-418) found that individuals are significantly inclined to belong to and remain loyal to 
“affinity groups central to their personal wellbeing”. This mechanism predicted ideological 
polarisation over the climate issue better than the other mechanisms, either in isolation or in 
conjunction. Empirical evidence has also shown that personal experience of adverse weather 
events that are plausibly related to climate change has a more immediate and lasting effect on 
people’s perception of the reality and threat of climate change if they are relatively unengaged 
with the issue (experiential learning), whereas those who are highly engaged tend to adapt their 
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experiences to their prior beliefs (motivated reasoning) (Myers, Maibach, Roser-Renouf, 
Akerlof, & Leiserowitz, 2013).  
Scholars believe that the complexity of contemporaneous problems and availability of 
conflicting information sources presses people into a holistic mode of understanding an issue 
at the cost of evaluating the factual evidence in question. As complexity increases, context 
becomes more important and the urge for a holistic evaluation increases. Kahneman (1982) 
points out that people employ heuristics (simplifying mechanisms such as representativeness, 
availability, adjustment and anchoring) to help them cope with risks and uncertainties, often at 
the cost of distortions, biases and errors in judgement.  
The cognitive psychological explanations of climate scepticism looks convincing in relation to 
the lay public, because a degree of self-delusion and lack of self-reflection is plausible for 
individuals for whom the climate is merely one more social issue in a plethora of potentially 
worrying issues. Can the same be said of elites or intellectuals who actively engage the issue 
and invest personal capital in the stances they adopt? Most scholars recognise that sceptics 
might be genuinely misguided, and subject to one or more cognitive constraints. Yet, at the 
same time, they remain particularly unforgiving towards the public exponents of ACD 
scepticism, who are often accused of wilfully and deceptively trying to discredit mainstream 
climate science.  
An implication from the cognitive psychological understandings of ACD scepticism is that the 
cognitive heuristics, shortcuts and adaptations that distort individuals’ interpretive powers can 
be overcome by better education of and communication to the public of the factual evidence 
underpinning ACD. Scholars have warned, however, that the cognitive errors close in on 
themselves, that they can instead block critical self-reflection and the reception of accurate 
information. Without negating the value of continued and improved climate science 
communication, there is growing recognition that the climate problem needs to be presented in 
culturally congruent ways (Kahan, 2013, p. 418), i.e. by stressing values and outcomes of 
climate mitigation that are consistent with the conservative/neo-liberal mindset. In a sense, 
instead of neutralising cognitive biases, they need to be activated to achieve an alternative 
outcome, in this case to support the scientific climate consensus. This novel approach to dealing 
with ACD scepticism is discussed later in the chapter in section 2.10 More neutral 
interpretations. 
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2.7 Communication of science literature 
There is universal acceptance amongst scholars that the mass media is an important influencing 
agent when it comes to the public’s understanding of climate change. Weingart et al.’s (2000, 
p. 261) study of media representations in Germany states confidently that the mass media “have 
influenced national policy responses” and “created public concern and a call for political 
commitment”. Boykoff describes it as such: “Ways of knowing, through media depictions, help 
to shape ongoing discourses and imaginaries, circulating in various cultural and political 
contexts and scales”, and “access to information, as well as the content of the information 
accessed, influence individual to community-level perceptions of climate change” (Boykoff, 
2008, p. 550) (my own emphasis in italics). These assumptions about the role of the mass media 
are derived from a rationalist-instrumental model of communication that places information at 
the centre. Compelling and accurate information is supposed to flow through various stages 
and actors, ultimately informing a public policy decision, and where this process fails, 
misrepresentation of the information would be to blame (Boykoff, 2010; Boykoff & Boykoff, 
2004, 2007; Weingart et al., 2000, p. 262). 
Scholars, however, also point to the limitations of what has become known as the information 
deficit theory. They point out that the communication of climate change science has been too 
technical, naive in the belief that more and better presented information will sway the 
sceptic/unconvinced portion of public opinion. A persistent disconnect between what the 
science of climate change is saying and what people actually choose to believe has been 
observed. While there is virtual consensus in the scientific community about the attribution and 
severity of impacts of climate change, both the conventional mass media and the internet reflect 
a perplexing “cacophony of opinions” (Whitmarsh, 2011, p. 1). Scholars have learned quite 
early that the relationship between knowledge of climate change science and acceptance of the 
science is neither unidirectional (more and better information leading to greater acceptance of 
the information in question) nor uniform (all demographic segments of the population 
responding similarly to information stimuli). ACD sceptics are a good case in point. Several 
studies have found a negative or neutral correlation between education and climate science 
knowledge, and belief in the ACD thesis or concern about the climate (Malka, Krosnick, & 
Langer, 2009; McCright & Dunlap, 2011). 
Important as the role of effective science communication is, scholars are now painting a picture 
of multivariate influences shaping people’s responses to scientific information (Whitmarsh, 
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2011, pp. 2, 8). They point out that disagreements about climate science have much more to do 
with certain value predispositions that make people vulnerable to doubt and disbelief, than to 
a lack of information. It is increasingly accepted that the reception of communication messages 
by the individual is mediated by a range of psychological, cultural and contextual 
(environmental) factors. The informational content of communication is but one component of 
the communication and by no means the most influential. Pre-existing values and worldviews 
have been singled out as particularly strong factors influencing the assimilation of scientific 
information by the individual (Whitmarsh, 2011, p. 8). Hamilton (2010b, p. 2) aptly describes 
this situation as follows: “denial [also read scepticism] is due to a surplus of culture rather than 
a deficit of information”. 
Values are, however, not only important at the consumption end of mass media 
communication. Carvalho argues that divergent value systems are responsible for the fact that 
news organizations filter and reinterpret information about ACD (or any topic for that matter). 
Carvalho uses the concept “ideological culture” (community of ideas, values and preferences) 
to describe the preferred value orientations of newspapers. Her investigation of how 
mainstream British newspapers reported the climate issue found that The Times adhered to neo-
liberal capitalism and The Guardian to the social democratic values of equity and solidarity 
(Carvalho, 2007, p. 239). In communications theory constructivism can therefore be discerned 
at either end of the communication process. The mass media constructs powerful images of 
reality for the public, but at the same time the public will contextualise these images against 
their own pre-existing schemas (Scheufele, 1999, p. 105). 
That values and worldviews necessarily shape media representations of the climate issue 
should not be accepted uncritically. Boykoff and Boykoff (2004, 2007) blame much of the 
distorted and unbalanced media reporting about the climate issue on prevailing “journalistic 
norms and values”. They found that a raft of journalistic and commercial considerations weigh 
on journalists when making their decisions about what to report, when and how. The daily 
reporting routine often resembles a “juggling act” (Boykoff & Boykoff, 2004, pp. 125 - 126) 
where norms like objectivity, fairness, balance and accuracy are competing with corporate 
demands for efficiency and profitability that favour the norms of speed, novelty and 
sensationalism. The pressures of time, reporters’ lack of expertise on the topic and the vocal 
and articulate interventions of a small group of sceptic scientists and advocates converge with 
journalists’ desire to write balanced reports. They stress that the bias they have detected in 
media reports in the US should not be seen as an ideological or political bias that may or may 
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not exist in individual media sources. The distortions and bias in the reporting of journalists is 
less the consequence of partisanship, and more the consequence of pressures of time, 
knowledge and indeed the requirement to balance reporting by affording equal space and 
prominence to those who disagree with an orthodox or majority view. In general, journalists 
are consciously militating against partisanship in their writing, which is reinforced by editorial 
guidance and censorship (Bennett, 2002, p. 44). 
The way the mass media represents the climate issue is important for our understanding of the 
sceptic phenomenon. To a large degree the reporting of the climate debate in the media 
perpetuates the stereotype that the controversy is a binary for-against matter (Schmidt, 2010, 
p. A539). This has the perverse effect that those with legitimate concerns about aspects of the 
science and climate policies can be stigmatised through association with extreme sceptics or 
corporate sponsors (Parkinson, 2010), which may mask substantive differences amongst 
sceptics themselves. Boykoff (University of Colorado at Boulder, 2010) argues this point as 
follows: “One problem occurs when outlier viewpoints are not individually evaluated in 
context”; and “[A] variety of influences and perspectives typically have been collapsed by mass 
media into one general category of scepticism. This has been detrimental both in terms of 
dismissing legitimate critiques of climate science or policy, as well as amplifying extreme and 
tenuous claims”. 
2.8 Scepticism as a contrived phenomenon 
The preceding discussion relays an interpretation of ACD scepticism as a systemic 
phenomenon. The systemic interpretation explains scepticism at the macro level as a visible 
manifestation of extant and inescapable ideological and cultural cleavages in society, and at 
the micro level as resulting from sub-conscious psycho-cognitive adaptive responses. In the 
systemic interpretation scepticism is seen as a not altogether surprising reaction in the 
prevailing political and economic climate. 
The systemic interpretation of scepticism co-exist with an interpretation that the phenomenon 
is deliberately fabricated and aggrandised by key actors who have very specific agendas. In 
this contrived interpretation, scepticism is not merely due to some genuine misreading of the 
science or some automatic internal psychological or cognitive adaptive response to a 
challenging social and economic development. Contrived scepticism posits that the sceptic 
actors are consciously and deliberately misrepresenting climate science and fabricating a 
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controversy that otherwise would not exist or would be much less acute than it has turned out 
to be. The contrived account of scepticism is awash with images of rogue scientists, scheming 
conservative lobbyists, self-serving corporate players and manipulative media sirens who are 
conducting a deliberate and orchestrated campaign to confuse the public debate about the 
climate issue and prevent or delay decisive climate mitigation. Their activities have been 
described as a “denial machine”; a “well-coordinated, well-funded campaign by contrarian 
scientists, free-market think tanks and industry [that] created a paralyzing fog of doubt around 
climate change” (Samuelson, 2007). From this vantage point ACD scepticism has very little to 
do with the science of climate change and everything to do with the agendas of fossil fuel 
corporates and the partisan ideals of conservative elites. In the words of Lahsen (2005, p. 137), 
“[p]olitical interests have instigated an important part of these campaigns, frequently resorting 
to ethically problematic tactics to undermine attempts at policy action designed to avert or 
reduce the threat”.  
Accounts of scepticism as a contrived phenomenon centre on two themes: that sceptics are 
duplicitous in their conduct, and that a core of sceptic actors act as the prime movers or 
instigators in the campaign to discredit the core claims of mainstream climate science, thus 
delaying governmental action to curb greenhouse gases. They also draw on a shared body of 
evidence that implicate some sceptic individuals in underhand tactics and unholy alliances. 
Exposés of the unwholesome character of ACD scepticism has a long track record in academia 
as well as investigative journalism. The genre was particularly popularised by Naomi Oreskes, 
an American science historian and co-author of the well-known book Merchants of Doubt 
(Oreskes & Conway, 2010). Many authors, as outlined below, have contributed to this 
widespread interpretation. These accounts are not without merit, but it is argued here that they 
have had a profound effect on the general way in which sceptics are framed and understood by 
non-sceptics. 
Hoofnagle (2007) and Cook and Washington (Cook & Washington, 2011, pp. 43-63) charge 
that sceptics draw on a set of unethical tactics to sow confusion about the climate issue. These 
tactics include conjuring a conspiracy of sorts by mainstream climate exponents, selectively 
presenting or critiquing scientific facts (cherry-picking), using fake experts, creating 
impossible expectations (moving the goalposts), and employing fallacies of logic or 
misrepresenting the facts. In his investigation of the activities of some Australian anti-climate 
mitigation actors, Hodder (2010, p. 73) makes claims of cover-ups, deception and threats on 
the part of these actors. Jacques et al. (2008), Jacques (2009) and Buell (2003) claim that 
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sceptics are not independent, objective analysts, but rather agents of CTTs. Pooley (2010) 
chronicles how the corporate sector in the US manipulated public opinion and policy makers 
to defeat climate mitigation policy. Lahsen’s (2005, pp. 144-145) analysis of the anti-ACD 
campaign in the US depicts the campaign as “generated by financial and political elites”, as a 
“money-dominated machinery that seizes on … dissident scientists”. She describes the 
dissident scientists as being “used” by vested interests. In the Australian context, Hamilton 
(2007) describes collusion between fossil fuel industries, the then Howard Government and 
conservative lobbies to stall pro-active climate policy change. Pearce’s (2007b) account of 
Australian climate change policies in the Howard era also builds on the government-industry 
collusion thesis, although with greater emphasis on the influence of ultra-conservatives in the 
Liberal Party. It is also common for scholars to conclude that although the publicly prominent 
sceptics (the opinion leaders/elites) represent a minority position in all professions, especially 
so in the scientific community, their views generally enjoy disproportionate exposure in the 
public media (Anderegg, Schneider, Harold, & Prall, 2010). It is widely hypothesised that their 
public prominence is one of the main reasons for the persistence of a core sceptic view in public 
opinion as well as more widespread public doubt about the reliability of the scientific evidence 
(Boykoff, 2008, pp. 550, 565). 
These are powerful narratives that depict sceptics, corporates and political conservatives as 
self-serving false prophets engaging in often obscure and underhand manipulative behaviour 
to promote their objectives. However, there are potential pitfalls with investigations of a 
historicist and investigative nature. Critics claim that with such approaches there is a danger 
that investigators might privilege facts and themes that are coherent and that build a plausible 
narrative (Walsh, 1967, p. 61). And although a powerful narrative can help to explain complex 
and obscure events, critics warn that investigators should not, in the process of telling their 
story, overemphasise the “plot” of the story (Heuer & Center for the Study of Intelligence 
(U.S.), 1999, pp. 128-129). The risk of overemphasising coordinated actions, conspiracies and 
the like, at the cost of less appealing and less coherent explanations such as unintended 
consequences, coincidences and small causes leading to large effects is always present with 
this approach (Jervis, 1976, p. 320). Some observers have, therefore, fallen in the trap of what 
is known as the “fallacy of identity” (Fischer, 1970, p. 177), in the sense that they have found 
in sceptics a  cause that matches the effect of increased public uncertainty about climate change 
and government reticence at adopting pro-active climate policies.  
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2.9 Scepticism as pathological behaviour 
A small but notable scholarly literature explains ACD scepticism in pathological terms. It is 
claimed that sceptics, particularly those in public view, display behaviour consistent with the 
“paranoid style”, Richard Hofstadter’s (1964) concept to describe the irrational behaviour of 
extremist fringe elements. To non-sceptics sceptics readily conform to the paranoid 
personality’s sense of disconnection and alienation from the mainstream, anxiety and 
frustration about their own status, and their defensive reaction to allocate blame to a defined 
enemy. Sceptics are, in the paranoid style, both irrational and extreme in their views. Non-
sceptics, including respected ones, frequently draw on the trope of sceptic irrationalism (for 
example Hoegh-Guldberg, 2013). A related theme in the literature is that sceptics are afflicted 
by “conspiracist ideation”, one of the key characteristics of Hofstadter’s paranoid style. 
Scholars are concerned that sceptics’ framing of climate science (as having been distorted by 
green extremists and a self-serving climate science establishment) might resonate with the 
public (Bricker, 2013, p. 220) and significantly influence public opinion about the strength and 
integrity of mainstream climate claims (Diethelm & McKee, 2009, pp. 2-3). This is, in the non-
sceptic view, undermining rational deliberation on the climate issue and delaying urgently 
required climate policy decision making. 
Two papers by a group of Australian social scientists stand out in the pathological interpretation 
of ACD scepticism. In 2012 Lewandowsky et al. (2012) published research that showed that 
sceptics gravitate toward conspiracy theories of various kinds (including that the CIA killed 
Martin Luther King, that the moon landing was fake, etc), not only those in relation to climate 
science. They conclude that conspiracist ideation amongst sceptics signify that they share a 
peculiar “personality factor or cognitive style” (Lewandowsky & Oberauer, 2012, p. 14), which 
contributes to their distrust of the core claims of mainstream climate science. In a follow-up 
study Lewandowsky et al. (2013) developed specific conspiracist classification criteria and 
tested the reaction of sceptics to their first paper against these criteria. They demonstrated that 
sceptics repeated the conspiracist tendency in their reaction to the first paper by once again 
engaging in conspiracist ideation and counterfactual thinking. University executives, a media 
organization and the Australian government were all targets of the new round of conspiracy 
thinking amongst sceptics. 
One of the key findings to flow from the conspiracist ideation studies, and one that is implicit 
in the general understanding that sceptics are irrational, is that the most extreme sceptics are 
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trapped in an “epistemically closed system that is immune to falsifying evidence and 
counterarguments” (Boudry & Braeckman and Kalichman cited inLewandowsky et al., 2013, 
p. 37). As such, they are very unlikely to be swayed through vigorous scientific debates or 
culturally resonant communication strategies. 
2.10 More neutral interpretations 
Because sceptics are so clearly at odds with established science on the climate issue, their views 
and contributions to the debate are heavily discounted by non-sceptics. As shown in the 
preceding sections of this chapter, much of the scholarly investigation into scepticism is 
focused on finding the reasons for this aberration and possible remedies thereof. This rather 
unidimensional treatment of the sceptic phenomenon has its dangers. Firstly, varieties and 
nuances in sceptic opinion might get lost. At the level of sceptic elites, research is almost 
exclusively focused on the handful of high-profile sceptics who represent the more extreme 
end of the sceptic spectrum. Secondly, the treatment of climate change scepticism as an 
aberration has been very counter-productive to constructive dialogue in the climate debate. 
Sceptics articulate experiences of hostility and disengagement from the mainstream exponents, 
and particularly object to the hurtful label ‘denier’. Finally, possible meritorious aspects of 
sceptic arguments or their possible benign objectives are lost in an antagonistic and polarised 
debate. Although much of the antagonism originates from sceptics themselves, the blanket 
discounting of all sceptic opinion has been unhelpful. Some sceptic criticisms are undervalued, 
such as their critique of peer-review and the defensive practices of some climate scientists 
(demonstrated in the so-called Climategate email hacking saga). Further, the policy debate has 
potentially been impoverished by the discounting of sceptic critiques that mainstream policy 
proposals are highly aspirational rather than effectual, and that different policy mixes or 
priorities might produce better outcomes on balance. In sum, it should be recognised that there 
is a range of opinions within the broad sceptic camp, some more moderate and responsible than 
others, that the motives of sceptics should not be assumed or pre-judged, and that deliberately 
neutral analytical lenses might advance both our understanding of the phenomenon and our 
reasoned engagement of sceptics. 
Some respected non-sceptic scholars have made contributions that stand in this light. Their 
more neutral approaches to the sceptic phenomenon focus on the cultural relevance of sceptic 
thought and the heightened sense of pragmatism and realism implicit in sceptic arguments, 
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particularly in the policy arena. (A full discussion of the potential contributions sceptics could 
make to the policy debate follows in the Chapter 8, SEVEN SCEPTICS, as well as Chapter 9, 
CONCLUSION.) 
In terms of recognising the cultural relevance of the sceptic phenomenon, some scholars 
working in the grid-group Cultural Theory tradition (the so-called theory of socio-cultural 
viability and risk perception) have signalled that scepticism is not an aberration but, in fact, an 
unavoidable and perhaps even desirable phenomenon, contributing to vigorous democratic 
contestation in a free and open society. Verweij et al. (2006, p. 828) postulate a “clumsiness” 
theory of the climate debate where none of the sides is wrong, where each argument is seen as 
using reason, logic and science, and where each argument is plausible and credible. In this 
view, the inclusion of all “voices” is important for the sake of the legitimacy of whatever 
climate policy is decided upon (Verweij et al., 2006, p. 829). They recognise that climate policy 
decision making is not about determining an optimal solution to the problem, but about settling 
on realistic responses that reflect extant contestations. These scholars position clumsy solutions 
as a way out of the procession of “unresponsive monologue(s)” on the one hand and the 
“shouting match amongst the deaf” on the other (Verweij et al., 2006, p. 839).  
An important implication of a cultural treatment of the sceptic phenomenon is that it relativises 
sceptic arguments. In other words, the arguments of both the sceptics and mainstream ACD 
advocates are constructed on the basis of their respective cultural predispositions. When 
someone, therefore, adopts a seemingly irrational position such as the denial of ACD, it is not 
necessarily a duplicitous or cynical act, but rather based on their acceptance of data and expert 
opinion that resonate with their own values (Kahan & Braman, 2006, p. 149). From the 
perspective of grid-group Cultural Theory, climate change scepticism is neither unexpected nor 
abnormal. 
In the vein of the cultural insight that primary worldviews construct people’s interpretation of 
and responses to social reality, Mike Hulme urges for a bottom-up approach to climate change. 
Cognisance of the cultural diversity underlying the debate should therefore be the starting point 
for devising an approach to which the ordinary person could buy into. Disappointed by the 
alienation and distraction caused by differences about the science of climate change, and the 
wholly inadequate international policy response to climate change, Hulme argues for the 
mobilisation of communities and the implementation of solutions from the bottom up (Hulme, 
2009b). At the heart of Hulme’s call for a bottom-up approach is the requirement of 
inclusiveness: “If we are to understand climate change and use climate change constructively 
49 
 
in our politics, we must first hear and understand these discordant voices, these multifarious 
human beliefs, values, attitudes, aspirations and behaviours” (Hulme, 2009a, p. xxvi). 
Roger Pielke Jr. argues it is wrong to frame the climate change debate in its starkest terms. The 
climate issue should not be treated as a zero-sum problem, where nothing but complete 
acceptance of the science and climate mitigation policies is acceptable. Pielke Jr. calls for a 
much more nuanced debate that takes into account political, economic and social realities that 
will stand, regardless the scientific prognosis of climate change. One such reality is that climate 
policies that compromise long term growth and development cannot gain acceptance. In the 
end the economy will always trump the environment (Pielke Jr., 2010a, p. 46). Implicit in the 
Pielke Jr. argument is that economic and social policies that are moderate and realistically 
possible might have to be accepted, even if the scientific evidence implies the need for a more 
drastic response. For Pielke Jr. the climate issue is akin to abortion politics. There is no absolute 
right or wrong in the debate. Although the sceptic argument is couched in the language of a 
scientific dispute about the evidence of climate change, it is also, and vitally so, about sceptics’ 
valuation of the costs and benefits of taking action. The scientific dispute is therefore 
disconnected from the true basis of the climate change debate, namely a conflict over values 
(Pielke Jr., 2007). 
Building on the theme that focusing on the facts alone, particularly the inevitable arguing about 
the uncertainties in the science, will not move forward the global response to the climate 
problem, some scholars call for a shift in the discourse away from the experts and towards 
narratives of hope. Simpson (2011, p. 3/6) argues that it would be much more helpful to “centre 
debates around the kind of societies we want, rather than being caught up in the scientific 
(un)certainties”. For Simpson “situated hope” is sitting side-by-side with doubt, “bedfellows, 
mutually entangled” (Simpson, 2011, p. 4/6). Taking the call for inclusiveness a step further 
some scholars would like to see the climate debate framed as the multiple appeals of all 
stakeholders to “life”. “Life” politics will bring new questions to the fore (Potter, 2009, p. 1/6): 
“Who speaks for life? How is life threatened by the caprices of state and market(?)”. This way 
of thinking about climate debates “opposes a prevalent moralistic framework that reads the 
practices and discourses of debate in terms of oppositional positions alone”. In this argument 
even the vilified agents of fossil fuel interests that manipulate scientific facts are part of a grand 
drama in which the actors “play out their claims to the project of life ... reveal(ing) a complex 
network of strategies and devices that seek to secure life in constantly renovated terms”. 
Rabinow and Rose (2006, p. 211) refer to “biopolitical circuits” that draw in the widest possible 
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array of actors and sites for the administration of “life”, including corporate and non-state 
interests for whom the maximisation of life’s qualities has become a concern. 
2.11 Conclusion 
This chapter describes the various theoretical lenses that scholars apply to the ACD sceptic 
phenomenon. Some of these have a less charitable assessment of the phenomenon than others. 
The less charitable interpretations include Jacques, Hamilton, Dunlap and others’ argument 
that scepticism as a vehicle for the defence of political conservatism, and the preservation of 
the neo-liberal free market status quo. The exposés of corporate and political machinations to 
discredit mainstream climate science, such as those provided by Oreskes, Gelbspan and others, 
are supported by damning evidence of the funding and facilitation of scepticism and sceptics 
by some powerful actors. The most damning interpretation of the sceptic phenomenon probably 
comes from Lewandowski and Cook, who add a pathological psychological aspect to ACD 
scepticism. They detect conspiricist ideation amongst sceptics, which is characteristic of a 
paranoid personality disorder.  
These accounts of the sceptic phenomenon, valid as they might be, have contributed to a 
generally unidimensional characterisation of scepticism and sceptics. In this characterisation 
scepticism is an aberration, and an impediment to healthy debate and sound decision making 
about the climate issue. The prevailing scholarly narrative of ACD scepticism is that the core 
claims of mainstream climate science are incontrovertible, and that doubt of the core claims is 
untenable. As such, sceptics are seen as either misguided in their criticisms of the science or 
being disingenuous with the science for the sake of their own causes. Given the seriousness of 
the climate problem, the narrative leaves no place for the sceptic persuasion in the climate 
debate, let alone climate policy making.  
The chapter, however, also registers the fact that there are respected non-sceptic scholarly 
voices that question the usefulness of the binary for-against storyline, that do not cast the 
sceptic position as an aberration, and that see room for reasonable debate about the most 
appropriate policy mix. Paramount amongst the more charitable contributions is the 
contributions made in the vein grid-group Cultural Theory. The explanation that scepticism is 
a cultural artefact is convincingly argued by Thompson, Verweij and others. Kahan combines 
this insight with the work of cognitive psychologists who show that sceptics rely on various 
heuristics and mental shortcuts when confronted by challenging climate information and 
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trends. Other scholars who have taken a more neutral approach include Pielke Jr. and Hulme. 
They do not propose accommodation of the sceptic argument, an impossibility given the 
strength of climate science, but that observers should look beyond the science dispute and try 
to understand that the values driving the sceptic persuasion have a place in deliberations about 
an appropriate climate response. They warn that enduring climate policy cannot be achieved 
without broad public acquiescence, which rests on a fair hearing of all discordant voices. 
This study critically examines the degree to which the prevailing characterisation of scepticism 
and sceptics holds, and as a result, whether there are aspects of the sceptic discourse or factions 
in the broad sceptic group that justify a fresh evaluation. There are suggestions in the preceding 
discussion of the various scholarly interpretations of the sceptic phenomenon that there is room 
for such a critical enquiry. The first and most obvious weakness of existing scholarly 
investigation is that the investigations of the activities of a very narrow band of sceptic elites 
have informed conclusions about the motivations and modus operandi of sceptics as a whole. 
For understandable reasons, sceptic elites are inaccessible for in-depth analysis of their 
personal views. However, their public discourse is available, and has been assessed in this 
study. A range of sceptic voices is directly investigated, unmediated and uninterpreted by the 
media or observers. 
Secondly, the literature has established a dual construction of scepticism and sceptics. Sceptics 
are shown to be captive to ideological, cultural and value dispositions which cause them to 
doubt the science. They are also shown to be manipulators and deceivers. Not victims, but 
masters of sowing doubt. Many times this dual construction falls into a lay-expert distinction. 
Lay sceptics are understood to be the victims of their own predispositions and cognitive 
failings. They are often portrayed as swayed by the activism of sceptic elites. In contrast, elite 
sceptics are held more directly accountable for their own views. Scholars are generally very 
unforgiving towards the so-called agents of scepticism, namely the dissenting scientists, 
conservative media professionals, conservative think-tanks, conservative politicians and self-
styled public activists. These individuals are denied the personal absolution for their views that 
any systemic explanation of scepticism might imply. 
This study gives an objective hearing to elite sceptics and does not assume ill intent, plausible 
as that might seem. The investigation of a broad spectrum of elite opinion undertaken here 
challenges the notion that sceptic elites consciously and deliberately construct the deceit 
implied by their scepticism. Although sceptic elites do find themselves associated with 
ideological and corporate actors who all have a stake in discrediting mainstream climate 
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science, it does not prove that they have ulterior motives in presenting their critiques of 
mainstream climate science. It is argued here that scholars should guard against being blinded 
by the views and machinations of a handful of entrenched sceptics, at the cost of recognising a 
more nuanced and fair representation of the broader sceptic position. 
A third weakness that emerges from the literature is the high premium scholars place on 
worldviews (as embodied in ideological preferences and cultural predispositions) as a primary 
driver of scepticism, whether it be subconsciously or consciously. Sceptics, most of whom can 
be assumed to be self-reflective intelligent individuals, vehemently deny that they are 
influenced in this way. This study places the spotlight on sceptics’ own explanations of their 
distrust of mainstream climate science and whether these might point to more mundane or non-
ideological explanations of the phenomenon. The ideological interpretation of scepticism is 
popular, but might be simplistic. 
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3 METHOD 
3.1 Introduction 
This study maps the ACD phenomenon conceptually. It also examines the public writings of 
sceptic elites with a view to describing in detail their objections to ACD science and 
progressive climate policies, and their motivating rationales. The writings/texts of Australian 
sceptics are analysed using both qualitative and quantitative methods. The texts under 
investigation are all articles written by individual sceptics for the op-ed pages of the 
mainstream printed media in Australia. For their quantitative analysis, the textual analysis 
software Leximancer is used. 
The methods described in this chapter are selectively applied in the subsequent substantive 
chapters. Due to their diverse foci, the substantive chapters each uses a selection of the methods 
described here. For instance, Chapter 4 is a critical reflection on expert understanding of the 
category, and consequently utilises a qualitative investigation of scholarly and other expert 
texts about sceptics and scepticism. Chapters 5 to 7 map the semantic features of a substantial 
number of texts produced by a fairly large group of sceptics and rely heavily on the textual 
analysis software. Chapter 8, again, investigates the views of a select number of prominent 
sceptics and returns to a qualitative interpretation of their texts. 
Following in this chapter is a discussion of the complexity of analysing verbal utterances and 
how a combination of quantitative and qualitative methods can help achieve reliable analysis. 
The software used for the quantitative analysis in some of the substantive chapters is described 
in some detail. A particular problematic aspect of computer assisted text analysis centres on 
the implications of sample composition for the results produced by the software, and 
considerable effort is made to discuss how this problem can be managed. Next, the steps in 
compiling the text sample for this study are described, followed by a description of the sample. 
The chapter then briefly sets out the different operations performed on the sample in chapters 
5 to 7. The chapter concludes with a reflection on the importance of observer neutrality. 
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3.2 Analysing argumentative texts 
The sceptic mind is accessed through the written texts of individual sceptics. It is a core 
assumption of this study that valid knowledge about the internal beliefs and motivations of 
individuals can be discovered from their spoken and written expressions. Four arguments 
provide confidence in this assumption. 
Firstly, the sceptics under investigation in this study live and work in a free and democratic 
society. There is no reason to suspect that the majority of sceptics investigated were under any 
kind of sanction or incentive that would have prevented them from expressing their true 
convictions. Secondly, the power relationship between sceptics and the establishment does not 
dictate public/private divergence. In other words, most sceptics operate as free agents and are 
not constrained by bureaucratic politics. Thirdly, the sceptics under investigation here can be 
considered intellectuals, and one can expect a reasonable measure of autonomy, effort and 
rigour in their expressed views. Finally, the genre of texts chosen, namely self-authored opinion 
articles in the mainstream printed media, favours reflective, rational and critical thinking. Texts 
from this genre are widely read and one might expect the sceptics would offer reasonably 
rigorous and durable views.  
It is important to acknowledge that some sceptics’ texts might be tainted or distorted by their 
performative intent. Some might employ rhetorical devices that obscure their true thoughts and 
beliefs. Texts produced for media consumption in particular are potentially problematic 
because they are attractive vehicles for influencing others and manipulating and shaping a 
debate. Sceptic elites might wish to convince readers of their own views, or they might try to 
discredit their opponents, or they might simply want to add another dimension to the debate in 
the interest of deliberation and balance. And depending on their intent, they might employ 
discursive strategies that deliberately over-emphasise, underplay, ignore or misrepresent their 
own and others’ views. Given the importance of public opinion in deciding climate policy, one 
should expect some rhetorical creativity with the facts from some sceptics, perhaps even 
deception from some extreme individuals. It is therefore conceivable that some sceptic 
arguments might not be a full representation of the individual’s beliefs. 
One way of navigating through this minefield is to consider the rhetorical styles one might 
expect from different types of media content. Waddell and McKenna (Waddell & McKenna, 
2005) distinguish between white, black, and grey rhetorics. White is the “Grecian agoric ideal”; 
it is a deliberative rhetoric, purposeful, and incorporates persuasive techniques and reasoned 
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argument to urge a specific action. Black rhetoric is mean-spirited, negatively emotional, and 
not focused on action. Grey rhetoric is “mere words, ritualized, abundant, and unproductive”. 
Black rhetoric can typically be found in public debates, at protest rallies, or in the so-called 
blogosphere with its free-for-all chatrooms and discussion threads. This is where a form of 
points-scoring and tit-for-tat rhetoric rules. Grey rhetoric is a more respectable kind and is 
typical of many political campaign speeches, media conferences, press releases, etc. These are 
often reported by the printed media in the third person. The white rhetoric that Waddell and 
McKenna describe is probably the most elusive, but if it is to be found in the printed media, it 
would be the self-authored opinion pieces on the centre pages. This is the space reserved for 
speakers and opinions of substance and serious debate. This is also the space targeted in this 
research, and a cursory inspection of the articles eventually included in the sample confirms 
that these texts generally approximate the white rhetorical style. 
Distortion of people’s expressed views can also occur at a subconscious level. The effects of 
cognitive dissonance avoidance, in-group/out-group dynamics, the use of various heuristics 
and the role of affect and imagery in shaping people’s opinions have been thoroughly described 
in the literature (Kahan & Braman, 2006, pp. 152 - 154). Empirical evidence shows that these 
mechanisms play a role at all levels of the public, from the politically “unsophisticated”, to the 
well informed, intellectually inclined, “sophisticated” (Kahan & Braman, 2006, p. 161). There 
is therefore no reason to believe sceptic elites are not susceptible to these influences. However, 
the process is much more complex in the case of intellectuals. Whereas the cognitive distortions 
might be particularly powerful in the case of lay persons – “Having neither the time nor skills 
to weigh up each piece of evidence” the lay person “fall(s) back on decision-making shortcuts 
formed by our education, politics and class” (Marshall, 2009) – intellectuals might be less 
prone to superficial cognitive escapes and heuristics, and thus achieve and maintain attitude-
behaviour consistency. Research has found that politically sophisticated individuals have 
strongly correlated views on a range of issues (Kahan & Braman, 2006, p. 161), which suggests 
that they form their opinions in a more deliberate fashion in order to achieve coherence and 
rigour. Sceptic elites who invest time and intellectual effort in formulating their ideas, can 
therefore be assumed to have carefully considered their arguments, especially when they offer 
their views as semi-formal written texts designed for public consumption. It is to be expected 
that they would construct arguments that are reasonably sophisticated, defensible and durable. 
Interestingly, it is precisely because of intellectuals’ assumed rationality that observers hold 
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sceptic elites to account for their views, as opposed to the lay public who are easily excused 
for being astray on the climate issue. 
The above discussion illustrates the difficulty of establishing the true motivations of speakers, 
or the degree to which their expressions are true reflections of their inner beliefs. It is proposed, 
however, that if a large and varied sample assembled from a genre of speech that is conducive 
to serious expression, as is attempted in this study, produces significant thematic patterns for 
which there are plausible explanations other than mere rhetorical devices, the astute researcher 
should take notice. The exploration of the data would then have achieved its purpose, namely 
to flag potential new insights into the phenomenon. 
3.3 Two-fold analysis 
The text sample is analysed by both qualitative and quantitative means. Depending on the 
investigative target, which differs between Chapters 5 to 8, either a purely qualitative or a mix 
of qualitative and quantitative methods is employed (see the section 3.8 Operations on the 
sample for an outline of which approaches were followed in which chapters). 
The combination of qualitative and quantitative methods in research has a long history and is 
well established. The way it is implemented in this study approaches Widdowson’s (2004) 
notion of an analytic phase (the description of the textual features) and an interpretation phase 
(establishing the meaning of the textual features with reference to the wider body of the 
discourse). The same logic is to be found in Babbie’s notion of manifest and latent content, 
where the former refers to the “visible, surface content of communication” and the latter to the 
underlying meaning of the communication derived through interpretation of the material 
(Babbie, 1995, p. 312). 
The quantitative examination of the text sample is conducted with a view to detecting and 
describing its semantic features, i.e. the semantic repertoires and preferences of sceptics.5 The 
quantitative metrics targeted include the range, frequencies and associations of key words. 
Following the generation of the quantitative data, the underlying text to which the semantic 
features are pointing is qualitatively examined with a view to interpreting the quantitative data 
                                                          
5 Semantics relating to the technical debate of the physical scientific evidence is excluded from the 
analysis because it is unlikely to shed light on the worldview/ideological pre-occupations of sceptics or 
other non-epistemic drivers in their rationales. 
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and drawing inferences. To the degree that it is possible, the quantitative data is generated 
automatically, i.e. with minimal researcher mediation and with the aid of computer software. 
The quantitative part of the investigation allows the sceptic discourse to surrender relevant 
concepts and themes. It focuses researcher attention in an inductive manner and counters 
possible researcher bias in the identification of relevant themes. It is a keystone of this research 
that the textual data should dictate which themes and topics receive attention and are reported 
by the researcher. 
The qualitative part of the analysis is important because there are limits to what the quantitative 
data can reveal. The quantitative analysis is good at revealing the gross semantic features and 
ostensible pre-occupations of the discourse, and can, with appropriate calibration, reveal minor 
concepts and themes. It can also indicate the context of concepts and themes through 
association metrics. However, qualitative investigation of the text in situ is necessary to verify 
the relevance of semantic features, and to establish the full meaning of the sceptic. The meaning 
of an utterance can hinge on innocuous elements such as the person’s choice of verb, or his/her 
sequence of the argument. The qualitative investigation also helps to identify peculiarities in 
the discourse that semantic metrics cannot reveal, such as ambiguous use of language and 
rhetorical devices. 
3.4 Computer aided text analysis  
The program Leximancer was chosen for the quantitative analytic tasks in this study. 
Leximancer was developed and released in 2000 by the Key Centre for Human Factors and 
Applied Cognitive Psychology at the University of Queensland, Australia. It exploits the 
quantifiable characteristics of text and was designed as a general data mining and analysis tool 
from which analysts could extract themes, concepts, and ideas, while concurrently attaching 
contextual meaning and understanding (Martin & Rice, 2007, p. 191). The use of Leximancer 
to extract conceptual networks and make sense of large text samples is well established in 
scholarly literature (see Cretchley, Rooney, & Gallois, 2010; Isakhan, 2006; Martin & Rice, 
2007; Rooney, 2005; Waddell & McKenna, 2007). 
3.4.1 The Leximancer analysis 
The Leximancer analysis performs two types of analysis of a given text, namely conceptual 
and relational analysis. Its conceptual analysis measures the presence and frequency of 
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concepts in the text. A concept can be a single word or a collection of words that represent a 
distinct idea. Leximancer’s relational analysis measures how the identified concepts are related 
to each other through their co-occurrence in pre-defined coding blocks (Leximancer, 2010). 
The result of the conceptual analysis is reported in a ranked concept list, and the result of the 
relational analysis is reported in a two-dimensional concept map that plots the concepts relative 
to their strength of association.  
Examining the statistical associations of words in a text sample has several advantages. Firstly, 
it reduces the potential for researcher bias. Quantifying the semantics of a sample has the 
advantage of grounded research in general, namely that the data drives the explanation of the 
phenomenon. Sophisticated computer programs, like the one used in this research, are designed 
to learn in a “grounded fashion what the main concepts in a corpus are and how they relate to 
each other” (McKenna & Rooney, 2005, p. 6), thereby developing grounded concepts and 
categories, as opposed to imposing their detection in the text (B. L. Berg, 2004, p. 248). The 
method therefore reduces potential bias on the part of the analyst by limiting the human element 
in the analytical process, particularly in the early stages of the analysis (Waddell & McKenna, 
2007, p. 380). It leaves the conceptual classification of the sample open-ended, i.e. not exposed 
to a predetermined ontology on the part of the analyst.  
A second advantage centres on the ability of the semantic metrics to resolve the themes and 
pre-occupations of any amount of textual data, which is particularly useful for the study of a 
discourse. The use of word frequency and co-occurrence information in this way has been 
described as follows: “(i)t is (a) ... fundamental task ...to note, in the discourse (being studied) 
just what terms habitually occur, what segments of the society’s world enjoy constant 
discursive attention. Clusters of related terms are found to mark out distinct kinds of 
preoccupation and topic” (Fowler, 1991, p. 82); and “analysis of the most frequently occurring 
words provides quantitative evidence of topical preoccupations” (Martinson, 2009, p. 57). The 
validity of these metrics for the accurate topical description of texts has been shown in studies 
where Leximancer results were compared to hand coding and other best practise methods (A. 
E. Smith & Humphreys, 2006). A cautionary note is required here. Although the themes and 
pre-occupations of a given text sample can be reliably inferred from the two metrics of 
frequency and co-occurrence, the statistical information can be too superficial to reliably infer 
causal or logical relationships between concepts. Qualitative investigation of the underlying 
text is still necessary to establish the author’s meaning when and where the concepts are used 
in close proximity. 
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Other advantages of computer aided text analysis are that it helps to systematise the analysis, 
that it facilitates the retrieval of evidence from the sample, and that the research data can be 
reproduced. 
The two main analytical outputs of the Leximancer analysis, the ranked concept list and the 
concept map, are discussed next. 
3.4.2 Ranked concept list 
Leximancer discovers concepts on the basis of the frequency of occurrence and association of 
a relatively consistent group of defining terms. In Leximancer parlance, concepts are 
“collections of words that generally travel together throughout the text” (Leximancer, 2005, 
2010). Leximancer lists and ranks all discovered concepts in a so-called ranked concept list. 
Some concepts are central whilst others are subordinate. Central concepts would be those that 
appear frequently and often in association with a range of other concepts. They represent the 
overarching topical interest of the whole text sample and can be expected at the top of the 
ranked concept list. Lower ranked concepts are also meaningful and signify confined topics or 
sub-themes in the text. In addition to the ranked concept list, Leximancer has a prominence 
metric.  This metric expresses attractions (relations) between concepts in both directions and 
is derived from the weighted frequencies of the concepts co-occurring whenever one of the two 
is present. Concepts with strong relational bonds indicate that they are used coherently, i.e. in 
shared contexts, thus suggesting thematic unity and meaning. The metric is accessed through 
Leximancer’s dashboard functionality (Leximancer, 2010). 
The ranked concept list is generated automatically by the software and might contain concepts 
that are spurious, ambiguous or irrelevant to the researcher. It is considered normal practice in 
computer aided text analysis to remove the unwanted concepts or merge similar concepts over 
a number of iterations in order to achieve a parsimonious concept list (Stockwell, Colomb, 
Smith, & Wiles, 2009, p. 429). Existing practice with Leximancer has shown that it is not 
uncommon to cull up to 50% of the original list of concepts that was automatically generated. 
This is in keeping with the inherent requirement of any research project to match the analytical 
tools with the needs of the analyst (Stockwell et al., 2009, p. 434). 
Normally, the concept list is a trade-off between meaningfulness and comprehensiveness. In 
other words, the more concepts the program is allowed to discover, the less meaningful the 
discovered concepts become. The researcher has two options to deal with spurious, ambiguous 
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or irrelevant concepts: either to allow the program to initially discover a large number of 
concepts and then manually pare down the concept list, or to recalibrate the program to discover 
fewer concepts from the outset. There is merit in the first approach because the most relevant 
concepts for a particular research objective are not always clustered at the top of the ranked 
concept list, where ranking is determined by the combined metric of frequency of use and 
connectedness. Concepts need to be chosen for their fit with the research focus, and it is 
accepted practice to accept concepts that might be less frequent or less explicit than some of 
the top ranked concepts (Waddell & McKenna, 2007, p. 385). The advantage of the second 
approach is that interpretation of the concept list is facilitated because it is not cluttered with 
unnecessary concepts. Because this study aims to discover and describe variety in sceptic 
views, the more inclusive first approach is favoured. 
A technique for distinguishing between concepts and helping to identify relevant concepts is 
to class the concepts on the ranked concept list according to the following categories. (The 
proposed categories have been found useful in this research, but might be augmented or revised 
by analysts with different research interests and objectives.) 
- Substantive or categorical concepts (main themes) 
- Supportive or subsidiary concepts (sub-themes) 
- Attribute concepts (concepts that describe or qualify thematic concepts, e.g. lack, least, 
major, best, etc.) 
- Generic concepts (concepts that have generic meanings and are used in multiple 
contexts, e.g. week, month, having, given, based, group, including, due, etc.) 
- Polysemic concepts (concepts that have dual meanings, e.g. australian, which could 
refer to a person or the national newspaper The Australian.) 
- Peripheral concepts (concepts that are of no or low relevance to the themes in the text, 
e.g. dr for Doctor, copyright for Copyright reserved, etc.) 
3.4.3 Concept map 
Leximancer has the added feature of representing the ranked concept list on a so-called concept 
map. The concept map is a particularly useful and popular feature of the program because it 
provides a “bird’s eye view of the material” (Leximancer, 2010, p. 4). The concept map spaces 
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and sizes the concepts on a two-dimensional plane in such a way that the underlying frequency 
and co-occurrence information is evident. 
The map typically shows some identifiable concept clusters, outliers, as well as some areas that 
are less structured. The concept clusters are potentially of interest because they indicate strong 
intra-relational bonds and thus very likely represent distinct sub-topics/themes in the discourse 
(Leximancer, 2010, p. 14). When concepts appear in polarised positions, it is indicative of weak 
relationships and mutually exclusive contexts. Figure 3-1 provides an illustrative example of a 
concept map, showing concept clusters, polarised positions and outliers.6  The circles and 
arrows were added to explain the significance of specific areas on the map. 
  
                                                          
6 A similar mapping device is used by scholars studying the inter-relationships between actors and 
organisational units constituting a ‘movement’. It is interesting that in both mapping devices the most 
fundamental unit of analysis is a singular entity (a word in the case of a semantic field or discourse, and 
an individual person in the case of a movement). These fundamental units are then grouped and 
organised at increasing levels of aggregation and abstraction, thereby creating a composite 
representation of the whole discourse or movement. See an example of a visual presentation of a 
movement in Doyle and Kellow (1995, p. 91). 
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Figure 3-1: Illustrative example of a computer generated concept map 
 
 
It is important to note that it is very difficult to 100% accurately represent the statistical 
relationships between multiple concepts on a two-dimensional plane (e.g. a concept map with 
100 concepts). All the concepts are attracted to all other concepts to varying degrees (the co-
occurrence metrics) and some distortion of their true relationships might occur when they are 
forced into a two-dimensional space. The concept map is therefore a best-fit representation of 
the relationships between the various concepts (Leximancer, 2005). The reliability of the 
representation provided by the concept map can be improved by regenerating the map several 
times to allow the concepts to settle in their natural places. A stable map, which occurs when 
repeated reconstructions generally produce the same spatial configuration of concepts, 
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increases confidence that the visual representation of the concepts reflect their true relative 
strengths of association (Leximancer, 2005). 
3.4.4 Inclusivity vs representativeness 
Computerised text analysis has one of two purposes: to provide a proportionate semantic 
representation of the text sample, one that reflects concepts and themes relative to their strength 
of occurrence in the text, or to provide a thematically inclusive representation of the text 
sample, one that reflects a cross-section of the voices present in the sample. For the purpose of 
whole discourse characterisation undertaken in this study, sampling and processing methods 
have been chosen to capture the most inclusive semantic range. To achieve this goal requires 
careful consideration of the inherent problems associated with multivocal text samples, i.e. text 
samples in which the texts of multiple authors are combined. These problems and how they 
can be managed are discussed next. 
3.5 The problem of unbalanced text samples 
Homogenous text samples, i.e. those that originate from a singular source and are topically 
confined, are the ideal to achieve accurate characterisation by the software. The software 
representation would, typically, accentuate the dominant concepts and themes, and report 
subordinate concepts and themes only to the degree that they are significant (the preferred 
granularity of the analysis is a researcher decision and can be adjusted through various software 
settings). The software typically highlights strong associations and dissociations between 
concepts and themes, which makes visible the outstanding conceptual features, the gross 
semantic terrain, of the text sample. With homogenous text samples, the characterisation 
achieved can indeed be used to make inferences about the interests and pre-occupations of the 
author. The standard calibration (default settings) of text mining software generally assumes a 
homogenous sample and that the researcher is interested in a proportionate characterisation of 
the text, in other words, that the researcher wishes to draw conclusions about the topical pre-
occupations of the text as a whole. 
Complications arise, however, with text samples, such as in this study, that contain texts of 
different lengths from different authors with different rhetorical styles. Firstly, concepts from 
the larger constituent or semantically more concentrated parts might dominate the 
characterisation of the sample and potentially displace relevant concepts from minority parts 
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or parts that are semantically and thematically dispersed. The outcrowding of minority concepts 
occurs through sheer proliferation of concepts contributed by the large subsets. In an 
unbalanced sample, concepts peculiar to minority parts, therefore, disappear from the view of 
the researcher, either through non-reporting in the results, or, more likely, through being 
subsumed in the definitions of more general and/or pervasive concepts. Secondly, the concepts 
captured by an unmediated software run do manage to capture themes in the sample, and often 
tell a coherent and interesting story of the discourse in the sample. However, there is no 
guarantee that unmediated themes tell the full story or that such themes are reliable in the sense 
that their nominal meaning concurs with their underlying meaning. Researchers who are 
unaware of the potential impact of a sample’s composition on its conceptual characterisation 
might uncritically accept unmediated results. And thirdly, an unmediated run of the software 
normally provides no mechanism for verifying that all relevant concepts and themes have in 
fact been captured, and how the captured concepts are spread in the sample. In other words, 
have all the voices been heard, and who said what? 
It is important that researchers are aware of these issues in their interpretation of the computer 
generated conceptual characterisation of the sample. Researchers need to match their research 
objective (either a proportionally accurate or thematically inclusive characterisation) with their 
composition of the sample and their choice of processing strategy.  Various degrees of user 
intervention might be necessary to produce optimal results. In particular, if researchers were 
interested in a thematically inclusive characterisation of their samples, more active user 
interventions would be required. The next section describes the measures and devices used to 
manage an unbalanced text sample in the Leximancer environment. 
3.6 Managing unbalanced samples 
3.6.1 Enlarging the analytic frame 
Text mining software usually extracts more concepts than are actually analysed in any amount 
of detail by users. Depending on the size of the dataset, a program like Leximancer typically 
extracts 30-50 concepts. However, researchers usually zoom in on only the 5 to 10 top ranked 
concepts because it is a practical number for detailed investigation. Also, the top ranked 
concepts are usually defining (they really are the high semantic terrain) of the text. In contrast, 
lower order concepts might look dense, unfamiliar and scattered in terms of meaning. The 
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reality is that researchers are drawn to the top layer of concepts in their analyses and tend to 
neglect lower order ones. 
Limiting the analytic frame in this way excludes potentially valuable concepts that are 
relatively less frequent and/or less connected. The most obvious strategy to obtain a better 
representation of the sample would therefore be for researchers to simply investigate a larger 
number of the concepts offered by the software. The researcher would almost certainly broaden 
his/her characterisation of the sample, and potentially add dimensions residing in the smaller 
subsets of the sample. In this study, all the concepts produced by Leximancer were considered 
for possible analysis. 
3.6.2 Deepening concept discovery 
Most users are content to work with the default software settings for concept discovery, which 
de facto limits the number of concepts discovered and displayed. In Leximancer, “a naturally 
emergent number of concepts” is extracted from the data, given the granularity settings of the 
software. This means that the software will limit the number of discovered concepts, even if 
the dataset is very large and diverse. Experimentation in Leximancer with topically similar but 
different sized datasets showed diminishing numbers of discovered concepts are achieved as 
the size of the dataset increases, which potentially means that relatively rare but still relevant 
concepts and themes from minority parts of the sample could be excluded. 
To capture greater detail from large and diverse datasets, researchers need to experiment with 
the software’s granularity settings.  The purpose would be to make visible concepts that are 
buried deep in the text, i.e. those that are less frequent and less connected to other concepts. 
The number of concepts to be discovered is, in Leximancer, controlled through its “number of 
concepts to be discovered” and “boilerplate” settings. Without experimenting with these 
granularity settings, the user would be generally unable to tell if the results might be hiding 
potentially relevant concepts and themes. 
This strategy is most useful if the user is simply interested in detecting a larger number of 
concepts and themes, regardless of where in the sample they occur. Their connectedness with 
other concepts and integration with the sample at large would be visible through the concept 
map, which would display well-connected and integrated concepts in central or otherwise 
populated regions of the map, and those that are less connected and less integrated in isolated 
regions of the map space.  
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In this study Leximancer was calibrated to discover a relatively large number of concepts (it 
was set to a maximum of 100 concepts per sceptic) in order to insure that all relevant 
subordinate concepts are indeed captured. 
3.6.3 Equalising sample subsets 
A final strategy is to manually balance the sample in the pre-processing stage. The objective 
here is to equalise the sample subset sizes in order to give each of the voices in the sample a 
reasonable chance to be heard. The level of equalisation is a researcher decision and might be 
partly determined by the size of the smallest subset(s). For instance, if the smallest subsets fall 
within the range of 10,000 to 20,000 words, the researcher could decide to cap all subsets at a 
number close to 20,000 words. 
Size equivalence between the constitutive parts of the sample is not a guarantee that all relevant 
concepts would be included in the software results. The most obscure concepts might still be 
invisible due to relatively low frequency and low connectivity. Yet, equalising a sample’s 
subsets is a relatively easy task, would not compromise discovery of the major semantic 
features of the sample, and does hold the potential of a more inclusive characterisation of the 
sample. This next section describes how the text sample for this study was equalised. 
3.7 Sample composition 
3.7.1 The target population 
The sampling strategy described in this section is aimed at capturing a comprehensive range of 
published sceptic views and arguments in Australia. As such, it facilitates the research objective 
to investigate and describe diversity in sceptic thinking. The study wishes to gain insight into 
the range of thinking and arguments offered by sceptics, regardless of whether a particular view 
or line of argument is dominant or not. Inclusivity is therefore important in compiling a 
working sample. It has been noted by scholars that in order to gain a deep understanding of a 
given discourse, it is important to include as many texts and sceptics (who are presumed to be 
speakers of the discourse) as possible in the analysis (Milliken, 1999, p. 233). 
The sample aims to capture the views of individuals who can be considered discourse leaders, 
for they have made public their positions on the climate issue through writings, speeches, 
participation in climate related campaigns or involvement in climate related organisations. 
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They are, in effect, the exponents of the sceptic discourse. Although they come from a variety 
of backgrounds and have varying degrees of expertise in the field of climate science, they are 
all well-educated and have professional backgrounds of high status. 
A pool of individuals of interest was compiled through a snowball method. The first 
identification round involved the scanning of all Australian websites (political parties, 
organisations and individuals) dedicated to questioning climate science and/or undertaking 
activism on the issue. These first tier sceptic websites are listed in Table 3-1. The use of 
websites to identify relevant individuals and to source material for samples is known practice 
in scholarly research (see Lack, 2013, p. 25). 
Table 3-1: Sceptic websites 
http://climatesceptics.net/ Australian Climate Sceptics Party 
http://theclimatescepticsparty.blogspot.com/  
http://www.auscsc.org.au/ Australian Climate Science Coalition 
http://carbon-sense.com/ The Carbon Sense Coalition 
http://www.galileomovement.com.au/galileo_movement.php The Galileo Movement 
http://www.australianclimatemadness.com/  
http://climate-cassandra.blogspot.com/  
http://www.conscious.com.au/  
http://joannenova.com.au/  
 
A second identification round involved following the recommended links from the above 
websites in order to reach a collection of second tier websites that are strongly sympathetic to 
the sceptic cause and for whom promotion of scepticism is one of a range of objectives. These 
websites were investigated with a view to identifying further individuals who identify with the 
sceptic cause. Table 3-2 shows these second tier sceptic websites. 
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Table 3-2: Sceptic sympathetical websites  
http://www.ipa.org.au/ Institute of Public Affairs 
http://www.lavoisier.com.au/index.php Lavoisier Group 
http://wearechangewa.com/ We Are Change WA 
http://australianlibertarian.wordpress.com/ Australian Libertarian Society 
http://aefweb.info/ Australian Environment Foundation 
http://www.australianpatriotsdefencemovement.org/ Australian Patriots Defence Movement 
http://www.facebook.com/ 
#!/group.php?gid=1276759405802 51 Australian Defence League  
http://austeaparty.com.au/web/ T.E.A. Party 
http://sciencespeak.com/  
http://australianconservative.com/  
http://jennifermarohasy.com/blog/  
http://www.dontcopit.com/  
http://ozcentral.blogspot.com/  
http://www.nocarbontax.com.au/  
http://blogs.theaustralian.news.com.au/janetalbrechtsen/  
http://timblair.net/ 
http://blogs.news.com.au/dailytelegraph/timblair/  
http://blogs.news.com.au/dailytelegraph/mirandadevine/ 
http://mirandadevine.com/  
 
A third identification round involved checking the signatories of sceptic declarations such as 
the Manhattan Declaration (International Climate Science Coalition) for Australian sceptics. 
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A fourth identification involved checking websites, books and articles that try to expose and 
debunk sceptics and their arguments. Table 3-3 lists the anti-sceptic sources consulted. 
Table 3-3: Anti-sceptic sources 
http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=Climate_change_sceptics 
http://watchingthedeniers.wordpress.com/ 
http://www.scepticalscience.com/ 
Hamilton, C., Scorcher: The Dirty Politics of Climate Change, Black Inc Agenda, Melbourne Vic, 
2007. 
Pearse, G., High and Dry: John Howard, climate change and the selling of Australia’s future, Penguin 
Group, Camberwell, Vic, 2007. 
Hamilton, C., Meet the new dirty dozen, Crikey, 2009. 
Hamilton, C., Requiem for a Species, Allen&Unwin, Crows Nest NSW, 2010. 
 
Finally, sceptics were identified on an ad hoc basis through continuous monitoring of media 
reports on climate science and policies. 
The culmination of these successive identification rounds was a pool of 285 individuals of 
interest. This pool constitutes the target population whose written texts were searched for 
possible inclusion in a text sample. 
3.7.2 Compilation of the text sample 
A search was conducted on the Factiva media database for articles authored by any of 285 
individuals of interest (the target population) during the period 01/01/2007 to 31/12/2012. The 
search specified three criteria: 
- Self-authored texts: That the individual is specified as the author of the article. 
- Relevant domain: That either of the compounds ‘global warming’ and ‘climate change’ 
is present in the lead paragraph of the article. This ensures that the article is primarily 
concerned with the climate problem, and excludes articles that might refer to the climate 
problem somewhere in the text but are primarily concerned with a different domain. 
- Relevant issue within the domain: That any form of the stems science, evidence and 
data is present anywhere in the text. This ensures that the individuals are speaking on 
the question of the validity of the science, in other words that they are speaking as 
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‘sceptics’. It is important to isolate texts that capture the sceptic discourse per se. The 
study aims to investigate not just any climate view of an individual, but how sceptics 
rationalise their judgements and choices about the climate problem in the context of 
their reading of the science. 
The Factiva search returned positive results for 53 of the 285 individuals of interest. All of the 
search results were scanned for relevance, genre homogeneity, duplicates and self-authored 
status. 10 individuals were dropped as a result of the scanning exercise, leaving the texts from 
43 sceptics in the sample See Appendix 11.1 for a list of the included sceptics. 
The spread of professional backgrounds amongst the selected sceptics is shown in Table 3-4. 
These backgrounds were current for the period 01/01/2007 to 31/12/2012. In some cases they 
are different to the original professional qualifications of the individuals. 
Table 3-4: Professional backgrounds of selected sceptics 
Academic (Earth sciences) 6 
Academic (Economic sciences) 2 
Academic (Human sciences) 2 
Artist 1 
Business 5 
Clergy 1 
IT 1 
Engineering 3 
Journalism 14 
Legal 1 
Medical 1 
Politics 6 
 43 
 
The number of texts returned per sceptic ranged from 86 for the most prolific to one text each 
for 11 sceptics. In the interest of inclusivity all the sceptics were retained in the sample, but the 
number of texts from the most prolific ones were pared down to achieve a more even spread of 
textual evidence. (Refer to the earlier discussion of the need for a balanced text sample in the 
context of computer assisted content analysis.) The paring down was achieved through 
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selecting every nth article in order to reach a target of 10 selections per individual. The final 
result was a text sample comprising 43 sceptics and 153 individual texts, with a maximum of 
10 texts per sceptic.  
The spread of the texts over the period 01/01/2007 to 31/12/2012 is shown in Figure 3-2. Each 
line represents one article. The dense strips correlate with milestones in the public debate, 
which generated a flood of articles. Article concentrations can be seen in the figure in 
April/May 2009, which coincide with the release and ensuing debate of sceptic Ian Plimer’s 
book Heaven and Earth, and November/December 2009, which coincided with the so-called 
Climategate email exposé, the defeat of climate legislation in the Australian Parliament and the 
Copenhagen summit. 
Figure 3-2: The spread of sceptic texts in the sample 
 
 
The articles included in the sample were published in a range of media titles, spanning the 
political spectrum from left to right, as shown in Table 3-5. Most appeared, as could be 
expected, in titles from the centre-right stable of the Murdoch media empire, such as The 
Australian and the Daily Telegraph. It is interesting that titles of the rival centre-left Fairfax 
Media group, such as the Sydney Morning Herald and The Age, did publish a sizable number 
of sceptic articles, which demonstrates the general newsworthiness of the issue during the time 
period under review. 
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Table 3-5: The media titles under which the articles in the sample were published. 
Australian Doctor 1 
Canberra Times 2 
Crikey 2 
Daily Telegraph 23 
Geelong Advertiser 2 
Herald-Sun 9 
Hobart Mercury 1 
National Post 4 
Saskatoon Star Phoenix 1 
South China Morning Post 1 
Sunday Herald 2 
Sunday Telegraph 7 
The Advertiser 4 
The Age 10 
The Australian 48 
The Australian Financial Review 11 
The Conversation 1 
The Courier-Mail 3 
The Mail on Sunday 1 
The Newcastle Herald 6 
The Sunday Telegraph 1 
The Sydney Morning Herald 12 
WA Business News 1 
 153 
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3.7.3 Sample representativeness 
Some unavoidable biases in the sample need to be acknowledged: 
- Different public profiles: Not all sceptic elites are publicly visible. There are sceptics 
who play important roles in sceptically inclined organisations or who maintain sceptical 
blogs and websites, but are unknown because they do not publish or speak as 
individuals. And amongst those who are publicly known, some are highly visible, like 
those who have publishing and broadcasting platforms, whilst others produce limited 
material that can be used for analysis. As discussed previously, this problem is managed 
through creating a balanced text sample.   
- Political and professional constraints: Many sceptic elite members are in politically 
sensitive positions where they are unable to express their views freely, or deliberately 
avoid public exposure on the climate issue so as not to attract negative attention to their 
business or professional interests. Sceptics in political parties are often constrained by 
party policy and some sceptics in academia might be careful not to raise the ire of 
colleagues and peers. Such politically and professionally constrained individuals 
generally do not publish or speak publicly on the climate issue per se. 
- Personal constraints: Some sceptics are not natural writers and prefer to voice their 
opinions orally only. A good example is the Australian mining magnate Gina Rinehart. 
She is well-known as a sceptic and has expressed her views on numerous occasions in 
speeches at meetings and during interviews, but has very rarely published written text. 
A Factiva search (in February 2013) of articles authored by Reinhardt across all dates 
returned only four, of which only one contained references to climate change or global 
warming.  
- Choice of genre: The words and concepts used in natural language can differ markedly 
from those used in semi-formal and formal texts like academic papers. Words and 
concepts might also be differently clustered, depending on the genre. The computer 
aided text analysis relies on words and concepts to be shared across the sample, and to 
occur in typical proximities to other words and concepts. It is therefore necessary to 
restrict the text sample to a specific genre, in this case self-authored opinion articles in 
the mainstream printed media. This means that some sceptics might be under-
represented in the sample, for instance those who speak prolifically but rarely publish, 
or those who only publish in scientific journals. 
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- Database constraints: The texts considered for inclusion in the sample are drawn from 
one database, Factiva. Factiva covers a vast range of national and regional papers, TV 
channels, newswires, trade and consumer publications and websites and is often used 
for sample compilation in scholarly literature (Factiva). However, its coverage is driven 
by commercial and licensing considerations. News sources with low circulation and/or 
local reach are excluded, which might exclude the views of lower profile sceptics from 
the analysis. The more prominent sceptics, though, would be published in the larger 
media titles, which are all covered by Factiva. And because the higher profile sceptics 
act as sceptic opinion leaders, it is unlikely that the text sources not covered by Factiva 
would contain unique sceptic perspectives. 
- Time frame of the sample: Self-authored texts published in the period 01/01/2007 to 
31/12/2012 were considered for inclusion in the sample. The choice of time period was 
discretionary but has the advantage that it spans a period characterised by several key 
political developments in which the climate issue featured prominently. The intense 
debate about the climate issue that occurred in this period ensures a rich source of 
related texts. 
3.8 Significance of the time period 
The start date of the period of the text sample is significant because the IPCC issued the 
Summary for Policy Makers of its Fourth Assessment Report in February 2007, followed by 
the full report (AR4) in April 2007. AR4 came to be viewed as the definitive statement on 
climate change. The SPM in particular set out those scientific claims that were considered 
beyond reasonable doubt representing the essential consensus of the scientific community. The 
report set the terms of the debate for the entire period, with sceptics challenging the claims in 
the report and the processes followed by the IPCC, and apologetics explaining and defending 
the claims and processes. AR4 has, therefore, provided a reference point for the identification 
and classification of what should be considered as sceptical or denialist thinking. 
In the Australian context 2007 is significant because Labor assumed government after more 
than 10 years of Liberal/National rule during which time little progress was made on climate 
change policies. Then Prime-Minister Kevin Rudd ratified the Kyoto Protocol in December 
2007, and bipartisan negotiations for carbon reduction legislation (the so-called Carbon 
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Pollution Reduction Scheme) progressed. AR4 and the momentum towards incisive climate 
policies galvanised the sceptic response and in the ensuing years sceptics undertook several 
engagements and campaigns to question the scientific justification for climate policies that 
might impact on consumers, jobs and economic growth in general. By 2009 bipartisan support 
for an Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) evaporated, Tony Abbott assumed the leadership of 
the Liberal Party (and the opposition) on the basis of his opposition to the ETS, and the 
legislation was withdrawn from Parliament. Labor eventually suspended the ETS in the 
beginning of 2010. By the middle of 2010 the Labor party was thrown in turmoil when Julia 
Gillard overthrew Kevin Rudd as Labor leader and assumed the Prime Ministership. An 
election followed in August 2010, which forced Labor into a minority government with the 
support of the Greens and Independents. In February 2011 then Prime Minister Julia Gillard 
re-opened the carbon pricing debate with the support of the Greens and Independents, and 
announced that a carbon tax (officially called Securing A Clean Energy Future) would be 
introduced. A period of intense campaigning by the opposition and sceptics against the 
proposed legislation followed, but it was approved by Parliament in November 2011 and 
eventually implemented in July 2012. The scheme was, however, doomed and became the 
catalyst for a Coalition election victory 2013 and its subsequent repeal of the Act. The period 
is, therefore, highly relevant for a study of climate views.  
3.9 Operations on the sample 
The sampling strategy outlined above means that first, the target population might not be 
complete or 100% representative of the all sceptic elites in Australia, and second that the chosen 
texts are not 100% representative of the target population. However, given the number of 
individuals included, their spread in terms of professional background, the number of 
individual texts included, the relatively long time period covered, and the variety of media 
outlets that carried the articles, it is proposed that the text sample is sufficient for the 
exploratory nature of this research. 
The operations that were performed on the sample depended on the intention and focus of the 
enquiry, and varied from chapter to chapter. The choices of method for each chapter are 
discussed next in the interest of clarifying and justifying why the computerised textual analysis 
method was only used in some chapters, and with slight variations between those chapters. 
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Chapter 4 entails a qualitative investigation of expert views on how the category ACD 
scepticism might be conceptually deconstructed and delineated. No quantitative method 
applies to this chapter. Chapter 5 has only an indirect quantitative element in that judgements 
are made about the relative prominence of sceptical themes and concepts. Chapter 6, which 
aims to identify all salient themes in the sceptic discourse in order to reveal the ostensible pre-
occupations of sceptics, lends itself to quantitative analysis. Because the main sceptic 
arguments are familiar and repeated in similar terms by sceptics, although in varying 
combinations and intensities, these pre-occupations and arguments are visible in the semantics 
of the discourse and can be quantified. The benefits of quantification and particularly computer 
assisted quantification have been noted earlier in this chapter under the headings Two-step 
analysis and Computer aided text analysis. The operations on the sample undertaken in Chapter 
6 include computer aided concept identification for the texts of each sceptic, classification of 
concepts to purge ambiguous and low semantic value concepts, collation of the concept lists of 
the different sceptics to find shared concepts, co-occurrence metrics of the shared concepts, 
concept visualisation with a computer generated concept map, and a hierarchical clustering test 
to verify the Leximancer co-occurrence map. These operations are unique to Chapter 6 and are 
described in greater detail there. Chapter 7, which is aimed at identifying the policy related 
themes and concepts in the sceptic discourse, also utilises the quantitative analysis of the text 
sample. A quantitative approach is suitable here because the main sceptic pre-occupations and 
rationales in relation to policy are familiar and repeated in similar terms by the sceptics. The 
operations on the sample undertaken in Chapter 7 include generation of a concept map, 
identification of concept regions and clusters, identification of policy related concepts, co-
occurrences of policy related concepts with the term ‘policy’, and finally the extraction of text 
segments containing the co-occurrences. These steps are described in greater detail in Chapter 
7. Chapter 8 describes the policy views of a select group of sceptics in order to gain a finer 
grained view of themes and variations in the sceptic discourse. A qualitative approach is taken 
here. The texts in the sample from the seven sceptics were closely read and the themes and pre-
occupations were noted for analysis and discussion. 
3.10 Observer neutrality 
The threat of climate disruption and the scope and implications of human responses to it, are 
simply too large for observers to stay neutral. Whether they are concerned with the physical or 
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human dimension, observers invariably submit to one or the other position of belief on the 
issue.  This author is no exception. I am not an ACD sceptic and I support speedier and more 
comprehensive climate policy interventions. However, I am also open to a critical assessment 
of the efficacy of climate policies, and I appreciate critiques (not only from sceptics) that 
expose the deficiencies of certain climate policies. I also appreciate the difficulty people have 
to accept measures that might seem futile and symbolic to them. I believe that for climate 
policies to endure, they must be politically acceptable to a sizable majority of both voters and 
interested players in the economy. I, therefore, see the need for positive engagement with 
sceptics and other detractors of progressive climate policies in order to build broad support for 
such policies. In all of these senses I am not a neutral observer in this investigation. 
The fact that strict observer neutrality on the climate issue is impossible does not preclude 
observers from reaching sound (and fair) conclusions about individuals and beliefs they might 
disagree with. In this study I try to achieve this in the following ways: 
- I respect the right of individuals to freely express their views, soundly based or 
otherwise. 
- Where and when individuals err on the climate issue, I do not assume ill-intent. 
- I believe that respectful and friendly treatment of individuals and their views are 
conducive to constructive dialogue and persuasion. 
- By being aware that I am not neutral on the climate issue I hope to raise my internal 
vigilance not to allow my personal convictions to bias my examination of individuals 
and views I might disagree with. 
- This study has a strong emphasis on nuanced description, which it attempts to ground 
in observer-neutral data (to the extent that it is possible). Computer processing and 
grounded research methods are used for this purpose. 
- The study is not concerned with sceptics’ interpretation of the physical evidence of 
climate change per se. At most it establishes that an individual is indeed at odds with 
the mainstream view, and then proceeds to analyse the different ways in which the 
identified individuals construct rationales that are consistent with their doubt about the 
mainstream view. As such, the sceptic rationales and arguments that are the focus of 
this study are not of the empirical kind, and can for the largest part not be said to be 
right or wrong. 
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3.11 Conclusion 
This study takes careful note of the various complexities surrounding the interpretation of 
argumentative texts, the use of computer assisted text analysis tools, and the compilation of a 
working sample. It concedes that not all the potential problems and deficiencies in these areas 
have been overcome by the chosen method. However, considerable effort has been made to 
mitigate some of the potential problems, like adding a strong quantitative element in the 
analysis, prefacing much of the qualitative analysis with quantitative data, calibrating the 
computer aided analysis for maximum inclusivity, balancing the sample to maximise the 
visibility of all relevant themes and arguments, and finally encouraging observer neutrality. 
With these tools in hand the following chapters will now tackle the task of delving into the 
sceptic phenomenon from various angles, but with the common objective to achieve a deeper 
and more nuanced understanding. 
In the next chapter the concept of ACD scepticism is unpacked and taxonomies are proposed 
for distinguishing between different types and intensities of scepticism. The chapter underlines 
the many varieties of sceptic opinion, which is important for the subsequent exploration of the 
sceptic discourse. 
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4 A CONCEPTUAL RE-EVALUATION OF THE CATEGORY 
4.1 Introduction 
‘Sceptics’ and ‘scepticism’ of ACD are widely used, familiar concepts. They refer to a fairly 
consistent family of arguments and pool of individuals that reject, dispute or question the 
mainstream/orthodox thesis that the global climate is changing primarily due to human 
activities, and that these changes will impact severely on both ecosystems and human 
populations if left unarrested. As such, they establish a distinct category of beliefs and 
individuals, at least in the minds of those standing outside the category. 
The category has come to assume a strong negative connotation because non-acceptance of the 
mainstream thesis is generally considered indefensible given the established nature of climate 
science and the gravity of the problem. It is also often used to isolate and delegitimise 
arguments and individuals associated with the category. Mainstream exponents have little 
difficulty labelling critics of the orthodoxy as sceptics or deniers. For many mainstream 
adherents it does not matter if one positively rejects, disputes or is merely unconvinced, 
ambivalent or agnostic about the core climate claims. The net effect is the same: non-
acceptance of a thesis about which no doubt should exist. 
This chapter critically re-examines the conceptual constitution of the category. It is noted that 
sceptics from different walks of life and with different levels of expertise deliver a wide array 
of critiques of the mainstream thesis and display a wide range of intensities of belief (or non-
belief). Some act as vocal public champions of the sceptic cause whilst others reservedly 
express unease about the reliability of the science. Some evidently exploit the issue for personal 
gain and others are seen to raise their critiques as concerned and responsible citizens. These 
shades of the phenomenon are largely lost in both the public and scholarly discourse where the 
blanket labels scepticism and sceptic still dominate. And on occasions where the category is 
being disentangled, some contestation of its associated concepts and labels remains evident 
(Capstick & Pidgeon, 2014, p. 390; O'Neill & Boykoff, 2010, p. E151). 
Following Capstick and Pidgeon’s (2014, p. 390) identification of “two broad treatments” of 
the concept, namely in relation to its epistemic and behavioural senses, the chapter sets out a 
scheme for its further delineation. It proposes the recognition of process scepticism (i.e. 
scepticism about the fairness and integrity of scientific and policy formulation processes) as a 
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distinct centre of scepticism alongside the familiar evidence and response critiques of sceptics. 
It is argued that these three conceptual stations allow observers to draw important qualitative 
distinctions based on where scepticism is anchored. It also helps to show the various ways in 
which sceptic logic flows, for instance from the evidence centre to the process and response 
centres, or from the process centre to the evidence and response centres. It is an important 
proposition in this analysis that the process centre has been underrated as a primary source of 
scepticism from which sceptics might derive their evidence and response misgivings. The 
chapter also examines the attitudinal variety amongst sceptics, i.e. their different intensities of 
belief, as well as the labels to describe these. Effort is made to dispose of inaccurate and 
counter-productive labelling practices. 
Before proceeding to disentangle the types of sceptic critiques and the attitudinal variety 
amongst sceptics, it would be helpful to consider the norm of scepticism in scientific enquiry 
and where ACD sceptics stand in relation to this norm. 
4.2 The norm of scepticism in science vis-a-vis ACD scepticism 
The role of scepticism in the scientific endeavour can be traced through a long history of 
philosophers and science practitioners who expounded its virtues. Pyrrho of Elis (365-275 BC) 
was one of the earliest exponents. He opposed the philosophers who proclaimed knowledge 
and truth, and questioned the reliability of our senses, i.e. how things appear to us. He argued 
for a suspension of our beliefs because it is impossible to determine whose belief is right 
(Sextus Empiricus, 1933). This principle survived to modern times and was elevated to a 
methodological injunction by Rene Descartes (1596-1650), who subjected all beliefs, ideas and 
thoughts to doubt, and only accepted something as true if evident knowledge of its truth could 
be established (Wilson, 2014). David Hume (1711–1776) argued for a “degree of doubt, and 
caution, and modesty, which, in all kinds of scrutiny and decision, ought for ever to accompany 
a just reasoned” (Buckle, 2001, p. 315). In recent times Robert K. Merton, the father of what 
has become known as the sociology of science, included this principle in a set of scientific 
norms that still guides scientific enquiry. Merton posited four norms of science, one of which 
he called “organised scepticism”. For him organised scepticism meant that scientists should 
withhold judgement until the facts are in, and should scrutinise all evidence in a “detached” 
manner (Butos & Koppl, 2003, p. 174). 
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That there might be unreasonable grounds for scepticism has been recognised very early on by 
science philosophers. Hume talks about “undistinguished doubts”, and the need for “mitigated 
scepticism”, i.e. a scepticism tempered through “common sense and reflection” (Buckle, 2001, 
pp. 314-315). Legitimate scientific scepticism has been described as “specific”, “even-handed” 
and “based on a prior understanding of the principles behind the work under consideration”, 
whereas the false kind would selectively doubt aspects of the work under consideration and 
remain uncritical of those aspects of the scientific work that matches the critic’s personal 
prejudices (Stott, 2012). 
The climate change issue vividly displays the contestation of what constitutes good science and 
what not. Mainstream exponents maintain that the sceptics are not sceptics in the scientific 
sense.  Cook (Mulvaney, 2010) states that climate change scepticism is “the complete opposite” 
of genuine scientific scepticism: “It’s coming to a preconceived conclusion and cherry-picking 
the information that backs up your opinion. Global warming scepticism isn’t scepticism at all”. 
Yet, sceptics maintain that it is mainstream climate science that has, in fact, abandoned the 
scientific tradition. 
An Australian sceptic blog The Galileo Movement states it as follows (The Galileo Movement, 
2014): 
Riddled with corruption, 'post-normal science' has replaced science. 'Science' has become 
a political tool and weapon to control people … Real science relies on consistent repeatable 
observations of Nature combined with proven laws of Nature. This can be supplemented 
by use of computer models, providing the models are based on fundamental factors that 
are well understood. The UN IPCC fails on all three. Its reports contradict, disregard, 
manipulate and/or misrepresent real-world scientific observations. The UN IPCC distorts 
or misrepresents accepted theories. 
This ostensible commitment to good scientific practise on both sides of the issue is consistent 
with the observation by some scholars that scientists generally, including those in opposing 
camps, have a good understanding of the norms of science (Diethelm & McKee, 2009; Enting, 
2007; Fumento, 1993). Ranalli (2012, p. 184) observes that the participants in the debate share 
a “common stock of ideas about the proper working of science”. Yet, why is so much of the 
climate debate centred on accusations and counter-accusations of scientific impropriety? Part 
of the answer lies in the reflective fallibility of scientists. They decry what they perceive as 
mistakes in others and then perpetrate the same distortions in their own scientific practise 
(Lahsen, 2005, p. 146). Another part of the answer lies in the democratisation of science and 
the extension of its practice and scrutiny to an enlarged audience through the help of instant 
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and global mass communication. This is where Beck’s (1992b) conceptualisation of a “second 
modernity” becomes relevant. 
Far from delivering a safer world, modernity has in fact produced new, more dangerous risks. 
Thus, the scientific confidence and optimism that accompanied the first modernity, has given 
way to awareness of “new kinds of scientific and ecological uncertainties that make evident 
the limits of knowledge at any given moment as well as the unavoidable reality of risk”. And 
when an issue appears, such as ACD, about which “complementary and often conflicting 
knowledges” are professed (Beck talks of a “polyphony”), the “experts' limited ability to 
produce authoritative truths and to steer public affairs independently of political deliberation” 
becomes apparent (Beck, cited in Lahsen, 2005, p. 140). New actors, it is envisioned, would 
step forward in answer to the heightened awareness of the fallibility of science, and the 
complexity and enormity of the risks facing humanity in the current age. Funtowicz and Ravetz 
(1992, p. 254) talk of an “extended peer community” in which the distinction between experts 
and non-experts has become blurred. 
Beck’s (1992a, p. 109) vision of a “heterogeneity of actors” and the “demystification” of 
science (meaning the experts have lost their “cognitive authority”) has, certainly in the case of 
ACD, come to pass. And although his vision did not deliver the “democratic triumph” over 
“patronization by technocracy” and powerful elites that he expected, Lahsen (2005, p. 141) 
claims that a qualitative change in the relationship between experts and the public has 
indisputably taken place. Mass media growth, mass social communication, and unprecedented 
access to information and expert opinion have empowered private experts and interested non-
experts. Members of the public are able to freely and instantly communicate with the experts 
and other members of the public. Greater questioning of expert judgement and distrust in the 
old institutions have ensued. Brin (2010a) conceptualises an “Age of Amateurs” in which 
“eager, savvy, question-asking citizens” actively engage scientific debates, often with an 
acumen that deserves the respect of experts.  
Finally, for all we know about the norms of good scientific practice and what marks bad 
science, in practice it can be very difficult to not only distinguish between the two, but also to 
convincingly prove a case of bad science. One person’s brave and independent thinker is 
another’s “stubborn mule, suffering from a deficit of humility” (Ranalli, 2012, pp. 198-199). 
And even if one was able, in a given instance, to convincingly adjudicate on the quality of 
someone else’s practise and reading of the science, the spectre of some larger systemic failure 
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would still loom. Kuhn (1970), and later Feyerabend (1975), showed how science can be caught 
up and distorted by paradigmatic thinking, and by various forms of internal defensiveness.  
4.3 Objects of climate scepticism 
4.3.1 Evidence scepticism (trend, cause and impact scepticism) 
Rahmstorf (2005) pioneered the trend-attribution-impact typology of climate change 
scepticism, which disentangles sceptics’ challenge of the scientific evidence of anthropogenic 
climate change. This approach assumes that sceptics follow a stepped pattern, with trend 
scepticism (denying a significant warming trend or proclaiming a cooling trend) at the pinnacle. 
Attribution scepticism would be one step down on the scepticism ladder because it might accept 
the general trend claim, but not that humans are primarily responsible. Impact scepticism would 
be another step down because it might accept that humans are altering the climate, but 
downplays the scale of potential negative effects from climate change. The trend-attribution-
impact typology enjoys wide currency. Wikipedia (2014) defines climate change denial as a 
set of organised attempts to downplay, deny or dismiss the scientific consensus on the extent 
of global warming (trend claim), its significance (impact claim), and its connection to human 
behaviour (attribution claim). The typology has also been expressed as stages of denialism, 
where a sceptic might start off as a trend sceptic, but as the evidence of global warming mounts, 
migrate to attribution scepticism, and again, as the evidence of human influence on the climate 
mounts, migrate to impact scepticism (Hamilton, 2007; Henson, 2007; Nuccitelli, 2013). 
Rahmstorf’s typology is realistic and useful because it mirrors the evidential claims made in 
IPCC assessment reports, the most authoritative account of the mainstream thesis. The first 
three chapters of the last complete IPCC Assessment Report, AR4 published in 2007 7 , 
respectively deals with the trend of climate change, its causes and its impacts (see Pachauri et 
al., 2007). AR4 states that “warming of the climate system is unequivocal, as is now evident 
from observations of increases in global average air and ocean temperatures, widespread 
melting of snow and ice and rising global average sea level” (Pachauri et al., 2007, p. 2). This 
is the so-called trend claim. It also finds that “most of the observed increase in global average 
temperatures since the mid-20th century is very likely due to the observed increase in 
                                                          
7 The first instalment of AR5, its Working Group 1 report, was published in September 2013. In terms 
of core claims, this report corresponds very closely with AR4. It is not used as reference in this study 
because the examples of sceptic claims analysed here were made in the context of the AR4 report. 
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anthropogenic GHG concentrations” (Pachauri et al., 2007, p. 5). This is the so-called 
attribution claim. Regarding the impacts of climate change, the report describes different 
scenarios for different warming stabilisation levels. At a 2°C above 20th century average 
temperature stabilisation level (the lowest modelled by AR4) it foresees “hundreds of millions 
of people exposed to increased water stress”, “increased damage from floods and storms”, 
“changed distribution of some disease vectors”, and “increased morbidity and mortality from 
heat waves, floods and droughts” (Pachauri et al., 2007, p. 10). These, and many more region 
specific predictions, are the so-called impact claims.  
These claims are fairly unequivocal, and mainstream exponents generally accept them as the 
core claims of the mainstream climate thesis about which no doubt should exist. Sometimes 
sceptics respond to the core claims in equally unequivocal terms, such as in the following 
examples: 
Earth’s temperature is currently cooling slightly, ocean heat is declining, global sea-level 
rise has not accelerated (although the climate models predict that it should) and tropical 
storm energy is at a thirty-year low (Carter, 2011a, p. 39). 
The warmists are correct that CO2 is a greenhouse gas and it causes warming, that CO2 
levels have been rising, and that it has been warming. Serious sceptics agree with all that, 
but point out that it does not prove that something else isn't causing most of the warming 
(Evans, 2012). 
There is no evidence that man's production of carbon dioxide is causing more extreme 
weather events. Any change caused by man will be gradual and there will be plenty of time 
to adapt, as humans have always done. Most people will hardly notice it (Forbes, 2013b). 
More typically, however, sceptic responses are convoluted, which can make it difficult to 
pinpoint their specific objects of scepticism, as seen in the following statement from the 
Australian sceptic group, The Carbon Sense Coalition (2013a). (I add my own comments in 
brackets to show the connection between the respective claims in the passage and the trend-
attribution-impact typology of ACD scepticism.) 
The so called greenhouse gases (mainly water vapour and carbon dioxide) have the ability 
to absorb radiant energy and transmit it to their surroundings (accepting the potential 
contribution of CO2 to global warming) … carbon dioxide occurs in tiny trace amounts 
in the atmosphere, and any surface heating it could do is already being done by water 
vapour (not rejecting but downplaying the attribution claim), which is more abundant 
and affects far more energy wavelengths. … It probably makes the nights slightly warmer, 
especially in higher latitudes during winter; and it probably has little effect on daytime 
temperatures (limited acceptance of the trend claim). But additional carbon dioxide in 
the biosphere gives a major boost to all plants which feed all animals (downplaying 
negative impacts). It is not a pollutant, anywhere (rhetorically indemnifying CO2) 
(http://carbon-sense.com/, The Carbon Sense Coalition, The Global Warming Gas, or The 
Bread and Butter of Life?, June 17th, 2013, http://carbon-sense.com/wp-
content/uploads/2013/06/gas-of-global-warming.pdf). 
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Occasionally, sceptics have revisited their readings of the science and revised their assessments 
in favour of the mainstream claims. Environment reporter Sara Phillips observed a shift (around 
the 2012 time period) in comments from the public on climate change op-ed pieces at the ABC 
(Phillips, 2012). She described it as a “trend away from complete denial” and that the sceptics 
are being pushed by the weight of the evidence “further and further towards the view of the 
majority of researchers working in the area”. An anonymous respondent to a sceptic newspaper 
article likened this shifting to the redrawing of defensive lines in a battlefield (Anonymous, 
2012). 
The anecdotal evidence that sceptics do shift and sometimes even reverse their original 
viewpoints is supported by comparing the public statements of some well-known sceptics over 
time. Examples include Bjorn Lomborg, who moved from doubting the seriousness of climate 
change to calling for “serious” efforts to “fix global warming” (The Week Staff, 2010), and 
Richard Muller,  professor of physics at the University of California, Berkeley, who moved 
from criticism of the methodology underpinning the so-called hockey stick temperature 
reconstruction (Muller, 2004) to acceptance of the warming trend (Muller, 2011) and later 
acceptance that humans are the primary cause (Muller, 2012). 
These shifts make it difficult to pinpoint ACD scepticism. The category resembles a shifting 
target. However, it still requires definition if it is to be analysed at all, and for that purpose the 
trend, attribution and impact objects of ACD scepticism remain valid as its defining 
characteristics. The three objects correlate directly, one-to-one, with the core evidential 
assertions of the mainstream climate thesis. If the category ACD scepticism is to be preserved 
in its common sense meaning as the antithetical climate view, i.e. not just any problematic 
climate view, then the primacy of its grounding in the evidence dispute should be accepted. 
That the evidence dispute should serve as the definitional heart of the category is implicitly 
recognised in studies that present frameworks that place the evidence dimension at the top or 
categorically preceding other dimensions (compare Capstick & Pidgeon, 2014, pp. 391, 397). 
Akter et al. (2012, p. 25) are more explicit in this regard when they find that attribution 
scepticism was “a common source of impact, mitigation and global co-operation scepticism”. 
The importance of specifying the evidence dispute as the definitional heart of the category will 
become clearer in the subsequent sections that discuss sceptics’ extended arguments, i.e. 
aspects of the climate debate that are natively commensurate with evidence scepticism but not 
dependent on it. The extended critiques are collectively referred to as concomitant objects of 
scepticism, and are depicted in Figure 4-1 later in the chapter. 
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4.3.2 Process scepticism 
Sceptics make various critiques of the scientific, bureaucratic and political processes behind 
mainstream climate science. Their arguments about the scientific processes include that the 
massive funding of climate research has become a biasing factor in climate research, that 
important new and contradictory research is habitually overlooked in mainstream climate 
research, that there are serious lapses in peer review and oversight of published research (in 
particular, IPCC reports are seen as consensus documents, rather than scientific truth), and that 
over-reliance on and manipulation of computer modelling is distorting climate research (Van 
Rensburg, 2014). The political decision-making processes relating to the climate issue are also 
directly and indirectly questioned by sceptics when they claim that the climate issue might be 
a hoax or conspiracy, and that prominent mainstream exponents and the media exaggerate the 
climate threat (see N. Smith & Leiserowitz, 2012; Whitmarsh, 2011). The context of these 
suspicions is that the public is being misled and that public decision-making processes are 
distorted.  
Although sceptics’ process critiques are well recognised as an integral part of the sceptic 
discourse, these have hitherto not been presented as a separate centre of scepticism. Capstick 
and Pidgeon (2014, pp. 390-391, 397) place doubts about the conduct of science, the reliability 
of mainstream climate expertise and the portrayal and communication of climate science in the 
same category as the disputation of the physical evidence, which they collectively call 
“epistemic scepticism”. These objects of scepticism have a similar functional purpose, namely 
to cast doubt on “the status and generation of knowledge around climate change”. 
Recognising sceptics’ process critiques as a distinct conceptual element in the category ACD 
scepticism, sets them apart a group of sceptic arguments that are not dependent upon either 
evidence or response scepticism, but rather enables and strengthens those. Process scepticism 
is, indeed, a strong centre of scepticism. Many sceptics are anchored in this centre, rather than 
the detailed technical contests around the evidence or how society should respond. The process 
critiques (e.g. there is a lucrative climate industry, scientists pursue funding and shut out 
dissenting voices, the media exaggerates the threat, environmentalists and socialists drive the 
climate agenda) appeal intuitively to many sceptics, who are strongly oriented in the climate 
issue by cognitive, cultural and ideological predispositions (Kahan, 2012; Kahan & Braman, 
2006). Scholars have found that process critiques are conspicuously present in the affective 
imagery cognitive processes responsible for climate change scepticism (N. Smith & 
Leiserowitz, 2012). 
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Process scepticism, therefore, offers a conceptual option that allows observers to draw 
distinctions between three centres of scepticism, the other two being evidence and response 
scepticism. It helps to differentiate sceptics of the physical evidence who extend their sceptic 
assault to process issues (and ultimately the response question), from those who have no clear 
knowledge of or judgement about the evidence and ground their apprehensions mostly in 
perceived process irregularities and response deficiencies. 
Finally, process critiques require distinct conceptual status because they can be, and are, held 
by non-sceptics. Mike Hulme, a former lead author at the IPCC and patently non-sceptical of 
the mainstream ACD thesis, has been publicly critical of the IPCC’s emphasis on “consensus 
building” (Hulme & Mahoney, 2010, pp. 10-11), its reluctance to allow scrutiny (Hulme & 
Mahony, 2013, p. 624), as well as the apparent closing of ranks by the climate scientists at the 
centre of the so-called Climategate revelations (Hulme, 2013b, p. 146). Process scepticism is 
therefore open to sceptics and non-sceptics alike, whereas evidence scepticism, by definition, 
excludes the non-sceptics. 
4.3.3 Response scepticism 
Several observers recognise that critiques of public and private responses to the climate issue 
represent an important centre of scepticism. Hamilton (2013) argues that response scepticism 
is one of the common themes in the family of sceptic arguments: “First, they deny that climate 
change is occurring. Then they say that if it is occurring it's not due to humans. Then they claim 
that if it is due to humans, the effects are trivial. If the effects are shown to be non-trivial, they 
opine that the benefits will exceed the damage. If the damage is shown to predominate, they 
say the cost of avoiding the damage is too high”. Painter is more emphatic and includes 
“policy” sceptics as a fourth type in his typology (Painter, 2012, p. 196). Capstick and Pidgeon 
(2014, p. 397) offer a two-pronged typology with “response scepticism” as the second type 
next to “epistemic scepticism”. In their conceptualisation response scepticism concerns 
“(d)oubts about the efficacy of action on climate change; doubts about the personal and societal 
relevance of climate change”. Akter et al. (2012, p. 3) propose five dimensions of scepticism, 
the first three of which relate to the evidential base of climate science, and the last two, which 
they call “mitigation scepticism” and “global co-operation scepticism”, relating to society’s 
response to the climate issue. For some, response scepticism represents the epitome of climate 
change scepticism. SourceWatch defines an ACD sceptic as “any position within the umbrella 
group, ‘opponents of effective global warming action’, where ‘effective action’ entails putting 
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a price on fossil fuel emissions, such that their true cost becomes clear and the economic 
‘invisible hand’ can wreak its market magic” (Sourcewatch, 2014). 
It could be argued that sceptics would be impelled, on the basis of their contrary reading of 
climate science, to oppose climate mitigation responses. The majority of sceptics, in fact, do 
follow the logic of their evidence scepticism through in this way. Yet, some scholars caution 
that there is no straight line between scientific evidence and one’s choice of response; that a 
certain reading of the science does not necessarily imply a certain policy preference. Research 
has shown that people’s support for climate mitigation depends significantly on factors other 
than their assessment of the probability and severity of future climate risks. Lee and Cameron 
(2008, p. 223) found that willingness to pay for climate mitigation varies according to the 
domestic instrument of choice, as well as the international level of cooperation. The point is 
also argued philosophically, for instance Hulme (2013a, p. 295), who calls for a 
“repoliticis(ation of) climate change, to challenge the scienticism which suggests that science 
should trump politics”. Anderegg (2010c, p. 336) makes a similar point: 
… science has little or no special role in determining should we act to curtail climate 
change and how we should act. This path must be picked up by economists, social 
scientists, ethicists, humanists, and the general public. 
The ambiguity between science and policy is nowhere clearer than in the case of the impact 
sceptics. Differences in perceived impact are linked closely to differences in recommended 
responses, which complicate the concept response scepticism. Some impact sceptics dismiss 
mitigation because for them it is addressing a non-existent problem. Others have a pragmatic 
view, believing that even if they don’t expect severe negative climate impacts, climate 
mitigation measures might deliver positive spin-offs in terms of greater energy efficiency and 
the promotion of cleaner technologies (Van Rensburg, 2012). In addition, impact sceptics find 
themselves aligned with non-sceptics who oppose mitigation because they doubt the cost-
effectiveness of such measures, not because they doubt the negative impacts of climate change. 
The controversial Danish economist Bjørn Lomborg, who advocates an alternative response 
path, purely based on cost-benefit considerations, is an example (Lomborg, 2009). The 
differences between impact scepticism and response scepticism start blurring when sceptics 
appropriate the arguments of non-sceptics like Lomborg in order to open another line of attack 
against the climate change orthodoxy and its supposed economic imperatives. 
The ambiguity of opposition to climate policies is also demonstrated by left-wing critiques of 
carbon pricing mechanisms. A few examples from the Australian context are noted below. The 
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Green Left Weekly (Butler, 2012), the mouthpiece of a socialist environmentalist activist group, 
describes the climate change debate as a “fake” debate because the outcomes of the two big 
national parties’ (the centre-right Liberal and National (L-NP) Coalition and the centre-left 
ALP) climate policies would be very similar. Calling the L-NP Coalition climate “deniers” and 
the ALP climate “pretenders”, it argues that even though the ALP is more ambitious than the 
L-NP Coalition, its policies too would be too little too late. “To act slowly or to act not at all 
matters little. Both will bring the exact same result – an unspeakable future of climate 
catastrophe”. The group is convinced that the reigning economic model cannot solve the 
climate problem: “the biggest (problem) is that it assumes we can solve the climate crisis with 
the same kind of thinking that got us into it”. Carbon pricing, as an “indirect lever to bring 
emissions down” is dismissed in favour of “direct measures” such as the outright prohibition 
of fossil fuel extraction, closing fossil fuel infrastructure and deploying renewable sources of 
energy. The Green Left Weekly argument is echoed by the leftist blog En Passant (Passant, 
2013), which describes the discourse between the Government and Opposition as irrelevant. 
“Labor doesn’t have a commitment to the environment. It has a commitment to capitalism and 
getting elected”. Just like the Green Left Weekly, it argues that carbon pricing will not solve 
the problem: “capitalism cannot address climate change”. En Passant calls for “system change” 
before there could be any hope of addressing ACD. 
These sentiments are not confined to Australian environmentalists. Naomi Klein, the Canadian 
anti-corporate, anti-globalisation and pro-environment activist, believes that the environmental 
movement is in “deep denial” about the failure of carbon pricing to deliver big emission cuts 
(Mark, 2013). She argues that climate initiatives like the Kyoto Protocol, the UN Clean 
Development Mechanism and the EU Emissions Trading Scheme have “disastrous” track 
records. They have not reduced emissions, are characterised by “no end of scams”, and have 
resulted in a massive “corporate giveaway”. She claims that many environmentalists have been 
caught up in the “neoliberal economic orthodoxy” and have bought into the notion that 
corporations are part of the solution. She argues that environmentalists should have “fought 
back”, “defended” ecological values and “resist(ed) the steamroller that was neoliberalism”. 
She argues that environmental victories in the past have come through “command-and-control” 
pieces of legislation; a “top-down regulatory approach”. 
Response scepticism is the most distant from evidence scepticism, which is the definitional 
heart of the category ACD scepticism. Response scepticism speaks to matters of policy and 
governance that have relevance quite independent from the climate issue. There are ongoing 
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debates about the desired level of government regulation, the timing and efficacy of tax/pricing 
mechanisms, and strategic considerations of a nation’s global responsibilities and capabilities. 
Thus, response scepticism is accessible to a much wider general audience. Reserving a 
conceptual space for response scepticism allows for a useful distinction between sceptics who 
are grounded in evidence critiques and those who are more concerned about the broader 
governance issues associated with climate responses. 
4.4 Proposal for a taxonomy 
Figure 4-1 shows how the aforementioned types of sceptic arguments can be conceptually 
organised. At the lowest level of classification, sceptic critiques belong to one of seven specific 
objects or targets of scepticism. Considering the nature each of these specific sceptic targets, 
three centres of scepticism emerge. The three centres – evidence, process and response – 
provide a neat categorisation that provides a home for the technical evidence dispute, a home 
for arguments about the processes through which the evidence pass beyond the laboratory, and 
finally a home for arguments about how society should respond to the evidence (or perceived 
lack of evidence). At the top level of categorisation, the centres of scepticism divide into two 
broad classes of sceptic arguments. The evidence critiques are labelled core and definitional – 
core because of their antecedent nature, and definitional to preserve the integrity of ACD 
scepticism as the antithetical climate view. The process and response critiques are labelled 
concomitant8 because they are commensurate with but not dependent on evidence scepticism. 
The core critiques define a sceptic as a sceptic, and attract concomitant critiques, which are 
highly congruent with and supportive of evidence scepticism. In many cases the concomitant 
arguments dominate sceptics’ argumentative rationales. They are widely acknowledged as 
integrally part of the sceptic identity, yet have not been conceptually related to one another in 
the clarified format presented here. 
  
                                                          
8 The label ‘concomitant’ is preferred as its dictionary meaning suggests that it accompanies a preceding 
object and often in a ‘lesser’, ‘subordinate’ or ‘incidental’ way (2014; 2014). 
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Figure 4-1: Conceptual hierarchy of sceptic critiques 
 
 
 
The distinction between core and concomitant types of sceptic critiques is important. An 
individual’s scepticism might primarily reside in the concomitant objects, from where evidence 
scepticism might be inferred. It is therefore possible for an individual to start questioning the 
physical evidence without needing to make (or being able to make) a detailed and informed 
assessment of the evidence. Individuals who are rooted in the concomitant objects of scepticism 
might be expected to be less rigorous and less intense when they profess their views because 
they have not committed to one or more of the core evidence objects, like the more virulent 
and outspoken sceptics. Observers and policy practitioners dealing with the sceptic challenge 
need to approach the concomitant critiques with caution because they can be, and are, held by 
non-sceptics as well. 
The concomitant objects are also qualitatively different to the core objects because an 
individual’s scepticism might primarily reside in the concomitant objects, from where 
epistemic deficiencies are inferred, without an informed assessment of the physical science. 
Individuals who are rooted in the concomitant objects of scepticism might be expected to be 
less rigorous and less intense when they profess their views because they have not committed 
to one or more of the core epistemic objects, like the more virulent and outspoken sceptics.  
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Table 4-1 provides some examples of typical sceptical claims associated with each object of 
scepticism. 
Table 4-1: Sceptical claims associated with the different classes, centres and objects of 
scepticism 
CORE 
objects of scepticism 
(arguments that define scepticism) 
CONCOMITANT 
objects of scepticism 
(arguments that strengthen scepticism) 
EVIDENCE PROCESSES RESPONSE 
Trend Cause Impact 
Scientific 
knowledge 
generation 
processes 
Climate 
decision 
making 
processes 
Policy 
instruments 
Policy style 
No post-
industrial 
warming 
 
Data is 
inconclusive 
 
Warming 
OR cooling 
in future 
 
Insignificant 
or 
unexceptional 
post-
industrial 
warming 
 
Warming 
stopped 
 
Cooling 
interlude 
No CO2 
causal 
mechanism  
 
Entirely 
natural 
causes (e.g. 
solar 
variation, 
ocean 
currents) 
 
Predominantly 
natural 
causes 
 
Natural and 
human 
causes 
indiscernible 
 
Too early to 
tell 
Negative GW 
impacts are 
speculative/ 
unproven  
 
Extreme 
weather events 
are not linked 
to  GW 
 
Extreme 
weather events 
are 
unexceptional  
 
Insignificant 
negative 
impacts can be 
expected 
 
Significant 
positive 
impacts can be 
expected 
 
Negative 
impacts might 
only occur in 
the distant 
future  
 
Possible 
impacts are 
still unknown 
 
Climate 
change is a 
hoax 
 
A lucrative 
climate 
industry 
exists. 
Scientists 
chase research 
funding 
 
Climate 
activists seek 
fame and 
money  
 
Scientists 
manipulate/ 
hide the 
evidence 
 
Scientists 
deliberately 
collude 
against 
sceptics 
 
Mainstream 
exponents 
deliberately 
exaggerate 
dangers to 
gain public 
attention 
 
Computer 
modelling is 
overrated and 
unreliable  
There is 
political 
interference in 
the IPCC. 
Politicians 
decide on the 
wording of 
documents. 
 
Socialists and 
Greens drive 
the climate 
agenda 
 
Activists have 
a wealth 
redistribution, 
world 
government 
agenda 
 
Economic 
players seek 
climate 
regulation for 
profit 
Financial 
institutions are 
behind the 
commercialisa
tion of carbon 
for profit 
 
There is a 
leftist media 
bias to 
influence the 
decision-
making 
agenda 
No problem 
– no 
response 
 
People need 
to prepare 
for any 
climate 
scenario (hot 
OR cold) 
 
Its better to 
invest in 
climate 
adaptation, 
which will 
improve 
human 
resilience to 
any climate 
eventuality  
 
Carbon 
pricing is 
futile 
because it 
will not  
achieve the 
required 
reduction in 
atmospheric 
CO2 
concentration 
 
The costs of 
mitigation 
outweigh the 
benefits 
 
The 
economy 
and jobs 
should not 
be harmed 
 
Wait for a 
global 
agreement 
– no  
unilateral 
response 
 
National 
measures 
should not 
exceed 
what other 
nations are 
doing 
 
Mitigation 
efforts will 
hurt the 
poor most 
 
Carbon 
pricing is a 
tax grab 
 
A 
pragmatic 
and 
measured 
response is 
best, given 
the 
uncertainties 
about 
climate 
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Peer review is 
flawed – a 
buddy system 
exists 
 
The media 
sensationalise 
the issues 
trends and 
impacts  
 
 
This taxonomy makes clear the bases for drawing distinctions amongst sceptics and their 
arguments, and might be used as a practical tool to classify sceptics. It is a guide only, as 
sceptics can be rhetorically skilful and they often couch or hedge their claims.  Also, most 
sceptics critique a casual mix of (variously) the evidence, processes and responses associated 
with the mainstream view, which can make it difficult to determine their essential dispute or 
concern. The challenge, from an analytical point of view, is to establish where the weight of an 
individual’s sceptical claims rests, or which object(s) are instrumental in their arguments. Such 
analysis would allow meaningful and purposeful discrimination within the sceptic category, 
the implications of which are highlighted in the Conclusion of the chapter. 
The chapter now proceeds to deal with some additional bases for variegating the sceptic 
phenomenon. These are collectively called attitudinal characteristics because they speak to the 
character or quality of sceptics’ beliefs, which might be evident through their presumed 
motives, the way they conduct themselves, and the degree of certainty with which they express 
their views (boldness of language). 
4.5 Attitudinal characteristics of sceptics 
4.5.1 Different motivations and modes 
Some observers have tried to distinguish between sceptics on the basis of their motivations and 
consequently the modes they have chosen for airing their views. Most of these attempts are 
premised on the assumption that some sceptics are merely using their climate views to advance 
their material and/or ideological interests, and because of this deception, they should be 
considered qualitatively different to those who are truly mistaken or misguided about the 
climate issue. 
Painter thinks it is useful to distinguish between “organised scepticism linked to well-funded 
bodies” and “individual sceptic(s) with no such links” (Painter, 2012, p. 198). Powell (cited in 
Walker, 2014) distinguishes between “professional science deniers” who do it for money or 
ideological reasons, and scientists that are “contrarian by nature”, who revel in being different 
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and provocative and seriously believe they are advancing the science by questioning the 
orthodoxies. This typology is closely replicated by Diethelm and McKee’s (2009, p. 3) 
distinction between those driven by greed, ideology or faith, and those driven by “eccentricity 
and idiosyncrasy”. Rahmstorf (2005, p. 79) proposes three sceptic archetypes: paid lobbyists 
(those in the pay of fossil fuel interests), Don Quixotists (those who are emotionally 
committed), and eccentrics (scholars from other scientific disciplines). Hamilton (2014) offers 
three categories of sceptics based on their inner motives: first, the manufacturers of doubt, who 
deceive the public with their lies; second, the repeaters of the lies, who amplify the views of 
the manufacturers for political and personal reasons; and third, the consumers of the lies (the 
public), who are seduced by the manufacturers and repeaters and resort to “casual denial” for 
any number of psychological reasons. 
What these different typologies have in common is that they make a basic distinction between 
those who have ulterior motives with their climate scepticism, and those who are simply 
mistaken and/or misguided. For many observers this is an important distinction because it adds 
a moral dimension to their analysis. However, it is a distinction fraught with danger. It would 
be extremely difficult (impossible indeed) to demonstrate empirically or assess objectively 
someone’s inner motivations, especially when the person in question is suspected of being 
disingenuous. And by assigning some inner extra-epistemic motivation to participants in the 
debate, by claiming some corruption of the mind by money, ideology or politics, the level of 
resentment and polarisation in the climate debate is merely perpetuated and exacerbated.  
A distinction, though, between original thinkers (the originators of sceptic critique) and the 
propagators or reproducers of their thinking, might address the problem of inner motivation 
and moral character, without blunting the accountability of the most egregious sceptics for their 
actions. Pendergraft (1998, p. 645) conceives of “scientists” and “prophets” in the climate 
change debate, where the scientists are supposed to make the “sober” claims and the prophets 
amplify and moralise such claims. The underlying assumption of such a distinction is that the 
originators actually scrutinised the science and that the reproducers are accepting what they 
say on trust and intuition. A greater onus, therefore, rests on the originators to get their science 
right, particularly if they arrive at antithetical conclusions. They can and should be judged to a 
high standard because they speak from some position of authority and command the trust of 
others. 
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4.5.2 Different certainties of belief 
There are qualitative differences between someone who emphatically rejects the mainstream 
climate thesis, someone who disputes aspects of it, someone who feels doubtful, and someone 
who feels undecided (agnostic). Most common in the literature is a two-fold distinction 
between rejectionists (those who dismiss the mainstream climate thesis or key aspects of it 
outright) and those who are uncertain or harbour reservations about the veracity of the scientific 
claims. In a study of public opinion in the US, Leiserowitz et al. (2009; 2011) found a range of 
seven climate change opinion categories9, two of which correspond to ACD scepticism, namely 
“doubtful” and “dismissive”. (The so-called seven climate change audiences are labelled 
alarmed, concerned, cautious, disengaged, doubtful and dismissive.) The dismissive category 
differs from the doubtful category in terms of the strength of their belief and their active 
engagement of the issue (Leiserowitz et al., 2009, p. 4). Hine et al (2013) identify five ACD 
audiences (which they call “interpretive communities”) amongst the Australian public: 
dismissive, doubtful, uncertain, concerned and alarmed. The differences between their groups 
were primarily predicted by the respondents’ behavioural responses to ACD, their consumption 
of climate related media and their preferences for energy policies, but also correlated with 
progressive increasing belief in ACD from the dismissive to the alarmed group. Cook et al. 
(2013, p. 3) distinguish between those “uncertain” of the mainstream thesis and those 
“rejecting” it. Painter’s (2012, p. 193) typology talks of those holding a “falsely balanced view” 
(not knowing what to believe) and those holding a “dismissive view” (believing that the climate 
is not changing or that humans are not responsible for changes). Hoffman (2011, p. 5) 
distinguishes between a more passive “sceptical” group that is doubtful about climate change, 
and a much more active and organised “denier” group that is working to discredit climate 
change science. The distinction between rejectionists/dismissers and doubters provides a good 
measure of the intensity of their beliefs, for the rejectionists are unlikely to embark on the level 
of activism and categorical denial characteristic of their group if they did not hold such beliefs 
deeply. Studies have, in fact, found that certainty of belief is an important distinguishing quality 
between groups of sceptics, with the rejectionists feeling very certain about their views, 
whereas those who are uncertain/reserved feel less certain about their views (Leiserowitz et al., 
2009, p. 4; Whitmarsh, 2011, p. 9). 
                                                          
9 The so-called seven climate change audiences are labelled alarmed, concerned, cautious, disengaged, 
doubtful and dismissive. 
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The reject/dismiss category is stable and does not reduce to sub-categories. The doubtful 
category, however, subdivides in multiple ways, depending on the observer’s preferences. 
Leiserowitz et al.’s (2009, p. 4) doubtful category is subdivided into three: those believing in 
the trend of climate change but not its human cause and seriousness, those not believing in the 
trend, and those who don’t know. Brin (2010a, 2010b) identifies three sceptic groups that are 
distinct from the extreme category, namely climate agnostics, climate denial followers (the 
gullible “koolaid-drinking” tools of a propaganda machine) and rational, open-minded, pro-
science people who are motivated by curiosity to ask legitimate questions of the mainstream 
thesis. 
There is no easy way to describe and identify the finer distinctions amongst the doubtful 
sceptics. Several problems are apparent. Firstly, how do we spot or prove a sceptic if the 
individual is very circumspect in his/her views and adept at expressing them in sophisticated 
ways. And even if someone’s scepticism is quite apparent from his/her public expressions, how 
do we know to what degree they have tailored the tone and explicitness of their expressions to 
their audience? Secondly, what amount of criticism and what tone would place one sceptic in 
a more extreme category than another? How do we distinguish between the incessant, vocal 
and brazen sceptic on the one hand, and the occasional sceptic voice on the other, if they share 
exactly the same criticisms? And finally, people can be inconsistent when they express their 
views. Their arguments might be convoluted, or they might modify their views over time – the 
so-called “water sloshing in a shallow pan” effect described by Revkin (2010). When 
individuals are ambiguous in their views, which expression at which point in time would mark 
the person as a particular type of sceptic? 
These problems should not preclude us from trying to disentangle the sceptic phenomenon in 
terms of the different types and intensities of belief of sceptics. Before attempting to capture 
these differences in a taxonomy, the next section first highlights the complexity of settling on 
a label that unites the sceptic category and won’t foreclose options for further sub-
classification. 
4.5.3 Labelling complexities 
Although there might be general agreement about who qualifies as ACD sceptics, the label 
sceptic is contested. Climate sceptics claim the label because they believe they are simply 
fulfilling the inclination and duty of any true scientist, that they are in fact serving science with 
their scepticism, and that the mainstream scientists are the ones stuck in a rut of groupthink, 
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captive to the vested interests that have accumulated around a supposed climate change 
industry (Carter, 2008c). In contrast, various scholars argue that the scepticism practised by 
ACD sceptics is not scepticism in the true sense of the word, and that the label is a misnomer 
(Anderegg, 2010a, p. 30; Antilla, 2005, p. 339 fn. 5; Brin, 2010b; Cook & Washington, 2011, 
pp. 1-2; Dunlap & McCright, 2011, p. 156 n. 1; Hamilton, 2010a, p. 117; O'Neill & Boykoff, 
2010, p. E151). 
As a consequence, scholars have been looking for alternative labels for the sceptic 
phenomenon. A popular alternative is climate change or global warming ‘denial’, which 
scholars have tried to ground theoretically (see Cook & Washington, 2011; Diethelm & 
McKee, 2009; Dunlap, 2013; Hoofnagle, 2007; McCright & Dunlap, 2010; Nuccitelli, 2013; 
Specter, 2009; Walker, 2014). Yet, its unfortunate connotation with Holocaust denial, 
indiscriminate use, and common sense meaning have all caused serious trouble in the climate 
debate. Sceptics find the label extremely divisive, to the degree that responses to the label 
foreclose any meaningful debate. When asked what it would take for him to accept the orthodox 
position on climate change, Anthony Watts, the creator of one of the most visited sceptic blogs 
on the internet, Watts Up With That, responded that a “starting point for the process” wouldn’t 
begin with more facts but instead with a public apology from the high profile scientists who 
have labelled him and his colleagues deniers (Merchant, 2011). Politicians who have had to 
navigate the climate issue also reflect on the counter-productive effect of the label, like former 
Australian Prime Minister John Howard (2013): 
Increasingly offensive language is used. The most egregious example has been the term 
‘denier’. We are all aware of the particular meaning that word has acquired in 
contemporary parlance. It has been employed in this debate with some malice 
aforethought. 
The denial label is, strictly speaking, misrepresenting the sceptic view. The majority of climate 
sceptics accept that the climate is changing; many of them agree that human activities are 
playing a part in the phenomenon, and a select few would even concede that humans might be 
the dominant cause of current climate trends. The trend-attribution-impact typology, in fact, 
implies that sceptics are disagreeing with parts (rarely all) of the mainstream climate thesis. 
Further, critique of perceived exaggerations of climate claims, rather than outright denial, is a 
central feature of sceptic discourse. Whitmarsh (2011, p. 8) found that the perception that media 
communication of climate change is alarmist is the single most common characteristic amongst 
sceptics. It is, therefore, not surprising that sceptics would rhetorically exploit the semblant 
misrepresentation behind the denier label. By emphatically arguing their acceptance of climate 
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change and a human contribution to it, they are ostensibly positioning themselves closer to the 
mainstream science, portraying their own views as critical improvements of the science, and 
discrediting their detractors for misrepresenting them by calling them climate change deniers. 
Another alternative label in limited use is ‘contrarian’ (see Boykoff & Olson, 2013; Brisman, 
2012, p. 42; Dunlap & McCright, 2011; Henson, 2011, p. 269; Nuccitelli, 2013). It carries two 
common sense meanings, namely a position of fact, such as in the Oxford dictionary (2013): 
“opposing or rejecting popular opinion or current practice”, or an attitude, such as in the Collins 
dictionary (2013): a “contrary or obstinate person”. It is not an ideal term because of its low 
currency (Painter, 2012, p. 195) and of its connotation with flippancy and obstinacy, which 
may apply to a good number of sceptics, but certainly not to all. Finally, Jones (2011) proposes 
“confusionists” as an appropriate label because it best describes the main goal of climate 
change scepticism, namely to promote confusion amongst the public. 
In most cases an observer’s choice of label is probably fairly arbitrary. It is likely that many 
observers simply persist with the commonly used label sceptic for purely pragmatic reasons, 
whilst acknowledging its messy relationship with labels like denier and contrarian (Antilla, 
2005, p. 339 fn. 5; McCright & Dunlap, 2003; Painter, 2012, p. 196). 
The chapter now turns to the task of selecting and justifying categories and labels to describe 
different qualities of scepticism, and organising these in a taxonomy.  
4.5.4 Proposal for a taxonomy 
For the overall category, preference is given to Anderegg et al.’s (2010, p. 12107) label 
“unconvinced of the evidence (UE)”.10 It accurately reflects the epistemic position of the full 
range of sceptics, from the agnostic/undecided and doubtful to those who actively dispute or 
reject some or all of the core mainstream claims. The label unconvinced avoids contestation 
over the badge scepticism, the positive scientific norm to which both sides in the debate are 
laying claim to. Avoiding the scepticism/sceptic badge altogether would help to limit tangential 
arguments about who are truly following the scientific tradition, and would deny the semblance 
of credibility enjoyed by sceptics, many of whom in actual fact practise a very low standard of 
scientific scepticism. 
                                                          
10 Although I propose that the label ‘unconvinced’ should replace the label ‘sceptic’ for the overall 
category, I have no illusions about the semantic appeal of the compound ‘climate change sceptic(ism)’ 
or its entrenchment in popular and scholarly use. I would hope, though, that in time the label 
unconvinced would bring more clarity to the discussion.  
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Sub-categorisations are shown in Table 4-2. At the first level of sub-categorisation, the scheme 
accommodates the wide agreement amongst scholars and observers that there is a significant 
qualitative difference between the most extreme sceptics and the rest, hence the reject-uncertain 
dichotomy. It is appropriate to use the label uncertain to separate the milder forms of scepticism 
from the rejectionists. The rejectionists represent the most vociferous and blatant sceptic 
persuasions. They are also far from uncertain in their views. Studies have shown that those at 
the most extreme end of the scepticism scale feel very confident in their dismissal of climate 
change evidence (Leiserowitz et al., 2009, p. 4; Whitmarsh, 2011, p. 9). The taxonomy avoids 
the labels denier and contrarian due to their semantic links to Holocaust denial and personal 
pettiness. 
The third and final level of sub-categorisation sub-divides the uncertain group into agnostics, 
doubters and disputers to reflect varying degrees and intensities of scepticism in this group. 
Including the agnostic/undecided here alongside the doubters and disputers is justified because 
the net effect of their position is the same as that of the other sceptics, namely non-acceptance 
of core climate change claims that should be beyond doubt, given the established and advanced 
nature of the science, the exceptionally high degree of scientific consensus prevailing, and the 
severity of the problem. The distinctions drawn in the taxonomy are, admittedly, subjective, 
but they are necessary to capture finer nuances in the sceptic phenomenon. 
Table 4-2: Certainty of sceptic belief: Categories and labels 
 
Umbrella label  for all sceptics 
Unconvinced 
(instead of sceptical) 
Two sub-categories to 
compartmentalise the most 
extreme sceptics from the rest 
Uncertain 
Reject/Dismiss 
(instead of denier or 
contrarian) 
 
Three sub-sub-categories to 
differentiate between finer 
nuances in the less extreme 
group 
Agnostic/ 
Undecided 
Doubt Dispute 
 
MILD 
SCEPTICISM 
   EXTREME 
SCEPTICISM 
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The proposed taxonomy reflects different intensities of climate change scepticism. For 
instance, a person emphatically rejecting the entire mainstream climate thesis is more likely to 
hold such views strongly and to actively challenge mainstream science than someone who is 
merely doubtful about some key claims. A degree of mobility between these categories can 
also be assumed. For instance, it is conceivable that extraneous events (like a particularly hot 
summer) may shift someone from doubtful to undecided and vice versa. The most extreme end 
of the spectrum can be expected to be stable because the individuals at this position are likely 
to have rationalised their views at length, and may have themselves heavily invested in this 
position in terms of professional prestige and opportunities for public exposure. Unavoidably, 
the labels are open to some degree of interpretation and are not entirely mutually exclusive. 
They have the advantage of drawing recognisable distinctions, and they dispose of the two 
most problematic ones, namely sceptic and denier. 
4.6 Conclusion 
This chapter proposes a conceptual map of climate change scepticism that might help an 
observer to draw both gross and subtle distinctions within the phenomenon. The evidence 
challenge is placed at the core of what it means to be a climate sceptic, with concomitant objects 
of scepticism moved to more neutral conceptual ground. The different certainties of sceptic 
belief are also relabelled for greater semantic accuracy and to dispose of toxic labels. These 
design elements might help to counter the potential pitfalls in prevailing assessments of climate 
scepticism, noted at the beginning of the chapter, and might provide important pointers for 
those concerned with meeting the sceptic challenge. 
Firstly, renewed recognition of the nuances in the sceptic phenomenon might help to counter 
the unintended but unfortunate ideologising of the debate that had occurred due to the intense 
interest in the extra-epistemic drivers of scepticism. Much of the mainstream response to 
climate change scepticism has failed to convince sceptics precisely because the science is 
skirted for the sake of a grand theory that casts sceptics as ill-intentioned rather than ill-
informed. And once the motivations of a participant are questioned, there could hardly be any 
chance of constructive dialogue and critique that might improve the quality of the science, the 
articulation of the science, or the debate in general. The right-wrong, serious-disingenuous 
dichotomies that dominate so much of the debate has made it difficult to engage sceptics in a 
discerning fashion, to direct chagrin at the egregious sceptic arguments, and give leeway and 
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credit to those sceptic arguments made in good faith. Pigeonholing sceptics who are sincerely 
concerned about aspects of the science with those who are egregious and entrenched in their 
scepticism has an unnecessarily polarising and politicising effect on the participants in the 
debate and their followers. 
Secondly, greater awareness of the distinction between core and concomitant objects of 
scepticism might encourage observers and policy practitioners to target their responses.  ACD 
scepticism hinges on the evidential challenge. If its evidential challenges are successfully met, 
it is likely that the associated critiques would lose coherence and appeal. By focusing on the 
core (and presumably refutable) sceptic challenges, observers and policy practitioners might 
avoid getting drawn into the ultimately political and moral debates typical of sceptics’ extended 
critiques. Sceptics have in the past benefitted from the resonance that their policy critiques have 
enjoyed amongst (non-sceptic or apathetic) partisans who oppose incisive climate mitigation 
measures, for various reasons. Without negating the potential value of addressing sceptics’ 
extended arguments, the value of a focused, resolute and sustained response to sceptics’ 
evidence claims should not be underestimated. It could be argued that the evidence debate 
provides a neutral and stable access point to sceptics, and that successful engagement of 
sceptics on purely evidence related matters would flow on to impact the credibility of sceptics’ 
extended arguments. 
Thirdly, systematising and formalising the task of classifying and labelling sceptics (by use of 
the two taxonomies) might make it easier to distinguish between those sceptics who stand 
closer to the mainstream view and might be amenable to argumentation methods and 
communication strategies, and those who are too extreme and entrenched in their views. 
Finally, relocating sceptics’ critiques of the scientific and bureaucratic processes behind 
mainstream climate science and the implied response imperatives of the mainstream thesis to 
more neutral conceptual ground unmerges the sceptic identity and reclaims these issues as 
legitimate concerns for everyone, not just sceptics. By lowering the defences on these issues it 
might be possible to dislodge the perception that sceptics are the drivers of public reticence and 
political indecision in climate matters. By treating the process and response issues as areas of 
legitimate disputation rather than an elaborate complex of sceptic provocation, observers and 
policy practitioners might demonstrate their commitment to a careful and thorough test of 
ideas, which might be helpful to convince those sceptics who are uncertain rather than 
dismissive of mainstream climate science. 
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5 CULTURAL MARKERS 
5.1 Introduction 
Analysis of the scholastic construction of ACD scepticism in Chapter 2 has shown that there 
are two concurrent interpretations of the phenomenon. Firstly, scholars have devoted much 
attention to the contrived aspect of elite sceptics’ behaviour, or, as some have labelled it, the 
‘manufactured’ aspect of ACD scepticism. The agents of scepticism (e.g. sceptic scientists, 
conservative think-tank analysts, right-wing journalists, sceptic hobbyists, etc.) are portrayed 
as rationally capable individuals whose aim it is to confuse the public debate about ACD and 
prevent or delay decisive action against climate change. Elite sceptics’ persistent questioning 
and rejection of mainstream scientific findings is viewed with suspicion, and they are often 
portrayed as scheming, cynical, self-interested, narrow-minded individuals (Dunlap & 
McCright, 2011; Gelbspan, 1997, 1998, 2004; Hamilton, 2006, 2007, 2010a; Hodder, 2010; 
Hoggan, 2009; Leggett, 2001; Oreskes & Conway, 2010; Pearse, 2007b; Pooley, 2010). 
Secondly, scholars have investigated the socio-psychological aspect of the phenomenon, and 
found that there are compelling subconscious intrapersonal forces conducive to a sceptical 
disposition. This interpretation is used, particularly, to explain the scepticism of laypersons (the 
general public). In this view, sceptics are captive to ideological and cultural constructs, have 
limited agency over cognitive and social processes, are unable to negotiate a complex, 
intangible phenomenon like climate change, and are susceptible to manipulation. The work of 
many scholars in the fields of cognitive psychology, social psychology and communication and 
mass media exemplify the interest in the cognitive and psycho-sociological mechanisms 
responsible for distorting the interpretive powers of the individual (Anderegg, 2010b; Bell, 
1994; Boykoff & Smith, 2010; Leiserowitz, 2005; Marshall; Poortinga et al., 2011; Swim et 
al., 2010; Whitmarsh et al., 2011). The two interpretations are concurrent and mutually 
supportive because the scepticism of the general public is widely blamed on the manipulative 
influence of elite sceptics. 
This chapter investigates sceptics’ cultural orientations in an effort to rebalance the 
manipulator-manipulated storyline. The critical question at stake here is whether sceptic elites 
might be driven as much, if not more, by cultural imperatives, as opposed to opportunistic and 
cynical motivations. The lay sceptic is afforded the benefit of socio-psychological or cognitive 
excuses for being mistaken about the climate issue, yet elite sceptics are often denied this 
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explanation. Should there not be greater recognition that the same cultural biases that contribute 
to uncertainty and doubt at the layperson level also play an important role in the rationales of 
sceptic elites – that sceptic elites and sceptic laypersons alike draw on deep-seated and shared 
conceptions of the ‘way of the world’, which predispose both to adopt sceptic positions? 
Two questions guide the investigation in this chapter: 
- What assumptions about human and physical nature are evidenced in the public 
discourses of a broad range of ACD elite sceptics? 
- How do such assumptions correlate with the grid-group typology of Cultural Theory? 
The chapter is organised as follows. The main tenets of grid-group Cultural Theory are briefly 
revisited in the next section. The integration of myths of human and physical nature with the 
core cultural rationalities, and how the cultural rationalities relate to one another are recapped 
for clarity of argument. The themes and concepts in the sceptic discourse that relates to 
assumptions about human and physical nature are outlined. The detected themes and concepts 
are then connected to the cultural rationalities postulated by grid-group Cultural Theory. The 
chapter concludes that the sceptic discourse is indeed embedded in very fundamental cultural 
notions that need to be recognised for better understanding and management of the sceptic 
phenomenon. Finally, the potential for more sophisticated engagement of sceptics in the public 
and policy arenas is flagged.  
5.2 Grid-group Cultural Theory11 
Grid-group Cultural Theory posits four cultural types: individualists, isolates/fatalists, 
hierarchists and egalitarians. These types are arrived at through a cultural map. Two dimensions 
of sociality establish four quadrants on the map. The first is the so-called group dimension, 
which indicates the degree of social incorporation/affinity of a person. The second is the so-
called grid dimension, which indicates the degree to which a person’s life is circumscribed by 
external prescriptions, in other words, a person’s preferences regarding social 
control/regulation (Hindmoor, 2010, p. 443). Elements of the group dimension include a 
person’s frequency of interaction, sense of mutuality, scope of social activities and social 
                                                          
11 The theory is explained in greater detail in Chapter 2, section 2.4.2 Grid-group Cultural Theory. Its 
main tenets are briefly recapped here for convenience and ease of reference. So is its central analytical 
device, the grid-group cultural map. 
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boundaries (Mars, 1982, pp. 24-28). Elements of the grid dimension include a person’s 
preferences about insulation, autonomy, prescription and competition (Douglas, 1978, p. 16). 
Grid-group Cultural Theorists maintain that these two primary dimensions of sociality “grasp 
the fundamental nature of the social being” (Mamadouh, 1999, p. 397). As such, grid-group 
Cultural Theory’s claims are taken to be general (explaining a wide range of people’s 
preferences, values and norms at any scale) as well as universal (applying across temporal, 
national and ethnic boundaries). Figure 5-1 depicts the typology. 
Figure 5-1: The grid-group cultural map*  
 
 
 
*This representation of the map is derived from Mamadouh (1999, pp. 399-401). 
  
GROUP 
GRID 
Social 
relations/affinity 
Social control/ 
regulation 
preferences 
FATALIST/ISOLATE HIERARCHIST 
INDIVIDUALIST EGALITARIAN 
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5.3 From cultural myths to myths of nature 
5.3.1 Myths of nature 
Drawing on the foundational work on myths of nature by Holling (1986), theorists have applied 
grid-group Cultural Theory to ecological issues (Dake, 1992; Davy, 1997; Douglas, 1992, 
1996; Douglas & Ney, 1998; Ellis et al., 1990; Grendstad & Selle, 1997; Schwarz & 
Thompson, 1990; Thompson, 1997; Thompson & Rayner, 1998). They have taken Holling’s 
original three myths of nature (nature robust, nature fragile and nature tolerant within limits), 
added another (nature capricious), and found strong correlations with grid-group Cultural 
Theory’s four cultural types. The correlations were not only established theoretically, but were 
also demonstrated empirically by several scholars (Grendstad & Selle, 2000, p. 28; Mamadouh, 
1999, p. 400; Thompson, 2003, pp. 5107-5108, 5233). The respective myths of nature were 
matched to particular cultural types on the basis of their contribution to “maintaining a 
particular way of life” (Dake, 1992, pp. 27-28), thereby making it a functional rather than 
ontological relationship. Each cultural type therefore chose a supportive myth of nature – “it is 
culture that provides socially constructed myths about nature” (Dake, 1992, p. 21).  
The correlations can be summarised as follows (Dake, 1992, pp. 29-30; Schwarz & Thompson, 
1990, p. 9): 
- Hierarchism fosters the myth that nature is tolerant within limits. Hierarchists’ tendency 
to managerialise problems by instituting structures and rules and to rely on expert 
decision-making underpins the myth that the ecosystem’s ability to sustain human life 
and progress can and should be managed. If nature is not properly managed humans 
might exceed the robust range of ecosystem resources and cause a collapse of some 
sort. A sustainable development and conservation ethic is thus strongly embedded in 
the hierarchist view. 
- Egalitarianism espouses the myth that nature is fragile. Egalitarians prefer equality of 
outcomes in social life and do not trust hierarchies or expert individuals to manage 
nature responsibly, for the equal benefit of all. A nature conceived as fragile, to be 
protected and preserved at all costs, thus facilitates egalitarians’ vision of a healthy and 
rich ecosystem in which all of humanity share collectively and equally. Only minimal 
exploitation of nature can secure equal benefits for all from nature, thus their strong 
precautionary, preventive and preservation ethic. 
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- Individualism engenders the myth that nature is robust. In the individualist way of life 
abundance follows if constraints on individuals and private enterprise are removed. 
Rules and hierarchies, as well as communal decision making, are typically seen by 
individualists as constraints on human creativity and progress. Individualists are 
optimistic that whatever environmental hazards may arise from the exploitation of 
nature would be overcome by technological innovation. A conception of nature as 
robust makes the individualist way of life possible. A progress and deregulation (limited 
environmental control) ethic is embedded in the individualist way of life. 
- Fatalists/isolates view nature as capricious. In the fatalist way of life people have 
limited agency over their own lives and simply responds to challenges as they present 
themselves. A conception of nature as potentially unstable and unpredictable suits the 
fatalist because there would be no point in trying to manage nature, just as there is no 
point in trying to cooperate with or manage society at a macro level. 
The myths of nature are graphically illustrated by a ball in a landscape where the landscape 
represents the world and the ball represents life. The shape of the landscape determines the 
interaction between the ball and the landscape, which tells a story about the “way” of physical 
nature (Schwarz & Thompson, 1990, p. 5). See Figure 5-2. 
Figure 5-2: Illustration of the four myths of nature* 
 
 
 
*The figure is reproduced from Schwarz (1990, p. 5). 
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5.4 Departure from, dilution, diffusion and proximity of cultural types 
The cultural types as theoretically constructed can be conceived of as “ideal typical social 
positions” that “account for cultural diversity in the most parsimonious way possible” 
(Mamadouh, 1999, p. 396). Others have called them “templates with recurring manifestations” 
(Hindmoor, 2010, p. 443), “a kind of heuristic in the rational processing of information on 
public policy matters” (Kahan & Braman, 2006, p. 149), “cultural leanings” that proscribe 
behaviour (Pendergraft, 1998, p. 650), and the “invisible hands” that guide debates over public 
issues (Kahan & Braman, 2006, p. 155).  In essence, they act as dispositional influences on 
individuals (Hindmoor, 2010, p. 445). They help individuals to derive or deduce their 
preferences, opinions and norms in relation to a specific issue (Mamadouh, 1999, p. 397). And 
because people argue “from different premises” that are “anchored in alternative forms of 
organising, they will never agree” (Verweij et al., 2006, p. 821). Grid-group Cultural Theory, 
therefore, provides an explanation of the consistency and persistence of diverse reactions to 
controversial societal issues.   
While grid-group Cultural Theory maintains that people’s cultural pre-commitments are 
always and everywhere influencing their attitudes and responses to societal issues, acting “prior 
to factual beliefs” (Kahan & Braman, 2006, p. 148), it is important to understand that they do 
not lock people into a particular interpretation of or response to a given situation or set of facts. 
There are always other psychological and situational effects that might either reinforce or 
weaken the cultural biases. Such interaction effects have been described in studies by Kahan 
and Braman (2006) (the relationship between cultural biases and overlapping psychological 
mechanisms), Kahan et al. (2012) (how exposure to technological solutions mediates cultural 
polarisation over climate science), and Goebbert et al. (2012) (how cultural biases and political 
ideology shape perceptions of changes in local weather). It is therefore possible that individuals 
might handle situations divorced from or even in contradiction to the pattern of their cultural 
bias (Sievers & Steg, 2000, p. 256). The key is, however, that before people will alter their way 
of life, they will first try to make the discordant voices fit with their existing worldview. 
Psychological mechanisms to achieve this, like cognitive-dissonance avoidance, affect, in-
group/out-group dynamics and the heuristic of deference to trusted sources, have been 
thoroughly described by social psychologists (summarised in Kahan & Braman, 2006, p. 153).  
So how does grid-group Cultural Theory deal with complex real-life social entities that are 
oriented in varying degrees by cultural pre-commitments? Firstly, it does not fix social entities 
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to particular locations on the cultural map. Ellis et al. (1990, pp. 4, 83) formulated the requisite 
variety condition in terms of which adherence to or support for diverse ways of life are always 
present in any society, in competition with each other. Adherents are constantly attracted to or 
moving from one way of life to toward another. Schwartz sees the situation as dominant and 
subordinate ways of life that “exist in alliance yet this relationship is fragile, constantly shifting, 
constantly generating a societal environment conducive to change” (Schwartz, 1991, p. 765). 
Secondly, grid-group Cultural Theory makes provision for diluted and diffused manifestations 
of the cultural rationalities. It concedes that the cultural types typify extreme biases, each 
offering but a “partial representation of reality” (Ellis et al., 1990, p. 25). Real-life social actors 
are unlikely to conform to all characteristics of the particular cultural worldview that orients 
them. To put it differently, not all the elements that could potentially define the type are present 
in each instance of the type (Mamadouh, 1999, p. 397). In a sense, therefore, the cultural types 
are collections of attributes, only some of which are detectible in the thoughts and actions of 
particular social actors at particular places and points in time. In theoretical terms the possibility 
– indeed, reality – of dilution/diffusion is expressed by the concepts of “mixed cultural 
orientations, complex alliances, borrowed rhetoric and evolving worldviews”, and the assertion 
that “no single ideological or relational characteristic can be employed to assign individuals or 
institutions to cultural categories” (Dake, 1992, p. 33). Empirical research has confirmed that 
individuals, while “lean(ing) toward one or another of the cultural types”, typically adopt a mix 
of elements from the different cultural rationalities (Pendergraft, 1998, p. 643). 
The relative proximity of the four cultural types has also been investigated. Research seems to 
have converged on the finding that the individualist and egalitarian types have the least in 
common, and that they often appear as polar opposites (Grendstad & Selle, 2000, p. 32). Some 
reflection on politics would confirm this: Strong environmentalism and human rights activism 
(core egalitarian values) are fused in the manifestos of left-wing political groups such as the 
Greens, whereas strong economic growth, personal responsibility and environmental 
utilitarianism (core individualist values) pervade the politics of the right. The relationship of 
hierarchism with the other types is more complex. Some research indicates “a melding of 
individualistic and hierarchical elements in opposition to egalitarian elements” (Pendergraft, 
1998, p. 643), whereas others have found some proximity between the egalitarian, isolate and 
hierarchist rationalities (Grendstad & Selle, 2000, p. 32). The ambiguity associated with the 
hierarchist position is borne out by current climate politics, where both environmentalists (and 
the political left in general) and corporate interests (traditionally associated with the right-wing 
109 
 
pro-growth side of politics) have supported market based managerial solutions (carbon pricing, 
tradable emission credits, renewable energy subsidies, etc.).  
In sum, the potential value of taking a grid-group Cultural Theory scalpel to the climate debate 
is not only in defining the opposing cultural biases, but also in identifying the “cultural 
interstices, where cosmological boundaries are weakest” (Pendergraft, 1998, p. 643). It is 
precisely because the respective rationalities argue from different premises, each employing 
“their own standards for judging what is right and what is wrong and what is to count as 
evidence” (Hindmoor, 2010, p. 443), that the climate debate is so fractious and intractable. The 
interstices between the rationalities therefore offer rare opportunities for a more inclusive and 
mutually intelligible dialogue. They also offer opportunities for countering the distorting 
influence of a particular cultural rationality. By framing the scientific evidence of ACD and its 
possible solutions “in terms that make assent to it compatible with, rather than antagonistic to” 
a person’s “cultural persuasion(s)” (Kahan & Braman, 2006, p. 149), one might succeed in 
swaying those at or close to the interstices to support pro-active climate measures. Hoffman 
chooses the term “broker frames” to describe those communication forms (“carefully selected 
metaphors, allusions and examples”) that might “trigger a new way of thinking about the 
personal relevance of climate change” (Hoffman, 2012, p. 35). Leiserowitz (2006, p. 64) makes 
the same point in calling for the “tailor(ing)” of climate massages to the needs and 
predispositions of particular audiences so that they might “resonate with strongly held values”. 
Having restated the theoretical understanding of how myths of human and physical nature 
underpin cultural rationalities, the chapter now proceeds to describe and interpret sceptics’ core 
assumptions. The sample of articles written and published in the mainstream media by 43 
Australian ACD sceptics during the period 2007 to 2012 (described in Chapter 3, section 3.7 
Sample Composition) is used for this purpose. As noted in Chapter 3 section 3.7, the search for 
Australian sceptics was comprehensive. Care was taken to include genre specific texts that the 
respective individuals wrote speaking as ACD sceptics, and not in some other capacity. The 
text sample was also balanced to ensure a more even representation between prolific sceptics 
and those who only published their views occasionally.    
5.5 Sceptics’ assumptions about human and physical nature 
For the analysis that follows a qualitative method was used where the text sample was read for 
meaning, information relevant to the research objective was noted, and subsequently organised 
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into a descriptive scheme. The question that guided the interpretation of the text is: What 
assumptions do sceptics hold about human nature and physical nature? The text sample was 
read as a whole and all instances where the sceptics alluded to human nature and/or physical 
nature were noted. 
The markers of these assumptions are subtle and are often described in different terms by the 
respective sceptics. I used a number of triggers to help with the identification and classification 
of relevant information in the sample. The triggers that guided the reading of the sample 
included descriptors like the essential or innate characteristics of the climate system and human 
nature, core truths about humans and the climate system, and key assumptions about the 
human-nature relation. No theme taxonomy was established ante factum because I did not wish 
to presume the presence or structure of themes in the sample. 
The result of the qualitative reading of the text sample is reported in Table 5-1. A notable 
feature of the detected themes relating to sceptics’ assumptions about human and physical 
nature is that they tend to co-occur as paired concepts. Table 5-1 lists twelve such dyads, 
together with a discussion of the contexts in which they appeared and selected quotes from the 
sample that demonstrate how sceptics verbalised them. 
Table 5-1: Sceptics’ assumptions about human and physical nature 
 
Core assumptions 
of human and 
physical nature 
Contextual appearances of the 
assumptions 
Illustrative quotes from the 
sample 
Concept pair 
1 
Vast and powerful 
nature – small and 
ineffectual human 
impact 
Sceptics construct the climate 
system as vast and ruled by 
overwhelming powerful natural 
forces. Human power is contrasted 
with the forces of nature, 
concluding that any human impact 
on the climate system could only 
be small in comparison. The 
human-climate relation is thus 
constructed as one where humans 
are relatively powerless, unable to 
affect the climate on a global scale. 
Sceptics do concede the potential 
of humans to impact nature on 
“Trying to ‘stop climate change’ by 
limiting carbon dioxide emissions is 
as foolish and as futile as trying to 
stop an earthquake or a volcanic 
eruption”. (Bob Carter, October 
2010)  
“… where is the borderline 
separating us from what is beyond 
human power?” (George Pell, 
October 2011)  
“The history of climate change 
provides no reassurance that human 
activity can control or even 
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Core assumptions 
of human and 
physical nature 
Contextual appearances of the 
assumptions 
Illustrative quotes from the 
sample 
local and regional scales. This idea 
also presents in sceptics’ 
acceptance of human 
custodianship of nature, the 
discussion of which follows later. 
substantially modify the global 
climate, although humans can effect 
important local changes for good or 
ill”. (George Pell, October 2011) 
 
Concept pair 
2 
Multiple influences 
on climate – human 
impact relatively 
small 
The observation that the climate 
system is influenced by a 
multitude of natural forces, and 
that human impacts represent only 
one of many influences, is 
frequently made in the sample. 
“Are we so arrogant to think that 
humans are the sole cause of climate 
change? One look at the Earth's 
dynamic and evolving history should 
cast doubts in everyone's mind”. 
(Cory Bernardi, April 2007) 
“What Al Gore, the EU, the UN, 
Garrett and Rudd all choose to ignore 
is the science that shows Earth's 
climate has always been variable and 
that climate change can be attributed 
to many things but among the least 
likely to have had an effect is human 
activity”. (Piers Akerman, April 
2007) 
Concept pair 
3 
Multiple influences 
on climate – humans 
unable to predict 
trends 
The fact that the climate system is 
governed by a multitude of 
influences is not only used by 
sceptics to relativise any possible 
impact humans might have on the 
system as a whole, but is further 
used to construct the notion that 
the system’s complexity exceeds 
human understanding and human 
ability to predict trends. 
Interestingly, only one instance 
was found where a sceptic seems 
to relate climate unpredictability to 
some chaotic principle at work in 
“Despite all the hype and the models 
and the catastrophic predictions, it 
seems to me that we human beings 
barely understand climate. It is too 
vast a domain. … The Earth is a big 
place.’ (Don Aitkin, April 2008) 
“We are confronted every day with 
how poor economic commentators 
are at prediction. If this is true in the 
domain of economics, how much 
more the case is it for climate, where 
the potential variables are vastly 
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Core assumptions 
of human and 
physical nature 
Contextual appearances of the 
assumptions 
Illustrative quotes from the 
sample 
the climate system, rather than the 
notion of an extremely complex 
system governed by multiple 
interlinked physical forces. 
greater?” (John Carroll, January 
2010) 
Concept pair 
4 
Climates change 
constantly – ever-
present natural 
causes 
The recurring nature of climate 
fluctuations is often associated in 
the texts with the assumption that 
current climate trends are not 
exceptional and are best 
understood against the background 
of the climate’s very long term 
historical trajectory. Climate 
fluctuations are thus constructed as 
natural phenomena. 
“Since the beginning of time, climate 
has always changed. It has warmed 
and cooled faster than any 
contemporary change. Nothing 
happening at present is unusual”. (Ian 
Plimer, July 2007) 
“… it is therefore most likely that the 
human signal lies buried within the 
noise of the natural climate system”. 
(Bob Carter, March 2008) 
Concept pair 
5 
Climate changes are 
cyclical – current 
trends unremarkable 
A prominent recurring theme in 
the sample is the notion that 
climate changes are cyclical. 
Sceptics observe that current 
climate trends are not 
unprecedented and are thus 
unremarkable.  
Sceptics’ construction of the 
climate as constantly fluctuating 
implies the notion of a dynamic 
self-correcting system. However, 
only one occasion was found 
where a sceptic explicitly pointed 
to the climate system’s ability to 
counter-act disturbances in ways 
that re-establish an equilibrium 
state close to what came before the 
disturbance. This is surprising 
because the theme of self-
regulation strongly enables the 
“The question of whether global 
warming is a new phenomenon or 
something that is just part of the 
naturally occurring 1500-year 
climate cycle was never raised in any 
of the discussions I have had with the 
Rudd government”. (Steve Fielding, 
June 2009) 
“Since then, however, there has been 
a growing swell of scientists who 
have presented strong arguments 
demonstrating that factors other than 
man-made carbon dioxide are the 
main causes of climate change; and 
that the climate change we are 
experiencing is not dissimilar to what 
this world has experienced over the 
eons”. (Dick Warburton, October 
2009)  
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Core assumptions 
of human and 
physical nature 
Contextual appearances of the 
assumptions 
Illustrative quotes from the 
sample 
sceptic argument that the climate 
system is able to absorb whatever 
human impacts there might be on 
the system. 
“There are now several independent 
pieces of evidence showing that the 
earth responds to the warming due to 
extra carbon dioxide by dampening 
the warming. Every long-lived 
natural system behaves this way, 
counteracting any disturbance. 
Otherwise the system would be 
unstable. The climate system is no 
exception, and now we can prove it”. 
(David Evans, April 2011) 
Concept 6 Past – present 
continuity 
Sceptics often contrast extremely 
long climate cycles with the very 
short industrial time period of 
modern times in order to construct 
an argument that the human 
impact from industrial activity has 
not caused unprecedented climate 
changes. 
“Global warming has occurred in 
past periods when human activity 
involving industrial type CO2 
emissions did not occur and 
temperature levels were almost 
certainly higher. Experts, including 
scientists, have a history of 
unrealised doom and gloom 
predictions”. (Des Moore, April 
2008) 
“Before the world had any power 
stations and steel mills and 
manufacturing, the world went 
through periods of ice ages and 
periods of global warming. There 
will always be changes that affect our 
climate, even if we stop all coal-fired 
power stations, steel mills and other 
manufacturing and put all their 
employees out of work and change 
our lifestyles”. (Gina Rinehart, 
March 2011) 
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Core assumptions 
of human and 
physical nature 
Contextual appearances of the 
assumptions 
Illustrative quotes from the 
sample 
Concept pair 
7 
Progress – 
technology  
Progress through technology is 
conceived as the typical human 
response to challenges, in this case 
environmental ones. As such, 
sceptics argue human resilience 
through ingenuity. 
“Technology has transformed the 
world because people adapt. Ignoring 
such a basic feature of human history 
and progress tells you much about the 
lack of rigour behind the evangelists 
who preach the global warming 
message”. (Janet Albrechtsen, 
February 2007) 
“Stern's black predictions of 
declining agricultural yields and 
global hunger -- "250 million to 550 
million additional people may be at 
risk" -- are based on studies that 
ignore human ingenuity: people 
developing new technologies, 
planting new crops, choosing 
different animal breeds and so on”. 
(Janet Albrechtsen, February 2007) 
Concept 8 Adaptability Complementing the 
abovementioned theme that 
humans overcome challenges by 
mastering nature in inventive 
ways, sceptics often invoke the 
idea that humans also successfully 
adapt by simply accepting changed 
conditions and environments. 
Human resilience is thus 
constructed through the idea of 
mere tenacity. 
“I would counsel that we accept that 
climate changes, and learn, as indeed 
human beings have learned for 
thousands of years, to adapt to that 
change as rationally and sensibly as 
we can”. (Don Aitkin, April 2008) 
“Humans readily adapt themselves to 
different climates (as they do now) 
and for the present it would be best to 
rely on adaptation”. (Des Moore, 
April 2008) 
Concept pair 
9 
Incomplete 
knowledge – huge 
uncertainties 
Many sceptics refer to the fact that 
humans have an incomplete 
understanding of the forces and 
processes driving climate change. 
The notion of incomplete 
“As a sceptic on this issue, I've spent 
years arguing that we just don't know 
enough about what's going on to 
predict the future with any certainty. 
… The earth might start to cool next 
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Core assumptions 
of human and 
physical nature 
Contextual appearances of the 
assumptions 
Illustrative quotes from the 
sample 
knowledge is derived from 
antecedent observations about the 
vastness and complexity of the 
climate system and is argued to 
imply that scientific uncertainty 
about climate change is a 
significant and legitimate 
problem. 
year (not necessarily a pleasant 
thought, incidentally), it might stay 
the same, or it might start to warm 
again. I don't think any of us knows”. 
(Michael Duffy, May 2008)  
“It is also claimed by some scientists 
that Earth may actually be entering a 
period of global cooling, not 
warming. We just don't know enough 
about the science to make that 
determination right now”. (Piers 
Akerman, July 2007) 
Concept pair 
10 
Incomplete 
knowledge – 
modelling flaws 
Sceptics use the incomplete 
knowledge argument to flag their 
deep-seated dislike of computer 
modelling in climate research. 
“Many scientists have noted that we 
just don't understand how the climate 
works well enough to place as much 
credence on these models as many 
people, particularly activists, now 
do”. (Michael Duffy, March 2007) 
“... our knowledge of the physics is 
incomplete, which requires the 
extensive use of ‘parameterisation’ 
(for which read ‘educated guesses'’) 
in the computer models”. (Bob 
Carter, April 2007) 
Concept pair 
11 
Reason – emotion 
tension 
Sceptics view themselves as the 
calm voices of reason in a debate 
that is characterised by hype and 
over-reaction. They frequently 
refer to their opponents and an ill-
informed public as being captive 
to emotional claims and 
exaggerations about the climate 
threat. 
“The need to believe in an 
apocalypse is a base craving 
unfortunately rooted in the human 
psyche. We need to resist it with 
another human attribute: the power 
of reason”. (Michael Duffy, March 
2007) 
“The media have continued to 
interpret any minor weather event as 
proof of global warming. Political 
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Core assumptions 
of human and 
physical nature 
Contextual appearances of the 
assumptions 
Illustrative quotes from the 
sample 
leaders have continued to crank up 
the panic. It's a response that has to 
raise concerns about the relative roles 
of reason, emotion and propaganda in 
public consideration of global 
warming”. (Michael Duffy, May 
2008) 
Concept 12 Custodianship Human custodianship of the 
physical environment is a 
recurrent theme in the sample, but 
is interestingly not functionally 
employed in the sceptic argument, 
i.e. as a rationale for continued but 
bounded human exploitation of 
nature. Rather, it is added as an 
adjunct, independent of the 
climate change equation, yet 
important enough to merit 
mention. Sceptics seem to want to 
register that responsible use of the 
environment has its own merit, and 
that their opposition to the climate 
change orthodoxy and its resultant 
policy prescription should not be 
interpreted as an anti-environment 
attitude. 
“Nobody is suggesting we despoil 
the planet and leave an 
environmental mess for future 
generations”. (Alex Robson, April 
2007) 
“Ultimately, though, this focus on 
climate change is a positive thing as 
it is forcing our communities to seek 
out alternative energy sources and be 
mindful of energy and water 
efficiency. These are positive habits 
for us all to get into in the long run 
...”. (Cory Bernardi, April 2007) 
 
It is evident from the detected themes that sceptics construct the climate system as vast, 
powerful, complex, variable, subject to multiple drivers and self-regulating. (The climate 
system serves as proxy here for the more general object of physical nature as used in the grid-
group Cultural Theory literature.)  
With these concepts in place, sceptics proceed to define ‘climate change’ in a particular way: 
The climate changes constantly. Changes usually occur over very long periods of time and 
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involve large shifts in prevailing patterns. Sceptics concur that climate can potentially change 
rapidly with destructive effect, but caution that as the time frame for change shortens, humans’ 
ability to comprehend causes and predict trends decline. 
Concomitant with their construction of the climate system, sceptics offer a specific construction 
of the human species. Humans are held as intelligent and resourceful, which enables them to 
achieve some mastery over nature through the use of technology. Thus, humans are 
exceptionally adaptive to whatever environmental challenges they might be confronted with. 
However, sceptics also hold humans to be limited in various ways, most prominently because 
of their incomplete knowledge and understanding of all the forces of nature. In addition, 
sceptics concede human fallibility in their rational faculties. Here, sceptics conceptualise 
humans as torn between the dictates of reason and emotional appeals from misguided 
individuals. 
The themes and concepts employed by sceptics in the sample of texts investigated here reveal 
that sceptics employ a concise, coherent and tightly interlocking argumentative logic in their 
construction of human and physical nature. The themes and concepts were found to be used in 
consistent patterns (most visibly as co-constructing concept pairs) by a cross-section of 
sceptics. The degree of commonality in the sceptic texts in relation to conceptions of humans 
and physical nature is remarkably high. No intrinsically contradictory concept(s) have been 
employed by any of the sceptics investigated. For the physical environment, sceptics’ 
argumentative logic reduces to the following singular coherent argument: The climate system 
is so vast and complex, under the influence of such powerful and lasting natural forces, that 
any human impact is difficult to prove and quite likely small. For human nature, sceptics’ 
argumentative logic reduces to the argument that humans are resilient and inventive, enabling 
them to adapt to challenging environments and at the same time care for their environment. At 
the same time, humans are limited in their knowledge and easily misguided, rendering their 
mastery of nature incomplete. 
5.6 Connections to cultural rationalities 
5.6.1 Cultural moorings 
A close look at how the individual concepts in the sceptic argument are deployed shows sceptic 
elites’ commitment to the individualist rationality. The concepts vastness, powerfulness, 
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complexity, variability and cyclicality strongly correlate with the robust, individualist type 
conception of physical nature. Sceptics’ notion that the climate system is cyclical, that it is 
ruled by a multitude of natural forces and that current climate patterns are not unprecedented, 
is an affirmation of a robust nature’s superiority and longevity, able to sustain life conditions 
under adverse pressures and influences.  
The sceptics’ explicit optimism about the prospects for human survival, even prosperity, in the 
face of climatic adversity resonates strongly with the individualist cultural type’s conception 
of human nature as robust, laden with potential. On numerous occasions sceptics refer to the 
use of technology to enhance and sustain the modern lifestyle. This endorses the individualist 
values of human progress and enterprise by leading individuals (risk-takers). 
Sceptics generally do not blame society as a whole for the controversy around ACD. Instead 
they aim their criticism at certain sectors (e.g. IPCC), individuals (e.g. Al Gore, Lord Stern) 
and political persuasions (e.g. Greens). They see themselves as representing mainstream 
thinking with the responsibility to bring reason and balance to the debate. Therefore, when 
sceptics claim that the public is misguided by leaders making exaggerated and emotional claims 
about the threats of ACD, they are displaying the individualist cultural type’s tendency to blame 
failure on other individuals. When sceptics accuse the IPCC and others of trying to monopolise 
the climate debate, they tap into the individualist conviction that success and progress is only 
possible through the open and free competition of ideas in the marketplace. 
5.6.2 Interstices 
The issue of human custodianship of the earth exposes an aspect of the sceptic rationale that 
resides at the interstice of the individualist and hierarchist rationalities. Many sceptics have 
accepted the individualist assumption that both humans and nature are robust, that both are able 
to withstand disturbances. In the event of large scale change, humans and nature are expected 
to simply settle at new equilibria. They are optimistic that humans will not only survive, but 
thrive in the face of climatic challenges. Sceptics of this persuasion tend to discount the 
maturity of alternative energy technologies, most often for the ostensible reason that they are 
economically inefficient (e.g. renewable subsidies) and impose costs on the consumer. 
Latently, though, it might be because they are seen as unnecessary in the scheme of a robust 
nature and resilient and adaptive humans.  
Somewhat in contrast, some sceptics do express concern about the impact of current 
technologies on the global environment and do argue for the development of low carbon and 
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other alternative energy sources, like nuclear. This is a hierarchist position, which 
acknowledges limits to the earth’s tolerance of human environmental impacts. In order to 
reconcile their concern for the environment with their distrust of the scientific prognoses and 
expected impacts of ACD, some are arguing a ‘no regrets’ position. In the ‘no regrets’ position, 
measures and technologies to restrict CO2 are defended on the basis that they have economic 
and environmental benefits, regardless of whether ACD is true or not. In Australia, coal seam 
gas is a good example because it reduces dependence on heavily polluting coal as a source of 
energy (locally and overseas), whilst at the same time generates economic opportunities. Some 
sceptics argue for nuclear, on the same basis. 
The different assessments of the robustness of nature inherent in the individualist and 
hierarchist worldviews seem to be at the heart of this apparent ambivalence in sceptic discourse.  
The archetypical individualist notion that the eco-system is so vastly powerful (in relation to 
human impacts on it) that it would maintain equilibrium without much difficulty sustains the 
more extreme forms of scepticism, whereas the hierarchist notion of an eco-system that is 
tolerant within limits enables a more pragmatic form of scepticism. One should not infer from 
the above that sceptics of the ‘nature is robust’ persuasion are unconcerned about the state of 
the environment. Just like their ‘nature is tolerant’ within limits cousins, they acknowledge that 
humans can impact the environment and that human impacts should be managed. The main 
difference is that the individualist inspired position acknowledges the fragility of nature at local 
scales, whilst the hierarchy inspired position is open to the possibility that nature might in fact 
be fragile to human impacts at a global level. 
Sceptics do not reject the necessity of institutional deliberation and decision-making about the 
climate problem, a stance that resonates with the managerial approach favoured by the 
hierarchist rationality. Hierarchists believe that expert led institutions are important in human 
decision-making and that decisions should benefit the group as a whole. Sceptics’ repeated 
calls for continued open debate about what they believe are disputed aspects of the science, 
their calls for ‘rational’ decisions and their critique of certain orthodox institutions, practices 
and personalities are perceived as attempts to remedy the decision-making processes, not a 
rejection of them. Sceptics differ, though, from the hierarchist deference to authority and 
expertise. They are strident in their criticism of climate science authorities (e.g. the IPCC, the 
former Climate Commission, and experts like Tim Flannery and Will Steffen). Sceptics’ acute 
sense of isolation and exclusion from the mainstream climate science and policy decision 
making processes resonates with the isolate’s sense of alienation and non-agency. However, 
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there is no suggestion in the sceptic discourse that, as the isolate cultural type would believe, 
there is little value in cooperative ventures and that humans ultimately have little control over 
their fate. On the contrary, sceptics bemoan what they perceive as the dysfunction of 
cooperative ventures, and they campaign for the liberation of scientific and policy-making 
processes that have, in their estimation, become captive to group-think (so-called noble cause 
corruption) and have fallen under the spell of environmentalist dogma. 
Sceptics’ emphasis on the huge complexity and variability of the climate system at first glance 
may seem to parallel the isolate cultural type’s construction of nature as capricious and 
unpredictable. However, the notion of capriciousness, which alludes to some chaotic principle 
at work in the climate system, is only mentioned once. The notion of unpredictability is 
frequently employed in the context of an extremely complex eco-system that is governed by 
multiple interlinked physical forces. In fact, one of the sceptics’ main arguments is that not 
enough scientific attention is given to exploring all possible explanations of climate change, in 
other words, not enough is being done to improve the current state of knowledge. There is a 
hint here of the hierarchist rationality that nature can be managed through rational expertise. 
But, equally, sceptics call for ‘better’ science (as opposed to the ‘junk’ science of ‘alarmists’), 
which locates them in the individualist category where humans are conceptualised as 
progressing through trial and error, constantly advancing through stages of discovery and 
technological development. 
Sceptics have little if anything in common with the egalitarian cultural type’s views of human 
nature. By definition, the sceptics consider themselves the devil’s advocates of the science 
world – outspoken, critical and often derisive of the orthodox science community. This 
approach stands in stark contrast to egalitarians’ insistence on in-group solidarity and 
democratic decision-making. 
5.7 Conclusion 
There can be little doubt about the cultural groundedness of sceptical thought. It is also clear 
that sceptics display a distinct cultural bent, i.e. their assumptions about human and physical 
nature align closely with the individualist worldview and have very little in common with the 
egalitarian worldview. In some instances they approach elements of the hierarchist view, 
consistent with grid-group Cultural Theory’s assertions about the dynamic and fluid nature of 
the cultural rationalities. 
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Recognition of the role that a particular cultural bias or biases play in the argumentation of 
sceptic elites is an important first step towards normalising the climate debate. It will help 
observers to move beyond the pervasive informed/ignorant, expert/non-expert, 
manipulator/manipulated dyads in the general climate discourse. 
There are also instrumental benefits to be drawn from greater recognition of the deep-seated 
cultural drivers of scepticism. The fact that elite sceptic rationales are anchored in the 
individualist view helps explain their presumed disproportionate influence over public opinion. 
The integration of individualist type notions of human nature and physical nature in their 
argumentative logic resonates strongly with the broader individualist constituency in the 
Australian population. The employment of core notions about human and physical nature in 
the sceptic discourse makes a highly scientific-technical matter culturally relevant to the 
general populace, and provides vital clues to the public to decode orthodox claims as egalitarian 
fictions aimed at destroying the individualistic way of life. Observers and climate policy 
practitioners who are concerned with meeting the sceptic challenge would do well to consider 
tapping into the individualist cultural notions when they market the necessity and urgency of a 
concerted climate response. Options and strategies in this regard are again discussed in Chapter 
9, CONCLUSION. 
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6 DISCOURSE MAP 
6.1 Introduction 
The preceding chapter shows that sceptics are oriented by a distinct cultural rationality. The 
notions contained in the sceptic rationality, like the notion that physical nature is vast, powerful, 
ever-changing and unpredictable, or the notion that humans are resilient and inventive which 
enable them to adapt to challenging environments but never able to totally control nature, act 
as prior commitments that scholars believe can heavily influence sceptics when they think 
about the climate problem and its societal implications (Rudiak-Gould, 2012, pp. 1-2). The 
sceptic rationality is, it would be safe to assume, not neutral in its definition of the climate 
problem or its proclivities to what it would consider an appropriate response to the issue. 
It is not surprising, therefore, that scholars have been drawing attention to the ideological 
significance of the sceptic position. In the ideological battles that rage around society’s 
response to the climate issue, sceptics and scepticism have slotted snugly into the neo-liberal 
cum conservative camp due to the congeniality of their cultural rationality. Sceptics’ strong 
individualist lean (their cultural type) makes them averse to climate responses that challenge 
neo-liberal economic values. As individualists they favour “individual pursuit of rational self-
interest” and “the optimal allocation of resources” through free markets (Thompson, 2003, p. 
227), which are profoundly political notions. The threat of ACD requires massive government 
intervention to shift the economy away from carbon emission intensive production and 
consumption patterns, and as such, runs against the individualist preference for free markets 
and limited government. Individualists would, therefore, tend to discount both the scientific 
basis of climate mitigation policies and the merits of the policies themselves. In the climate 
debate the individualist would favour arguments most congenial to their worldview, such as 
that nature is robust and capable of withstanding human impacts, that professional and political 
agendas drive climate ‘alarmists’, and that the free market and entrepreneurial innovation offer 
the best prospect for addressing environmental challenges (Verweij et al., 2006, p. 827). 
Sceptics’ association with neo-liberal cum conservative political agendas has also been willed 
into action by political conservatives who see in sceptics and scepticism an opportunity to 
further their cause. Scholars like Dunlap (2009, 2013), McCright (2000, 2003, 2010) and 
Jacques (2006; 2008) do not hesitate to make the connection: the climate problem threatens the 
interests of political conservatives, who respond by orchestrating a wide ranging counter-
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movement to thwart and delay climate programmes that might disrupt the prevailing economic 
and social status quo. In this endeavour, the promotion of scepticism is a key strategy. The 
climate dispute is, therefore, a mere smokescreen for a deeper cause; a proxy for a much more 
fundamental dispute over the way society should organise itself. 
This chapter takes stock of the broad sceptic discourse with a view to testing the command of 
the worldview/cultural/ideological influences in the sceptic rationale. Whilst the plausibility of 
such influences are clear and the manipulation of scepticism by political conservatives have 
undoubtedly occurred, it is not clear to what extent the broad range of sceptics are oriented in 
this way. Many sceptics, indeed, take umbrage at suggestions that they have been 
subconsciously predisposed to be sceptical or are duplicitous in their pursuit of the issue. The 
chapter, therefore, examines the salience of other motivational drivers in the sceptic rationale. 
It does not, and cannot, given the method, disprove the worldview/ideology thesis of ACD 
scepticism. Instead, it aims to put these foundational influences in perspective. It examines the 
very plausible possibility that many sceptics might be primarily motivated by more mundane 
and direct drivers in their rationales, and that these might be of overriding importance to them. 
If that were the case, observers and policy practitioners would need to take notice if they hope 
to accurately assess the sceptic challenge and devise an effective response to it.  
The full non-technical sceptic discourse is being investigated here, and differs from the 
confined remits of the preceding chapter, which focussed on the cultural notions in sceptic 
thought. It differs from the following chapter, which again takes a more specialised interest in 
sceptics’ policy preferences. This chapter aims to identify and describe the full range of themes 
and pre-occupations in the sceptic discourse, from which inferences can be drawn about the 
relative salience of the various concerns and arguments offered by sceptics. This is achieved 
through a grounded analysis of the semantics and concepts employed by sceptics. The chapter 
contributes to the overarching research objective of the study, namely to reveal nuances in 
sceptic argumentation and to critically test the general characterisation of sceptics as being 
ideologically and materially motivated. 
Whereas a qualitative approach was necessary in the investigation of sceptics’ cultural 
rationalities, due to the subtle nature of the assumptions underlying these rationalities, a 
quantitative approach is both possible and necessary in this chapter. It is possible because the 
themes and pre-occupations in the written texts in the sample of the group of Australian sceptics 
can be revealed through analysis of the semantics the sceptics have used, and the meaningful 
ways in which they associated their choices of words and concepts. Chapter 3, section 3.2 
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Analysing argumentative texts, explains the basis for accepting the sceptics’ written words as 
a valid source of information about their convictions and rationales. Chapter 3, section 3.3 Two-
fold analysis, explained the limits of quantitative semantic analysis and the need to augment 
the quantitative evidence with qualitative investigation and interpretation of the contexts 
underlying the semantic features. Chapter 3, section 3.7 Text sample composition, explained 
the care that has been taken to ensure that the sample of sceptic texts is as comprehensive as 
possible, is relevant to the research objective, and provides as equitable representation as 
possible of the respective sceptic voices. 
The quantitative evidence is a very necessary part of the investigation because it reduces 
potential researcher bias. The climate problem has severe and potentially irrevocable 
consequences for humankind, and compels most observers, including this one, to take a 
position. Further, the emphasis in scholarship and popular literature on the contrived nature of 
scepticism provides a powerful lens that might colour researchers’ objective evaluation of the 
phenomenon. Using quantitative data, and limiting researcher intervention through the use of 
automated computer processing, reduces these biases. The nature and reliability of the 
computer aided textual analysis software used, namely Leximancer, is described in Chapter 3, 
section 3.4 Computer aided text analysis. 
The chapter proceeds as follows. The next section describes the operations on the data that are 
specific to the quantitative investigation undertaken here. These data operations follow a 
logical sequence and are important to achieve the objective of identifying and describing 
common or shared themes in the sceptic discourse. The results of the data operations, such as 
the identified salient concepts, their co-occurrence patterns, and a visualisation of the 
relationships between the concepts are included in this section. The section thereafter analyses 
the underlying texts associated with the shared concepts are investigated with a view to 
describing the argumentative themes that they represent and construct. This is followed by an 
investigation of the correlation between the professional backgrounds of sceptics and the 
themes that they emphasise. A discussion follows in which the identified themes from the 
discourse are evaluated and classified. The chapter concludes with a reflection on the relative 
prominence of the respective thematic categories in the sceptic discourse, and what that means 
for our construction of sceptics and scepticism. 
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6.2 Data 
A number of operations were performed on the text sample in order to achieve three core 
objectives: firstly to extract, in depth, the concepts and themes propounded by each individual 
sceptic, secondly to eliminate irrelevant concepts and themes from the analysis (i.e. those 
relating to the physical evidence, generic and ambiguous concepts, as well as ‘low value’ 
semantics), and thirdly to identify which concepts and themes are shared by a significant 
number of sceptics. The final objective is important because the chapter aims to depict 
characteristic or common strands in the sceptic discourse, as opposed to individual arguments 
that are not shared by many other sceptics. 
The following operations on the text sample start with a broad-based survey of the semantics 
used by the sceptics (concept extraction using the Leximancer software), and then go through 
successive steps to weed out irrelevant concepts (manually classifying and collating the 
comprehensive list of concepts extracted by Leximancer), to exclude concepts that are not 
widely shared by the sceptics (concept reduction), and to establish the usage patterns of the 
remaining concepts (analysing concept co-occurrences using Leximancer). These steps are all 
necessary preparations in order to produce a computer generated visualisation of the semantic 
features of the text sample that is reliable and meaningful. 
6.2.1 Concept extraction 
The texts of each sceptic included in the sample were processed with Leximancer. The software 
essentially counts the instances of words in the sample, counts and records which words appear 
in close proximity to each other (their connectivity), and then produces a ranked concept list 
(see Chapter 3, section 3.4.2 Ranked concept list) of concepts that are both frequent and 
potentially meaningful. Minor adjustments were made to the default software settings to obtain 
optimal concept extraction, for instance, forcing context block boundaries across the 
fragmented paragraph structure of newspaper articles. (See Appendix 11.2 for the Leximancer 
software settings.) 
It was important to extract salient concepts for each sceptic separately. Concept extraction from 
the combined text sample might have led to an outcrowding effect, where concepts 
predominant in the texts of prolific sceptics might displace concepts predominantly occurring 
in the texts of the less prolific ones. 
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The result of this concept extraction step was that a total of 1113 unique concepts were 
identified. These concepts occurred across the texts of all 43 sceptics included in the sample. 
Although they occurred frequently and were well connected, not all would be relevant to the 
inquiry. The next step, concept classification and collation, weeds out irrelevant concepts.  
6.2.2 Concept classification and collation 
According to the meanings they were nominally pointing to, all concepts were classified in the 
following categories: low semantic value, ambiguous, theme generic, physical evidence 
related, and potentially meaningful. The result of this step is shown in Table 6-1. 
Table 6-1: Classification of initial concepts 
Category Examples Number 
Low semantic value activities, city, dr, explain, giving, issue, 
meet, minister, mr, professor, senator 
530 
Ambiguous authority, convinced, lobby, modest, 
population, rights 
77 
Theme generic global, warming, climate, change, 
science and variants, evidence and 
variants, data, emissions, carbon, 
dioxide, co2 
27 
Physical evidence related antarctica, cycle, hot, ice, ocean, surface, 
temperature, weather 
99 
Potentially meaningful concepts but 
only used by single sceptics 
government, debate, rudd, research, tax, 
price, ipcc, junk, policy, media, models, 
past, history, alarmist, public, 
international, agreement, university, 
expert 
253 
Potentially meaningful concepts 
shared by two or more sceptics 
127 
 TOTAL 1113 
 
The complete list of initial concepts is shown in Appendix 11.3. 
6.2.3 Concept reduction 
The 127 potentially meaningful shared concepts arrived at in the previous stage are concepts 
that are not of low semantic value, are not ostensibly ambiguous, are not generic to the topic, 
and are not confined to the technical evidence debate. However, they are not all equally relevant 
for the purpose of describing characteristic or commonly shared themes in the sceptic discourse 
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as a whole. Those that are too limited in their usage across the cohort of sceptics whose texts 
are included in the sample, therefore, need to be discarded for the analysis. 
An arbitrary sharing threshold of 40% was chosen to select the concepts most widely shared in 
the sceptic cohort. Table 6-2 shows the top concepts most widely shared by the 43 sceptics. 
The threshold produced a manageable number of concepts for in-depth analysis. These 
concepts provide the starting points for identifying shared themes of interest in the sample. 
Table 6-2: Top 6 concepts shared by sceptics 
 
 
% of sceptics using 
the concept 
world 51% 
debate 49% 
research 47% 
ipcc 47% 
australia 42% 
government 40% 
 
6.2.4 Concept co-occurrences 
Themes are typically not indicated by singular concepts, but rather by associated groups of 
concepts. When a concept is repeatedly used in similar contexts, i.e. it co-occurs consistently 
with one or more other concepts, one might adduce the presence of a theme. Distinct co-
occurrence patterns potentially indicate that the co-occurring concepts are repeatedly co-
employed and most likely in meaningful ways, in other words, they are co-constructing 
particular ideas. 
The next step in the analysis, therefore, looked for those concepts that co-occur frequently and 
relatively uniquely with the top six shared concepts. This analysis followed a conservative 
approach and only considered co-occurring pairs that are highly correlated and for which the 
underlying text displays distinct themes. Concept pairs that do not co-construct a meaningful 
idea or theme were excluded from the analysis, even if they co-occurred frequently. Examples 
of pairs that were excluded are ‘government’ and ‘political’ (they were used in close proximity 
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but in very diverse senses and did not co-construct a distinct idea or theme), and ‘ipcc’ and 
‘report’ (they occurred simply as a compound, namely ‘ipcc report’, which is not meaningful 
in itself). 
Leximancer’s Prominence metric was used to find concepts that are highly correlated, i.e. they 
co-occur fairly exclusively with each other. Leximancer calculates the co-occurrence of 
concepts in predefined text segments called context blocks. Co-occurrences are expressed as 
probabilities. For instance, the probability of concept A being present whenever concept B (the 
category) occurs is expressed as the Relative Frequency of the concept given the category, and 
the probability of concept B (the category) being present whenever concept A occurs is 
expressed as the Strength of the category given the concept. To measure how well concepts are 
connected (co-occur), Leximancer combines these probabilities of the concepts co-occurring 
in a metric called Prominence. The Prominence score captures co-occurrence probability in 
both directions, and is, therefore, a good indication of the exclusivity of concepts co-occurring. 
Prominence scores above 1.0 are positive correlations, and below 1.0 are negative correlations 
(Leximancer, 2010, p. 101; 2013). 
After applying a Prominence score threshold of 2.0 to all concepts that co-occur with the six 
most shared concepts, a total of 15 concept pairs (dyads) were isolated. Given that prominence 
scores above 1.0 are positive correlations, and below 1.0 are negative correlations, the 2.0 
threshold represents significant strength of exclusivity. 
Table 6-3 shows the most highly correlated concept pairs for the six most widely shared 
concepts in the text sample. Each pair (node) combines one of the top shared concepts (the first 
member of the pair) with another concept that it prominently co-occurs with in the underlying 
text (the second member of the pair). 
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Table 6-3: List of concept pairs that are meaningful*  
Co-occurring pairs for analysis 
(top 6 shared concepts on the left) 
Prominence scores 
(correlation threshold set at 2.0) 
world – rudd 2.1 
debate – political 2.6 
debate – sceptics 2.4 
ipcc – analysis 4.4 
ipcc – century 2.5 
ipcc – research 2.2 
ipcc – fact 2.1 
research – energy 2.3 
research – computer 2.1 
australia – trading 3.5 
australia – policy 3.3 
government – scheme 5.2 
government – trading 5.0 
government – tax 4.8 
government – policy 3.4 
 
*These concept pairs can be considered meaningful because their prominence scores indicate they co-occur 
frequently and relatively exclusively.  
6.2.5 Concept visualisation 
The co-occurring concept pairs were visually mapped on a Leximancer concept map (Figure 
6-1). The map displays their contextual closeness with each other and allows the researcher to 
make inferences about the uniqueness or otherwise of themes in the discourse. 
Proximity on the map indicates that respective concept pairs appear in similar textual contexts, 
and vice versa. The ‘government’ and ‘australia’ nodes share constituent members, and are 
used in similar contexts, therefore their tight clustering. One should expect related themes to 
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emerge from this cluster. The same applies to the two ‘debate’ nodes. The ‘ipcc’ nodes are 
more dispersed, which could be indicative of greater thematic variety. The two ‘research’ nodes 
(‘research – energy’ and ‘research – computer’) are relatively far removed from each other, 
and one should expect unrelated themes to emerge from the two nodes, despite sharing the 
concept ‘research’. 
Figure 6-1: Leximancer concept map of the most prominent co-occurring pairs* 
 
*Each pair is anchored by one of the top six shared concepts. 
Because the concept map compresses multidimensional relationships into a two-dimensional 
space, the spatial distribution of the nodes on the map does not 100% accurately reflect the co-
occurrence probability metrics of the respective pairs of nodes (Leximancer, 2010, p. 93). Each 
node is pulled by all the other nodes to varying degrees, and eventually settles on the map in a 
best fit position. 
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Two measures can be used to check that the map indeed provides a reasonably accurate 
approximation of the relationships between the nodes. Firstly, the map can be checked for 
stability, and secondly the clustering on the map can be compared with the results of a statistical 
clustering routine. 
To check the stability of the clustering configurations on the map the map was regenerated and 
reclustered multiple times to check that it reproduces in similar ways. High stability is achieved 
when the sample is sufficiently differentiated and not dominated by one or more concepts. This 
map reproduced very similarly and should be considered a very reliable reflection of the 
relationships between the nodes. (See Leximancer, 2010, p. 92 ) 
The accuracy of the Leximancer concept map was also tested by comparing the co-location of 
concepts on the map with their clustering in a hierarchical agglomerative clustering (HAC) 
dendrogram. HAC is regularly used in scholarly literature to find patterns and topic themes in 
textual data (Blashfield & Aldenderfer, 1978). HAC algorithms measure the similarity and 
dissimilarity of different objects/cases/samples on the basis of various characteristics/variables 
(Romesburg, 1984, pp. 2-3). The particular clustering algorithm used is called Ward’s method, 
which favours the formation of compact clusters (Holland, 2006, p. 2). Figure 6-2 shows the 
HAC dendrogram for the top six shared concepts.  
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Figure 6-2: HAC dendrogram of the top six shared concepts 
 
 
 
For the HAC dendrogram to be consistent with the Leximancer concept map, concepts that are 
grouped together at short HAC clustering distances should present as clusters on the 
Leximancer map, and concepts/concept clusters that only group together at long HAC distances 
should be located far apart on the concept map. Figure 6-2 shows that the ‘world’/‘research’ 
and ‘australia’/‘government’ pairs are grouped at short HAC distances, which implies they are 
tight clusters. The Leximancer map shows that the concept pairs anchored by these two 
concepts are indeed located in close proximity. Figure 6-2 also shows that ‘debate’, ‘australia’ 
and ’government’ are only joined to the other concepts and each other at relatively long HAC 
distances, which means that they are quite dissimilar to the others and each other. On the 
Leximancer map they are indeed located in isolated positions. The HAC dendrogram, therefore, 
confirms that the two-dimensionality of the Leximancer concept map does not unduly distort 
the multidimensional relationships between the concepts. 
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6.3 Analysis of the underlying text 
The underlying text where the concept pairs appear together is next investigated with a view to 
fleshing out the themes flagged by the Leximancer map. Leximancer has a querying function 
through which it is possible to locate text segments that contain specific chosen concepts. 
Whenever the analysis of the underlying text crystallises into a theme, the theme is formulated 
at that point in the discussion and shown in italics. 
6.3.1 The ‘australia’ and ‘government’ cluster 
The six nodes in this cluster are, as expected, close to one another on the concept map. Each 
node shares a constituent concept with at least two of the other nodes in the same cluster. The 
‘australia – policy’ and ‘government – policy’ nodes carry the arguments against climate 
mitigation policy in general, whilst the ‘government – trading’, ‘government – scheme’, 
‘australia – trading’12, and ‘government – tax’ nodes carry the arguments against the two types 
of mitigation policies debated in Australia in the 2007 to 2012 period, i.e. an emissions trading 
scheme and a carbon tax. Where the cluster points to sceptics’ criticisms of the proposed cap 
and trade scheme per se (during the 2007 to 2010 period when it was actively debated), three 
categories of criticism are offered. Firstly, it is argued that there is insufficient scientific 
justification for the scheme (that it is an unnecessary impost on the Australian economy). 
Secondly, it is argued that even if the scientific rationale is accepted, implementing the system 
in isolation (not in concert with a truly global cap and trade scheme) would not achieve any 
real environmental benefit. And thirdly, it is argued that the scheme would be unwieldy and 
open to abuse. The spectre of bureaucratic complexity and rent-seeking gamesmanship is 
raised. For instance, Aitkin (2008): “What we should not do is go down the path of carbon 
taxes, carbon trading and carbon caps before it is absolutely plain that there is no alternative. 
Why? At present such measures seem likely to be unnecessary and futile and to lead to rorts”. 
Where the cluster points to sceptics’ criticisms of a carbon tax per se (during the 2011 to 2012 
period when it was actively debated), similar arguments are offered as for an ETS (i.e. it is not 
scientifically justified, it is an unnecessary cost impost on the economy, it is a form of 
government economic intervention that can be politically abused). In a number of instances, 
sceptics object to the principle of carbon pricing, regardless of the mechanism. For both an 
                                                          
12 The ‘government – scheme’ and ‘government – trading’ nodes are contextually virtual duplicates. 
This is an artefact of the co-occurrence of ‘trading’ and ‘scheme’ as the compound ‘trading scheme’ in 
both nodes 
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ETS and carbon tax sceptics argue that mitigation by Australia in the absence of a concerted 
international mitigation effort (one that includes all the major emitters) would be futile, harmful 
to the Australian economy, and scientifically unfounded. For instance, Carroll (2010): “But 
Copenhagen has rendered even that futile for a trivial world polluter such as Australia, given 
that China and India have made it clear they will not be cutting back on their use of coal.” This 
argument is also prominent in the ‘world – rudd’ node.  
Theme 1: A national (grand) carbon pricing policy regime is unjustified and self-damaging. 
As an alternative to carbon pricing and climate mitigation, some sceptics campaign for a policy 
centred on adaptation. They understand adaptation as the building of national resilience to 
withstand all possible climate hazards as and when they occur.  
Theme 2: National climate policy should be aimed at adaptation rather than mitigation.  
In addition to contesting the justification for and merits of a national climate mitigation policy, 
the underlying text also shows criticism of the processes by which national climate policy is 
being arrived at. Firstly, government is accused of developing climate policy in a haphazard 
way and not explaining its rationale very well. Secondly, it is argued that the style of climate 
policy making has been autocratic. It is argued that sceptic voices have been explicitly excluded 
from discussion fora as well as research funding opportunities.  
Theme 3: Climate policy development is haphazard and autocratic.  
A hint of pragmatism around the issue of carbon pricing is detected in the underlying text, with 
one argument that a trading system is preferable because it would be consistent with 
international trends, and another that a tax is preferable because it would be more transparent 
and easier to manage than an ETS. 
6.3.2 The ‘research–energy’ node 
The underlying text at this node indicates that sceptics are not principally opposed to the 
development of clean or alternative energy supplies, but that they are deeply concerned about 
the way it should be done. They argue that any reformation of the energy mix should not impede 
the competitive advantage Australia derives from cheap coal. Sceptics are, therefore, 
principally averse to carbon trading schemes, carbon taxes and renewable energy targets 
because they, directly or indirectly, force energy prices up. Instead, they prefer clean energy to 
mature and be advanced through R&D to the point where it can compete with traditional 
sources of energy without the prop of artificially high energy prices. Several sceptics promote 
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the nuclear option as a viable clean energy source. For instance, Devine (2009): “Yet there has 
been little debate about the impact on jobs, household budgets, agriculture and industry, on 
electricity, gas and petrol prices, no consideration of nuclear energy, and scarce information 
about how we will do without the cheap baseload energy from coal-fired power stations which 
underpins Australia's high standard of living.” 
It is interesting that the underlying text discusses alternative (called ‘clean’ and ‘green’) sources 
of energy, but fails to mention the role of new fossil fuel energy sources  (e.g. coal seam gas) 
in the national energy equation.  Also, when sceptics discuss the merits of specific types of 
alternative energy (e.g. solar and nuclear) they tend to not do it at the cost of other alternative 
energy sources. This leaves one with the impression that sceptics are uncommitted on the 
question of clean energy development, yet find it important enough to talk about. 
Sceptics talk about the energy question in a fairly narrow context. It is only mentioned at this 
node, and not at the two nodes containing ‘policy’ as a focusing concept. One might assume 
that alternative energy development is a ‘nice to have’ item in the sceptic rationale. 
Theme 4: Alternative sources of energy need to be developed (to the point where they can be 
competitive) through investment in research and development.  
6.3.3 The ‘world–rudd’ node 
Two contexts emerge from the underlying text at this node. In the context of ‘a warming world’, 
sceptics’ disputation of the evidential basis of ACD is repeated. It is argued that the scientific 
rationale for a national scheme to limit carbon emissions (referring to the Carbon Pollution 
Reduction Scheme – CPRS – proposed during the 2007-2010 period when Kevin Rudd was 
Prime Minister) has collapsed. Although sceptics are clearly critical of the climate beliefs of 
politicians, there is a hint in their arguments that ‘warmist’ scientists are primarily to blame 
and that politicians have been misled into accepting the ACD thesis. For instance, Paltridge 
(2012): “As one organisation after another jumps, or is pushed, into producing public 
assessments of the climate change issue, we see the same small group of activist-scientists in 
the background. We see them providing briefings to federal and state politicians.” 
This argument fits in the context of the so-called Climategate controversy at the time. The more 
interesting context to emerge from this node is the argument that the CPRS was a far-reaching 
plan that would have placed Australia ahead of the rest of the world in climate policy. This 
argument is underpinned by the observation that Australia’s gross domestic carbon emissions 
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are miniscule on a global scale, and that domestic emission reductions without a concerted 
international effort would have a negligible impact on the physical climate. In their argument, 
a carbon tax or trading scheme would impose a cost on the Australian economy without any 
environmental benefit. 
Theme 5: World climate leadership by Australia would be ineffectual and self-damaging. 
6.3.4 The ‘ipcc’ cluster 
The ‘ipcc–research’ node repeats an argument also made at the ‘research – computer’ node, 
namely that the massive funding of climate research has not delivered conclusive proof of the 
mainstream ACD thesis and that the funding in itself has become a biasing factor in climate 
research. Two additional arguments are made at the ‘ipcc–research’ node. Firstly, it is argued 
that important new and contradictory research is habitually overlooked in mainstream climate 
research. Secondly, lapses in peer review and oversight of IPCC published research are 
highlighted to show the inherent problems with IPCC published research. The argument is 
made that, because the IPCC does not produce new or original research (it merely synthesises 
existing research), the process of combining and summarising available climate research has 
exposed it to political manipulation. In particular, IPCC reports are seen as consensus 
documents, rather than scientific ‘truth’. For instance, Blair (2010): “That claim [that 
Himalayan glaciers would melt away by 2035] turned out to be based on a conversation with 
some guy whose opinion ended up in a magazine. No research. No peer review. Nothing more 
than a doomsday forecast from some bloke described in Indian media as a ‘dial-a-quote’ about 
glaciers talking on the phone … This Nobel-winning 2007 IPCC report, upon which Kevin 
Rudd had so much faith, has more holes in it than Saddam Hussein's bullet-riddled rapist sons. 
Whole chunks of it, for example, cite the completely neutral and unbiased science organisation 
Greenpeace as a source on matters ranging from the health of the Great Barrier Reef to solar 
power efficiency and wind energy.” 
The following three themes can be formulated from the ‘ipcc–research’ node. 
Theme 6: The evidential support for the ACC thesis remains weak/inconclusive. 
Theme 7: Mainstream climate research lacks rigour. It overlooks contradictory research and 
shows serious lapses in peer review. 
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Theme 8: Mainstream climate research (as reflected in the work of the IPCC) is inherently 
biased because of an imperative to produce a consensus position, and because of selective 
funding of research.  
The remaining nodes in the ‘ipcc’ cluster do not add new themes of interest. 
6.3.5 The ‘research–computer’ node 
This node repeats the argument in the ‘models’ cluster that computer models are unable to fully 
replicate the complex climate system and that their results are indicative at most. In addition, 
the node argues that in spite of the massive investment in climate research funding over many 
years, amongst others in expensive computer modelling, the evidential base of the mainstream 
climate thesis remains inconclusive. The key argument is that computer modelling, which 
inherently has limited evidential value, has been disproportionately favoured (and 
manipulated) in the broader climate research project. For instance, McLean (2008): “Scientists 
associated with the development and use of climate models dominate the clique of chapter nine 
authors and by extension the views expressed in that chapter … These models are said to 
require a human component to reasonably match historical temperatures and the modellers 
claim that this proves a human influence on climate, but the human factor is an input so a 
corresponding output is no surprise. A more plausible reason for the mismatch without this 
influence is that the models are incomplete and contain errors.” 
Although the massive climate research budgets are viewed derisively for their perceived lack 
of strong evidential results, the underlying sentiment is not anti-climate research, but rather 
better directed and focused climate research. 
Theme 9: Over-reliance on and manipulation of computer modelling is distorting climate 
research. 
6.3.6 The ‘debate’ cluster 
The underlying text for both nodes in this cluster show a consistent concern with what is 
perceived as hyperbole and invective in the climate debate. It is argued that sceptics and their 
viewpoints are pilloried in order to inoculate the climate debate from dissenting views. Slightly 
less prominent in the cluster, is the critique that dissenting climate views have been explicitly 
excluded from public debating fora such as the Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC). 
The charges of hyperbole, invective and exclusion are directed at politicians, scientists and the 
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media. It is argued that mainstream climate exponents use these tactics to advance their political 
objective of reshaping socio-economic relations though a carbon regime. Interestingly, the 
underlying text acknowledges that radical statements from some sceptics themselves on 
occasion also contribute to the poor quality of the climate debate. For instance, Paltridge 
(2012): “But perhaps the biggest of the underlying problems, and it is common to both 
arguments since it inevitably exists when there is large unpredictability and uncertainty, is the 
presence of strong forces encouraging public overstatement and a belief in worst-case scenarios 
… one might take much more notice of the global warming scare campaign if it were not so 
obvious that many of its most vociferous supporters have other agendas.” 
Theme 10: The climate mainstream conducts an acrimonious style of debate. Sceptic at times 
also guilty.  
A minor argument from the cluster is that an open and balanced debate is necessary, given the 
far-reaching social and economic implications of climate policies. It is also argued that a one-
sided debate is no longer tenable due to the perceived failure of the Kyoto Protocol (since the 
Copenhagen summit) and the perceived manipulation of the science by senior mainstream 
climate scientists (the so-called Climategate affair). 
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6.3.7 Thematic summary 
To summarise, the identified themes are shown in Table 6-4. The themes are listed here 
according to their association with each of the clusters on the concept map. 
Table 6-4: List of shared themes in the sceptic discourse 
 
Nodes/clusters Themes 
australia – policy 
australia – trading 
government – tax 
government – trading 
government – scheme 
government – policy 
1. Climate policy development is haphazard and autocratic.  
2. A national (grand) carbon pricing policy regime is unjustified and self-
damaging.  
3. National climate policy should be aimed at adaptation rather than 
mitigation. 
 
research – energy 4. Alternative sources of energy need to be developed (to the point where 
they can be competitive) through investment in research and development. 
world – rudd 5. World climate leadership by Australia would be ineffectual and self-
damaging. 
ipcc – research 6. The evidential support for the ACC thesis remains weak/inconclusive. 
7. Mainstream climate research lacks rigour. It overlooks contradictory 
research and shows serious lapses in peer review. 
8. Mainstream climate research (as reflected in the work of the IPCC) is 
inherently biased because of an imperative to produce a consensus position, 
and because of selective funding of research. 
research – computer 9. Over-reliance on and manipulation of computer modelling is distorting 
climate research. 
debate – political 
debate – sceptics 
10. The climate mainstream conducts an acrimonious style of debate. 
Sceptics at times also guilty. 
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The ten themes can be distilled into four super-themes. The super-themes are carbon mitigation 
policies (domestic and international), Australia’s energy future, climate science (evidentiary 
and institutional weaknesses) and the general style of the national climate conversation. Table 
6-5 shows the ten themes in their four super-theme categories. 
Table 6-5: Ten discourse themes in four super-theme categories 
 
Carbon mitigation policies (domestic and 
international) 
 Australia’s energy future 
2. A national (grand) carbon pricing regime is 
unjustified and self-damaging.  
3. National climate policy should be aimed at 
adaptation rather than mitigation. 
5. World climate leadership by Australia would be 
ineffectual and self-damaging. 
 4. Alternative sources of energy need to be 
developed (to the point where they can be 
competitive) through investment in research and 
development. 
   
Climate science (evidentiary and 
institutional weaknesses) 
 Style of the climate conversation 
6. The evidential support for the ACC thesis remains 
weak/inconclusive. 
8. Mainstream climate research (as reflected in the 
work of the IPCC) is inherently biased because of an 
imperative to produce a consensus position, and 
because of selective funding of research. 
9. Over-reliance on and manipulation of computer 
modelling is distorting climate research. 
 1. Climate policy development is haphazard and 
autocratic. 
7. Mainstream climate research lacks rigour. It 
overlooks contradictory research and shows 
serious lapses in peer review. 
10. The climate mainstream conducts an 
acrimonious style of debate. Sceptics at times also 
guilty. 
 
The super-themes have also been observed in other studies of the sceptic discourse. An 
investigation of documents from the websites of 15 of the most prominent sceptic think tanks 
and organisations in the US found that topics related to the science of ACD, discussions of 
energy policy, and domestic and international policy concerns dominated the sceptic argument 
(Boussalis & Coan, 2013, p. 12). A content analysis of three internationally prominent climate 
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sceptic blogs found that the discourses in these blogs were dominated by scientific challenges 
to mainstream climate science and critiques of the conduct of the climate science system 
(Sharman, 2013, p. 17). 
6.4 Professional groups’ contributions to the sceptic discourse 
Leximancer has the ability to display files and folders on the concept map. In this functionality 
the dataset/sample is organised into different files and/or folders. All the text occurring in a 
particular file or folder is coded to a file or folder tag. The frequency and co-occurrence metrics 
of the various tags are then calculated in the same way as all the word concepts on the map, 
which means that the tags become concepts in their own right. The net result is a map that 
shows the connectivity of specific parts of the dataset/sample to other parts, as well as to all 
the word concepts on the map. This function is very useful for making discriminant analysis 
between sample subsets (Leximancer, 2010, pp. 56-57). 
For this part of the study, all the sceptic texts were placed in folders according to the 
professional backgrounds of the sceptic authors. The professional groups and the folder tag 
name for each are shown in Table 6-6. By way of an example, the tag ‘FOLDER1_business’ 
represents all the texts in the sample written by sceptics with a business professional 
background. 
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Table 6-6: Professional group folder tags 
Academic (Earth sciences) FOLDER1_acad-earth 
Academic (Economic sciences) FOLDER1_acad-econ 
Academic (Human sciences) FOLDER1_acad-hum 
Artist FOLDER1_artist 
Business FOLDER1_business 
Clergy FOLDER1_clergy 
IT FOLDER1_it 
Engineering FOLDER1_engineering 
Journalism FOLDER1_journalism 
Legal FOLDER1_legal 
Medical FOLDER1_medical 
Politics FOLDER1_politics 
  
The tags for the different professional groups in the text sample are shown on the concept map 
in Figure 6-3. The position on the map of any given folder tag shows its connectivity to other 
folder tags or concepts. Other folder tags and concepts that are relatively close to a given folder 
tag indicates overlap and commonality, and vice versa. (An interpretation of the spatial 
configuration of the various professional folder tags in Figure 6-3 follows after the figure.) 
Not all the tags are significant because some of the professional groups are poorly represented 
in the sample, such as the Clergy, IT, Artist, Legal and Medical groups, which have only one 
sceptic associated with each. The significant groups are the Academics (Earth sciences), 
Business, Journalism and Politics groups. 
The arrangement of the word concepts changes slightly when folder tags are added to the map. 
The general spatial features remain similar in both maps though. For instance, when the two 
maps in Figures 6-1 and 6-3 are compared, it can be seen that the ‘ipcc’ and ‘government’ 
dyads continue to appear as distinct clusters in both maps. The ‘debate’ dyads were drawn 
closer to the other concepts in the map with folder tags (Figure 6-3), but retain their separation 
from both the ‘ipcc’ and ‘government’ clusters. 
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Figure 6-3: Concept map with folder tags 
 
 
A notable feature of the map is the clear association of journalists with primarily the ‘world-
rudd’ dyad, and secondarily with the ‘debate’ and ‘government-tax’ dyads. This indicates that 
the sceptic journalists strongly question Australia’s climate leadership (during the Rudd era), 
the wisdom of a carbon tax and the general way the climate debate has been conducted and 
handled in Australia. Unsurprisingly, the earth scientists are located at the opposite end of the 
concept map in the vicinity of the ‘ipcc’ dyads. This merely reflects their expertise and interest 
in the evidential debate. It is surprising that the politicians and business professionals are also 
strongly associated with the debate surrounding the ‘ipcc’ dynamics, and that they are 
apparently weakly associated with the ‘world-rudd’ dyad, which centres on the question of 
Australia’s climate leadership. One might assume that the politicians and business 
professionals place a high premium on the debate around the integrity of the IPCC processes 
and reports, given the legitimating role of the IPCC. The fact that the ‘government’ dyads 
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occupy the centre ground of the map indicates that they are equally strongly connected to most 
of the surrounding concepts, i.e. the surrounding concepts are often used in relation to 
government policy or initiatives. The central position of the ‘government’ dyads also indicates 
that most sceptics take an interest in government’s role in the climate issue. For most, the 
climate issue has political significance and they are willing to comment on government’s role. 
6.5 Discussion 
Three observations can be made from the themes and arguments that stand out from the sceptic 
discourse. Firstly, sceptics articulate the political significance of their reading of the science in 
favour of neo-liberal cum conservative values. Secondly, the sceptic critique is unnecessarily 
complex, often including extraneous arguments, which raises a question about the motivations 
of sceptics. And thirdly, sceptics often raise concerns about the style and standard of climate 
science and politics, which are worldview/ideology neutral. Each of these are subsequently 
discussed. 
6.5.1 Evidence of an ideology/worldview bias 
Ideological bias on the part of sceptics is conspicuous in their critique of climate policies. For 
instance, when sceptics deride the economic cost impositions of carbon pricing regimes of 
whatever brand, they are defending the ideal of a relatively unregulated and efficient free 
market. When they are warning against increased bureaucracy and regulation that would come 
with climate pricing regimes, they are defending small government and personal freedom. 
Sceptics defend national self-interest when they warn that carbon pricing in Australia would 
make the nation less competitive internationally and would harm local industries and jobs. 
They are very averse to the argument that Australia, as a high per capita CO2 emitter, has a 
moral obligation to undertake climate change mitigation, and that its moral obligation 
outweighs its immediate economic national self-interest. Sceptics repeatedly argue that 
Australia’s economic interests would be harmed if it were to undertake climate actions in 
isolation, i.e. without similar actions undertaken by its major trading partners. Sceptics also 
express a clear preference for measured and cautious change when they argue that the radical 
and far-reaching economic restructuring that a national carbon pricing regime would bring 
about is not warranted given the perceived uncertainties in climate science. A preference for 
conservatism in policy decision making is also evident in sceptics’ arguments for adaptation 
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instead of mitigation as a national climate response strategy. They argue that adaptation is the 
safe option; that it builds societal resilience regardless of the cause, direction or severity of 
future climate change. They typically argue for ‘cool’ heads in the ‘hot’ climate debate.  In 
sum, sceptics’ policy critiques and preferences quite overtly display a bias towards what could 
broadly be classed as neo-liberal political conservatism, which includes the ideals of a free 
market, limited government, national self-interest, and measured, cautious change.  
6.5.2 Evidence of opportunism 
A second observation relates to the multiplicity and complexity of sceptic argumentation. 
Sceptics invoke a vast array of objections in their rationale, including objections to the 
empirical claims of the science, the research methods (in particular climate modelling), the 
institutional research processes (arguments relating to funding, peer review and the perceived 
monopolisation of climate science by a select group), media reporting of the issue (perceived 
as alarmist), the processes of policy development (perceived as rash and ill-advised), the effects 
of proposed policies (perceived as harmful to the economy and national self-interest), and the 
merits of participating in international and multilateral climate initiatives (perceived as futile 
and self-damaging). Some of these critiques are clearly extraneous to sceptics’ central science 
argument. For example, in the ‘australia’ and ‘government’ concept cluster, all forms of climate 
mitigation policy are derided, and principally so on the ground that it would serve no purpose 
given sceptics’ conviction that human emissions are not materially impacting the climate. This 
argument is augmented, though, with extraneous concerns about various bureaucratic 
encumbrances and undesirable economic rent-seeking behaviour that might follow in the wake 
of a national carbon pricing regime. Also, consider the argument at the ‘world – rudd’ node 
that Australia should avoid leadership on the climate issue in the absence of a concerted 
international effort that includes all the major emitters. To argue that Australian emission cuts 
in isolation would have no environmental benefit is spurious given sceptics’ questioning of the 
magnitude of human contributions to the greenhouse mechanism. It would be more consistent 
with sceptics’ scientific position if they argued that the fait accompli of an international 
emission trading system, on purely pragmatic grounds, necessitated participation by Australia. 
Yet, this argument is rarely made. Another example can be found at the ‘research – energy’ 
node. Here it is apparent that sceptics have no objection to the development of so-called clean 
energy sources. But again, sceptics fail to harmonise the argument with their science position. 
If the development of clean energy sources had merit in the sceptic logic, it would have to be 
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on the basis of non-emission related environmental, economic or strategic benefits, such as that 
it would diversify Australia’s energy supply. Yet, these arguments are not very prominent in 
the sceptic discourse, and one is left with the impression that sceptics’ response to clean energy 
is mostly reactive, i.e. trying to ensure its development occurs as economically painlessly as 
possible. 
6.5.3 Evidence of integrity 
The third observation from the evidence centres on the question of style, which arises in the 
‘australia’ and ‘government’ cluster (under the theme ‘climate policy development is 
haphazard and autocratic’), in the ‘ipcc’ cluster (under the theme ‘climate research lacks 
rigour’) and in the ‘debate’ cluster (under the theme ‘the climate debate is acrimonious’). 
Sceptics are making three significant points about how they perceive the style of climate 
science and policy making: Firstly, they argue that there is, in principle, value in challenging 
conventional wisdom. They count themselves in tune with the great scientific luminaries of 
history (e.g. Copernicus and Galileo) who proved that the majority/mainstream view can be 
wrong. And even if they are proven wrong in the future, some sceptics make the argument that 
their critical opposition to the orthodoxy would have helped improve the quality of the science 
and policy making. Secondly, sceptics are at pains to warn against over-confidence and haste 
in scientific and policy matters. They point to the many uncertainties in climate science, 
denounce what they perceive as exaggerated/alarmist scientific claims, and question whether 
climate policies would indeed achieve what they are designed for. And, thirdly, sceptics are 
concerned about the conduct of mainstream exponents. They perceive a vindictive and nasty 
campaign against them, often citing the use of the label climate denier as an example of the 
misrepresentation and malicious intent on the part of mainstream exponents. Sceptics often 
plea for a respectful and civilised debate. One might argue that sceptics’ sense of exclusion and 
ostracism is of their own making, and that they are merely trying to discredit mainstream 
science and policy in every possible way. It is proposed here that opportunism is only part of 
the explanation of the style critiques of sceptics. 
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6.6 Conclusion 
The identified themes and the way in which they are employed in an argumentative logic 
support the thesis that ACD scepticism is driven by a particular worldview/ideology. As a 
cohort, sceptics privilege the values that are locked up in what can broadly be described as 
political conservatism. Sceptics openly rail against the negative implications of climate policies 
for the free market, for limited and efficient government, and for the national self-interest. They 
openly call for restraint when considering policies that have large structural implications. 
Sceptics’ worldview/ideology bias is also evident, albeit more obliquely, from their 
unnecessarily complex critique of mainstream climate science and policies. They include a 
number of extraneous arguments against the mainstream case, which casts doubt about their 
true motivations. If their critique of the science of ACD was their primary concern, as most 
sceptics generally insist it to be, one might have expected a more focussed and limited 
argument. The combination of open privileging of politically conservative values and 
extraneous arguments in an unnecessarily complex critique leads one to suspect that sceptics’ 
worldview/ideology preferences play an important role in bringing them to their stance. 
However, sceptics’ concerns about the style and quality of climate science and policy decision-
making indicate that they also see their critiques as a matter of principle, and that they value 
good science and sound decision-making processes. They rail against practises that, in their 
view, threaten the calm, reasoned and careful conduct of climate science and political 
management of the issue.  
It is argued here that when sceptics’ raise their concerns about the style of the scientific debate 
and political decision-making, they are in fact defending the principles of good science and 
governance. When they proclaim their own critical and independent thinking, they are in fact 
displaying a strong commitment to the integrity of climate science. And when they argue for 
restraint and caution in assessments of the climate and decision-making on the basis of those 
assessments, they are in fact displaying a commitment to sound and durable decision-making. 
Their arguments that science is not an exercise in consensus, that exaggerated/alarmist 
scientific claims befuddles good climate decision-making, and that climate policies in their 
current form would not achieve real climate mitigation, have merit, and should not be 
discounted as ideology/worldview motivated or mere opportunism. This perspective is slowly 
gaining traction amongst some scholars (Boykoff & Olson, 2013, p. 283; Ranalli, 2012, p. 200; 
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Sharman, 2013, pp. 17, 19), but remains undervalued in the popular and scholarly construction 
of sceptics and scepticism. 
In sum, sceptics’ arguments point to a complex of personal values and norms that include the 
open and free competition of ideas, freedom of expression (and respect for that freedom), 
critical and independent thinking, allowing new knowledge to mature, not rushing to 
conclusions and actions, and staying realistic about the limits of human knowledge. These are 
not negligible values in understanding the sceptic mindset. At the very least there is cause for 
observers to reconsider their assumptions about the command and reach of the 
worldview/ideology thesis. 
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7 POLICY MARKERS 
7.1 Introduction 
Sceptics often argue from a principled position that climate policies are unnecessary because 
human emissions of greenhouse gases are not the primary driver of climate change. Most 
scholars claim that this stance is motivated by a deep-seated individualistic worldview and 
represents an attempt to preserve ‘business-as-usual’. This chapter investigates the policy 
preferences of a range of sceptics and finds that the ‘business-as-usual’ characterisation 
obscures differences amongst sceptics about the utility of climate policies as well as how to 
respond to existing climate policies. In addition to the familiar puritan voices in the sceptic 
discourse that consistently oppose progressive climate policies, a pragmatist tendency that both 
accepts the reality of climate policies and seeks to guide climate policy in preferred directions 
is detected amongst sceptics. 
Because sceptics’ policy views are specific to the policy environments in which they find 
themselves, the chapter starts by explaining the Australian policy context, which is the setting 
for the sample of sceptics investigated in this study. It then highlights the relevance of sceptics 
in climate policy decision-making. The next section outlines the connection between people’s 
policy preferences and a ‘business-as-usual’ worldview. The ‘business-as-usual’ worldview is 
described in some detail for later comparison with the evidence of sceptic policy preferences. 
In the Results section that follows the computer generated analysis of the text sample is 
reported, including a discussion of the discourse markers that relate to sceptics’ policy views. 
Extracts from the text sample are presented and evaluated, i.e. the various policy preferences 
are identified and classified. The chapter concludes with a discussion and critical review of the 
‘business-as-usual’ characterisation of sceptics. Areas of conceptual convergence between 
sceptic and mainstream policy views that could potentially be exploited for constructively 
engaging sceptics and their public constituency are finally explored. 
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7.2 Australian policy context 
As one of the most energy intensive economies of the world and heavily reliant on fossil fuel 
for its energy needs, Australia is showcasing the enormous difficulties of developing an 
economic response designed to curb carbon emissions and at the same time preserve the 
country’s competitiveness, domestic jobs and economic stability. The Australian experience 
has, perhaps more than any other developed country apart from the US, illustrated the potential 
of the climate issue to define the political landscape, wreck political careers and cause bitter 
political divisiveness (Tranter, 2011, p. 79).  
The defining feature of Australia’s response to the climate challenge is discontinuity. The past 
decade has seen climate policy development in Australia cycle through inaction, new action, 
stalling and re-engagement (Christoff, 2012, p. 1; Manne, 2012). Public sentiment about the 
climate issue has also fluctuated from indifference to euphoric heights to disillusionment and 
doubt. Labor rode high on a groundswell of public support for decisive climate actions in the 
run-up to the 2007 federal election (The Climate Institute, March 2007, p. 4), only to face a 
reversal of fortunes by 2010. Within a span of three years public commitment to decisive 
climate action retreated significantly and uncertainty about the need for action increased 
(Hanson, 2010b, p. 14). Political cooperation between the major political parties to implement 
an emissions trading scheme (the so-called Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme – CPRS) also 
collapsed, precipitating major upheavals and leadership changes in both the Coalition and 
Labor Party. Labor was able to resume legislative work on the climate issue after the 2010 
election, but not because of any sea change in political and public attitudes. In fact, public 
sentiment about climate problem continued to slip in 2011 (Hanson, 2011, p. 1). The fact that 
Labor was able to roll out a new carbon pricing scheme (Department of the Environment, 
2011), the so-called carbon tax, was only due to a unique and brief policy window that opened 
as a result of negotiations to form a minority government after the election (Crowley, 2012, pp. 
4, 9, 15). Labor secured the support of the Greens under a formal agreement that, amongst 
others, compelled the introduction of carbon pricing in Australia during that term (2010), 
despite substantial public opposition and uneven support from business and civil society 
(Christoff, 2012, p. 3). This unsettled condition continued into 2011-12, with polls showing 
strong public opposition to the carbon tax and the lowest level of public support for decisive 
climate action since 2006 (Hanson, 2012, pp. 6-7). Further, it quickly became official Coalition 
policy to scrap the carbon tax, even if that would require the triggering of a double dissolution 
of Parliament and fresh elections (2013). It seems that Australia’s fitful relationship with the 
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climate issue is bound to continue for the foreseeable future (Fielding et al., 2012, p. 717). It 
remains a raw nerve in the Australian political psyche – one that defines the political landscape, 
and has the potential to wreck political careers and continue to cause bitter political 
divisiveness. 
The demonstrable difficulty Australia has with scaling the climate policy mountain is well 
understood from the perspective of the economic interests and political power relations of 
various domestic stakeholders. As one of the most energy intensive economies of the world 
and heavily reliant on fossil fuel for its energy needs, Australia has strong disincentives to 
adopt a progressive climate policy. In his investigation into the formulation of climate policy 
during the pre-2007 Howard government era, Pearse (2007b) documented the multi-pronged 
strategies of the carbon emission exposed industries to infiltrate and influence government in 
order to set an agenda favourable to them. He recounted how these industries funded the 
economic, scientific and political institutions on which Prime Minister Howard relied for 
advice, and how the vested economic interests became virtually indistinguishable from 
government through the rotation of personnel and the use of direct channels to pass analysis 
and advice to cabinet and top level bureaucracy. Pearse concludes that “John Howard has been 
successfully sold what I call a ‘quarry vision’ of Australia’s future … [he has been] capture[d] 
by the carbon lobby … [his] greenhouse response assumes that cheap fossil fuel is the backbone 
of our economy—our most important natural competitive advantage” (Pearse, 2007a, p. 12). 
Other scholars dissected the Australian domestic scene in similar ways. It has become clear 
that designing policy that would convincingly curb carbon emissions and at the same time 
preserve the country’s competitiveness, domestic jobs and economic stability would be a 
daunting, if not impossible, task. Crowley (2011, p. 43) argues the point as follows: 
… the most compelling explanation of the politics of Australian climate change policy 
failure … remains the structure of its natural resource-based, carbon-intensive economy 
and the influential lobbying of the industries likely to be affected by mitigation. This in 
turn is significant in generating political and economic self-interest, leading politicians to 
… refuse to act for fear of the costs of compliance to themselves and to the country. 
Others have argued that these constraints are bound to persist, given Australia’s committal to 
the “universal pro-growth ideology that is synonymous with the ‘successful’ management of 
advanced capitalist economies” (Beeson & McDonald, 2013, p. 344). 
Self-interest and political power dynamics, important as they are, are however not the only 
influences on policy development. Harrison and Sundstrom propose a triad of influences: self-
interest, ideas and political institutions (Harrison & Sundstrom, 2010b, p. 8). Christoff makes 
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the same point when he argues that the “political theatre” of climate politics has dominated 
studies of Australian climate politics, and that the “stories built around interactions between 
individual and collective actors” can and does “underplay” consideration of other formative 
influences, especially the “discursive formation” of policy, discourse coalitions and institutions 
(Christoff, 2012, p. 6).  
7.3 The battle against progressive climate policies 
To the extent that ideas shape climate policy (Harrison & Sundstrom, 2010a, p. 269), it is 
plausible to suggest that sceptics contributed (partly at least) to the policy and public opinion 
retreats witnessed since the 2007-08 heyday of climate policy ambition. Their incessant 
questioning of the evidence and scientific processes underpinning ACD stimulated a public 
discourse of doubt about the reality, extent and urgency of the threat of climate change. Public 
opinion polls over the period 2007 to 2010, indeed, show a significant and sustained decline in 
public concern about the climate issue, levels of certainty about the science of ACD, and 
willingness to act on the climate problem. Public concern about the climate peaked in 2007 
(people ranking it as the second most important issue facing Australia) and then steadily 
declined through the ensuing years. By 2010 it ranked as only the seventh most important issue 
facing Australia (Institute, August 2010, p. 8). Another poll found that in 2006 68% of people 
agreed with the statement “Global warming is a serious and pressing problem. We should begin 
taking steps now even if this involves signiﬁcant costs”, declining to 46% in 2010 (Hanson, 
2010b, p. 14). By 2012 this number dropped even further to 36% (Hanson, 2012, p. 6). Purely 
on the willingness to pay question, the proportion of people willing to pay any amount to relieve 
climate change decreased from 71% in 2008 to 59% in 2010, and the proportion of people 
unwilling to pay anything increased from 21% in 2008 to 33% in 2010 (Hanson, 2010b, p. 15). 
The waning of the public’s concern about the climate, certainty about the science of ACD and 
willingness to act on climate change, coincided neatly with the retreat from pro-active climate 
policy by policy-makers since 2008. Without suggesting that public sentiment drove policy 
responses, it has to be acceded that in a representative democracy public opinion at least 
constrains the ability of the government of the day to pursue policies (Fielding et al., 2012, p. 
728). 
To what extent have publicly prominent sceptics, through their vocal criticisms of mainstream 
climate science, played a role in turning public opinion and possibly the views of some policy 
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actors on the climate question? Many scholars and observers think they have, and very 
successfully so. The charges levelled against the sceptics are explicit and comprehensive: 
The long war the denialist movement had fought against science and against reason, in the 
US and throughout the English-speaking world, had indeed achieved a famous victory. 
This is a victory that subsequent generations cursing ours may look upon as perhaps the 
darkest in the history of humankind. (Manne, 2012) (Robert Manne is a professor of 
politics at La Trobe University.) 
Oh, my personal view is that climate scientists are losing the fight with the sceptics. That 
the sceptics are so well funded, so well organised, have nothing else to do. They kind of 
don't have day jobs. They can put all of their efforts into misinforming and 
miscommunicating climate science to the general public whereas the climate scientists 
have day jobs and this actually isn't one of them. … They are doing a superb job at 
misinforming and miscommunicating the general public, state and federal governments. 
(Hall, 2010: quoting Andy Pitman) (Pitman is co-director of the University of NSW's 
Climate Change Research Centre and was a lead author of the IPCC's 2001 and 2007 
reports.) 
Climate change sceptics, the climate change deniers, the opponents of climate change 
action are active in every country. … They are a minority. They are however powerful and 
invariably they are driven by vested interests [and are] powerful enough to so far block 
domestic legislation in Australia. … As we approach Copenhagen, it becomes clearer that 
the domestic political pressure produced by the climate change sceptics now has profound 
global consequences by reducing the momentum towards an ambitious global deal. 
(Rodgers, 2009: quoting Kevin Rudd) (Rudd was Australian Prime Minister from 2007 to 
2010 and for a short period in 2013.) 
More significantly, with the Rudd government threatening to tackle seriously the issue of 
Australia’s high per capita greenhouse gas emissions, contrarian think tanks and climate 
change deniers busied themselves with attempts to confuse and confound the scientific 
messages and public understanding of these. (Burgmann & Baer, 2010, p. 8) (Burgmann 
and Baer are senior academics at the University of Melbourne.) 
A study of Australian politicians found that of the four groups of climate advocates, in-groups, 
business and industry and farmers, climate advocates exerted the greatest influence on 
politicians’ ideas about the climate (Fielding et al., 2012, p. 726). When these advocates speak 
at and through sympathetic institutions like think tanks, as is happening frequently in the case 
of climate sceptics and neoliberal think tanks, their influence is compounded (McKewon, 2012, 
pp. 278-281). Think tanks exert significant influence on public opinion and political leaders. 
They are important news sources in their own right and provide valuable venues for 
ideologically like-minded individuals and groups to orchestrate strategies of influence (M. P. 
Allen, 1992). The symbiotic and influential roles of conservative think tanks, their corporate 
sponsors and individual sceptic scientists are well documented (Buettner, 2010; Greenpeace, 
2010; Hamilton, 2006, 2009; Hodder, 2010; McKewon, 2012; McKnight, 2010; Pearse, 2007b; 
M. Smith & Marden, 2008). 
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7.4 The ‘business-as-usual’ climate policy rationality 
The preceding discussions of the influence of socio-cultural factors on people’s assessment of 
climate threats and their receptiveness to ACD scepticism showed that a deep-seated socio-
psychological frame predisposes certain individuals to doubt the mainstream scientific view 
and reject climate policies (Kahan, Jenkins-Smith, & Braman, 2011, p. 2). Scholars, in 
particular those working in the tradition of grid-group Cultural Theory (Ellis et al., 1990), 
interpret scepticism as a defence of an individualistic worldview in which humans pursue 
progress and prosperity through ingenuity, resilience and mastery of nature (Connor, 2010, p. 
254). Sceptics, therefore, have an underlying interest in defending the free-market economic 
system, or preserving ‘business-as-usual’ (Verweij et al., 2006, pp. 826-827). In this view 
scepticism is a cultural artefact or, more precisely, a product of the cultural predispositions of 
the sceptics themselves. 
The way in which these cultural predispositions map onto the climate policy debate was 
elaborately described in a 2006 study by a group of leading grid-group Cultural Theorists 
(Verweij et al., 2006, pp. 822-827). They described three 13  alternate climate policy 
rationalities, each representing one of the grid-group cultural types. The ‘profligacy’ rationality 
focuses on the way that profligate consumption and production in modern economies causes 
climate change. This is the story of the egalitarians and motivates a strong argument for a 
dramatic restructuring of the economy and society at large in order to achieve an equitable and 
sustainable lifestyle. The ‘lack of global planning’ rationality concerns itself with the limits of 
economic and population growth and argues for a gradual and planned transition to more 
sustainable economic practices. This is a hierarchist story. The ‘business-as-usual’ rationality 
belongs to the individualists and views climate change as a misinterpreted phenomenon being 
misused by idealists to attack the free market economic system. This, theorists assert, is the 
predominant story told by sceptics and their sympathisers. 
The aforementioned scholars (Verweij et al., 2006) claim that institutions like the Cato Institute 
in the US, the Institute of Economic Affairs in the UK and the Wall Street Journal adhere to 
                                                          
13 The authors argue that “the fatalist solidarity does not motivate people to participate consistently in 
public debates” (Verweij et al., 2006, p. 822), therefore its exclusion from their analysis of the climate 
issue. The fatalist rationality is based on a conception of nature as being without ‘rhyme’ or ‘reason’ 
and humans as being ‘fickle’ and ‘untrustworthy’ (Verweij et al., 2006, p. 820). Although these 
sentiments are present amongst sceptics, the authors see a clearer association between sceptics and the 
individualist conception of nature as being resilient and humans as being driven by a self-seeking 
cooperative free-market spirit. 
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the ‘business-as-usual’ rationality. In this rationality people who support the ACD thesis are 
either naive or “international bureaucrats looking to expand their budgets and influence” 
(Verweij et al., 2006, p. 826). The ‘business-as-usual’ persuasion, it is claimed, views the 
human condition as constantly facing challenges, including environmental challenges, which 
can best be overcome by individual agents who competitively and opportunistically look for 
solutions. The individualist spirit is one of optimism. Humankind would, if damaging climate 
change transpires, produce the technological solutions necessary to combat its impacts or 
further onset. It believes nature is robust and bountiful. The heroes in this story are the sceptics, 
the “risk-taking entrepreneurs” who will deliver clean technologies, and the “decision makers 
who refuse to be intimidated by all this scaremongering” (Verweij et al., 2006, p. 827). 
The immediate question that presents itself from this particular rendition of the rationality of 
sceptics is whether it adequately captures, or even attempts to capture, nuances within the 
sceptic group. There is no indication that the aforementioned study of climate policy 
rationalities has explored the discourse in a grounded fashion, i.e. through cataloguing a range 
of views in an open-ended fashion. Only three institutions are referenced as examples of 
‘business-as-usual’ agents, of which only one was substantiated with a quote from a 
representative. It seems that the discourse has been observed from a considerable distance – 
that the scholars set out to look for and found evidence in support of their posited cultural 
archetypes. The analysis presented below aims to shed light on the currency of the ‘business-
as-usual’ stance in Australian sceptic discourse. Some evidence of the ‘business-as-usual’ 
storyline in the Australian sceptic discourse is to be expected. Also, some coherence in relation 
to policy preferences is to be expected since Australian sceptics and conservative political 
groups have a history of association and mutual support (Hamilton, 2006; Hodder, 2010). The 
more important question, however, is to what degree sceptics share a singular policy vision. 
7.5 Results 
The same sample of sceptic texts used in the previous chapter is used here. The text sample 
was again processed with the Leximancer text analysis software, but this time without seeding 
any concepts of interests, as was done in the previous chapter. This chapter is less concerned 
with achieving a general conceptual characterisation of the sample that represents the broadest 
cross section of sceptics possible, and therefore does not require the measures that were taken 
before to extract a large number of concepts and then systematically reduce them to a core 
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group of concepts that are widely shared. The focus in this chapter is sceptics’ climate policy 
views, which we already know is one of their key concerns. Here it is of interest to see what 
policy related concepts emerge from a computerised analysis, and where they settle in relation 
to any other discourse themes. 
Using the same software settings (described in Appendix 11.2) as before, the complete sample 
of sceptic texts was processed with Leximancer. Leximancer produced a concept map of 165 
concepts, shown in Figure 7-1. The map is annotated to assist with the identification of clusters 
of concepts, which might be indicative of the presence of distinct themes in the text sample. 
The map shows that the sceptic discourse investigated here is dominated by two concept 
categories which can be loosely described as the science debate and the government policy 
debate. The science related concepts appear together in one region, the top of the map, as should 
be expected, and the government related concepts appear at the bottom of the map, with a 
smaller third group of public/political/media related concepts in the centre-right region of the 
map. The unlabelled area between ‘Science’, ‘Government’ and ‘Political’ consists of generic 
terms and lacks definition, which indicates that those concepts are shared in use by the 
surrounding thematic groups and do not represent a distinct theme. 
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Figure 7-1: Annotated concept map showing thematic categories and sub-categories 
 
 
The annotated thematic clusters were checked for accuracy with Leximancer’s own built-in 
thematic visualisation tool. In Leximancer the analyst can choose the level of thematic 
diversification required, upon which Leximancer will display a commensurate number of 
thematic clusters. The level of thematic diversification is set with Leximancer’s theme 
magnification tool. For instance, a 100% magnification setting will produce only one theme 
that endeavours to represent all the concepts in the text sample. If the current text sample were 
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processed with a 100% theme magnification setting, ‘climate’ would emerge as the all-
encompassing theme. Conversely, if a 1% magnification setting was used, a multitude of mini 
themes would emerge, too many to be of any use. 
Table 7-1 shows the themes produced by Leximancer at four magnification levels. At 85% 
magnification Leximancer reproduces the two super themes ‘science’ and ‘government’. These 
themes indicate the gross conceptual terrain of the discourse. 
Table 7-1: Substantive themes at decreasing levels of thematic resolution 
85% 65% 45% 25% 
science14 
government 
science 
government 
sceptics 
science 
government 
political 
power 
price 
party 
science 
government 
political 
energy 
price 
tax 
country 
 
At 65% theme resolution a new but smaller theme emerges, ‘sceptics’, which includes concepts 
like ‘public’, ‘opinion’, ‘media’ and ‘political’. At 45% the ‘government’ theme sub-divides 
into four separate themes: ‘government’, ‘price’, ‘party’ and ‘power’. At 25% a new theme 
centred around the concepts ‘tax’, ‘trading’ and ‘scheme’ splits off from government. Thus, at 
25% thematic resolution the following themes of interest emerge: ‘government’, ‘energy’, 
‘price’ and ‘tax’. 
7.5.1 Substantive concepts 
The concepts of most interest to the question at hand, Does the discourse of Australian sceptics 
display a ‘business-as-usual’ position in relation to climate policies?, are most likely to be 
found in the government region of the map. In this region of the map 18 concepts potentially 
                                                          
14 The sub-divisions of the science category at lower resolutions are not included in the table because 
the research focus here is the policy discourse and policy related themes. 
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refer to substantive policy positions taken by sceptics: ‘business’, ‘china’, ‘coal’, ‘copenhagen’, 
‘cost’, ‘economy’, ‘electricity’, ‘energy’, ‘environment’, ‘ets’, ‘growth’, ‘industry’, ‘kyoto’, 
‘market’, ‘nuclear’, ‘policy’, ‘power’ and ‘tax’. These concepts are subsequently referred to as 
substantive concepts because they point to distinct policy areas. They differ from other 
concepts in the region that denote qualities/attributes (e.g. ‘national’, ‘reduce’ and ‘response’), 
are intrinsically generic (e.g. ‘country’, ‘government’ and ‘party’) or are evaluative (e.g. 
‘better’ and ‘important’). 
7.5.2 Meaning in context 
In order to investigate the meaning in context of the substantive concepts, Leximancer was 
queried for instances where the substantive concept group co-occurred with the concept 
‘policy’. The query result produced 155 three-sentence text excerpts representing 80 unique 
news articles written by 34 of the 43 sceptics in the sample. This is a surprising high number 
of sceptics expressing views about climate policies per se, considering the bias of the sample 
towards articles that specifically address the (physical) science arguments.15 It is, however, 
possible that the compilation of the sample from mostly traditional news sources biased the 
sample towards individuals taking an interest in the public debate about ACD, which inevitably 
includes the policy implications of one’s reading of the (physical) science.  
The text excerpts were investigated for the presence of two types of expressions: firstly 
expressions of the principles that sceptics would like to see adhered to in the development of 
climate policy, and secondly expressions in favour of or against particular substantive policy 
positions. The results of this investigated are presented next. 
  
                                                          
15 Chapter 3, section 3.7.2 Compilation of the text sample, describes the strategy that was used to source 
relevant sceptic texts, and why and how the terms ‘science’, ‘data’ and ‘evidence’ was used assemble 
the collection of sceptic texts. 
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7.5.3 Principles for climate policy 
Several conceptual markers of sceptics’ style, goal and process preferences were found, shown 
in Table 7-2. 
Table 7-2: Style, goal and process markers 
 
STYLE GOAL PROCESS 
dispassionate, common 
sense, reason, pragmatic, 
conservative, caution, 
realistic, prudent, 
evolutionary, adaptive, 
careful and modest. 
welfare, prosperity and 
progress and growth. 
learn, debate, road tested, 
cost, benefit, evidence, 
advice and feedback. 
 
 
The sceptics’ policy style preferences were expressed as follows: 
Basing a policy response on pragmatic conservatism learning from the mistakes of the past, 
advocating caution and encouraging realistic outcomes is hardly enthralling enough for 
rock stars (Albrechtsen, 2007). (The context of this quote is Janet Albrechtsen commenting 
adversely on the climate change advocacy of Al Gore and Live Earth performers.)  
But to pursue an extreme policy agenda that is not supported by consensus scientific 
evidence has the potential to disadvantage Australia. We need to act prudently and 
cautiously to protect our prosperity (Bernardi, 2007). 
In view of these statements, it is evident that sceptics are opposed to what they perceive as 
dramatic and sudden policy evolutions. 
The second set of policy principles favoured by sceptics is expressed as core policy goals. 
Given their preference for evolutionary and cautious policy development, it is to be expected 
that they would argue for a continuation of the prevailing economic paradigm of progress, 
development and growth. This is borne out in the following expressions: 
The goal of public policy must always be to increase human welfare (C. Berg, 2011). (This 
is part of an argument that economic progress has been and still is the key to humanity’s 
ability to overcome climatic and other challenges.) 
Rational policy, then, would be aimed at promoting the fastest possible growth in the 
economy (McCrann, 2011a). (This is part of an argument that economic growth is the only 
defence against environmental challenges.) 
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The economic goals of progress, development and growth (and by implication human welfare) 
are clearly important elements in the sceptic argument, and one would expect some measure of 
tension between them and competing goals. Decarbonisation of the global economy, which is 
the cornerstone of global climate policy, fits in the sceptic narrative as a competing economic 
goal that implies concessions in relation to growth, development and prosperity. Surprisingly, 
however, the question of competing economic paradigms only receives scant explicit mention 
in the sceptic discourse. Only two sceptics alluded to a fundamental conflict between 
environmental values and the values of progress, development and growth: 
Nobody knows how an economy could operate with standards of living like Australia's 
while adopting the sorts of measures proposed. Carbon dioxide emissions are the automatic 
outcome of driving cars, generating electricity, smelting metals, making concrete and just 
about every other activity (Moran, 2008b). (This is part of an argument that nothing short 
of the wholesale adoption of nuclear energy as a power source would achieve the high 
levels of emissions abatement required under mainstream climate scenarios.) 
The Greens want nature to be preserved at all costs, but all progress - hospitals, schools, 
homes and roads - means encroachment on nature (Cox, 2010). 
This seeming lack of attention to paradigmatic (big picture) conflicts could be explained by the 
presence of the surprisingly strong ethic of pragmatism when sceptics articulate their policy 
style preferences and substantive policy positions (as discussed later). 
The third set of principles favoured by sceptics revolves around their prescriptions for the 
processes of policy formulation. Commensurate with the policy style principles of evolution 
and caution, sceptics argue for greater consultation of and receptiveness to the dissenting voices 
in the climate debate: 
Before further dangerous excursions into energy-control policies, governments need to 
take note of the grave doubts of so many of the world's eminent scientists at the Heartland 
Institute conference (Moran, 2008b). 
I would like government to stop treating climate as a slogan and cast around a little wider 
for advice, including listening to the many well-qualified meteorologists, hydrologists and 
paleoclimatologists whose more accurate forecasts have so far been ignored.... (Marohasy, 
2011). 
Sceptics express the principle of net gain to society through emphasising the application of 
rigorous cost-benefit tests to climate policies: 
A panicked approach to dealing with climate change would cost more than the benefits. 
One thing we already know about the outcome of the election is that whoever wins, 
Australia is committed to some bad policy on climate change (A. Wood, 2007). 
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The Institute of Public Affairs took the lead in addressing the economic and social costs of 
assumed human-induced climate change and the various costs of measures seeking to 
prevent it (Bernardi & Kennard, 2010). 
Can we start looking at the cost benefits of all our policies instead of reasoning by fallacy 
(Nova, 2011b)?  
The claim that climate policies lack rigorous cost-benefit tests or are based on erroneous 
applications of the test occur frequently in the texts under investigation. This is to be expected 
if sceptics, as has been demonstrated, share a sense of inadequate consultation in the policy 
development process. 
7.5.4 Types of policy responses 
Although sceptics share a fundamental distrust of the scientific evidence and/or the mainstream 
interpretation of the evidence, they are not unanimous in rejecting all climate responses. Their 
policy preferences range from principled rejection of all climate policies because they are based 
on ‘false’ science, to rejection of specific climate policies because they are based on ‘false’ 
promises, to motivated support for climate policies that have the least negative impact on 
economic growth and prosperity, to opportunistic support for ‘no regrets’ climate policies, i.e. 
policies that would be economically beneficial even if climate change proves to be a non-
problem.16 
Principled opposition to any climate policy because it is perceived as fundamentally 
unnecessary, is expressed as follows: 
No, what Abbott must do is lead the opposition to walk away from all this; to build a 
sustained narrative against the entire climate change orthodoxy, to go back to his core 
belief that ``climate change is crap’’, but this time based on substance (McCrann, 2011b). 
It is past time for those who have deceived governments and misled the public regarding 
dangerous human-caused global warming to be called to account. Aided by hysterical 
posturing by green NGOs, their actions have led to the cornering of government on the 
issue and the likely implementation of futile emission policies that will impose direct extra 
costs on every household and enterprise in Australia to no identifiable benefit (Carter, 
2007). 
Opposition to climate policies because they are perceived to be based on a false promise is 
evident from the following: 
                                                          
16 See Bulkeley (2001) for a detailed account of the evolution, drivers and limitations of a ‘no regrets’ 
climate policy, which came to characterise the approach of the centre-right Howard government in 
Australia from the latter half of the 1990’s up to 2007. 
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Anything Australia does to reduce CO2 emissions won't make any difference to the 
temperature, the oceans, rainfall or any other climatic conditions (Bernardi, 2009). 
There is no feasible policy option available that will lower Earth's temperature (Johns, 
2010a). 
... Australia's emission reduction measures are irrelevant unless all countries adopt similar 
plans (Moran, 2010a). 
Not one scientist says this carbon dioxide tax will slow global warming by anything anyone 
can measure. It is purely symbolic (Bolt, 2011b). 
Several sceptics express qualified support for some form of climate policy, even if they are not 
convinced of the fundamental rationale behind such policies, namely that climate change can 
be substantively mitigated through atmospheric greenhouse gas abatement. In many cases, 
qualified support of some form of climate policy is based on recognition of the political reality 
of ACD belief and on a desire to steer policy development in the least harmful direction. This 
position is evident in the following statements: 
But free-marketeers cannot refuse to engage and critique the ETS just because they are not 
happy with the science. The general public supports some sort of action on climate change, 
and until that support diminishes the government is unlikely to retreat from implementing 
a climate change mitigation policy (C. Berg, 2008). 
If most economies broadly similar to Australia that is, the US, Canada, Japan, South Korea 
and western Europe - were embracing tough emissions reduction targets under ETS-style 
policies, Australia should do the same to pull our weight and to participate in a carbon 
market (Sheridan, 2010). (This is part of an argument that Australia should refrain from 
economy wide climate policies in the absence of concerted international implementation 
of such schemes.) 
... the realist in me suggests that the push for a ``solution’’ to climate change will not 
abate. Adaptation is still the best policy, but the search for a technological fix at no damage 
to the economy is the one that governments must support (Johns, 2010b). 
The most pragmatic sceptic policy position is expressed as a ‘no-regrets’ position where 
sceptics essentially support decarbonisation policies, not because they believe it is vital to stave 
off ACD, but because they recognise that there are tangible benefits in decarbonising the 
economy and that there are workable energy alternatives. 
The only technology that could possibly generate electricity on a big scale other than coal 
is nuclear (Sheridan, 2009). (This is part of an argument that Australia should embrace low 
carbon nuclear solutions overseas through exporting uranium.) 
... a new policy response could involve more public spending on technological research 
and development in energy, adaptation and geo-engineering. Not perfect, but a better 
alternative to economically crippling policies, futile grand gestures and highprofile 
climate-change travelling circuses when there is no global or policy consensus whatsoever 
(Switzer & Hamilton, 2010). 
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Any policy pursued in the short to medium term should be a no-regrets, direct-action 
policy, which achieves outcomes that are worthwhile irrespective of the scientific outcome 
... (Robb, 2011). 
Sceptics express a substantial amount of criticism of the costs and other unintended 
consequences of economy-wide carbon abatement policies. This position is evident from the 
following statements: 
The carbon tax will increase reliance on wind and solar and further increase prices. The 
government has said it will compensate poorer households but many will not be 
compensated and the economy will suffer (Cox & Stockwell, 2011). 
It may not be designed for this purpose but the carbon tax is part of a combination of 
policies that would massively increase the size of the state, bring much greater regulation 
to economic life, entrench European economic and political norms, and demonstrate a way 
for voters to be browbeaten into acceptance of a policy they don't like (Sheridan, 2011). 
... this tax twice as much and twice as broad as any other in the world will drive gassy 
businesses overseas, most likely to giant emitters such as China and India that refuse to cut 
their gases (Bolt, 2011a). 
7.6 Discussion 
The evidence shows that sceptics are relatively united about the goal, style and process 
principles that they believe should shape policy development. They support the continued and 
unabated pursuit of economic growth, prosperity and development. They are opposed to 
dramatic and sudden policy evolutions, and argue for more caution and conservatism when 
considering the need for and type of climate policies. In regard to the policy formulation 
processes, sceptics argue for greater inclusivity, both in terms of broader consultation with 
dissenting voices and in terms of broader acknowledgement of all the costs and benefits of 
proposed policies.  
The evidence, however, also shows significant differences amongst sceptics when they reflect 
on the types of existing and proposed policies. A number of sceptics are clearly averse to any 
policy intervention because it would be fundamentally futile (addressing a ‘fictitious’ cause) 
or unrealistic (incapable of achieving the objective of cutting gross global emissions). In this 
view, all mitigation policies are counter-productive and unnecessarily impeding the welfare of 
humankind. This is a puritan position where sceptics demand complete harmony between their 
science convictions and policy. It is a very confined retelling of the ‘business-as-usual’ story 
in that these sceptics see no justification for the wholesale restructuring of the economic 
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system. In this narrative the path of progress that has been forged so far has served humanity 
extremely well and will continue to do so. 
A good example of the puritan position exists in outspoken Australian sceptic Prof. Bob Carter, 
geologist and Emeritus Fellow of the Institute of Public Affairs (Melbourne). His reading of 
the science of ACD leaves him in no doubt that policies aimed at curbing human caused 
greenhouse gas emissions are misplaced – it has not been proved that human activities are the 
primary drivers of climate change. Prof. Carter and other sceptics have been repeating this 
proposition over a period of time. Carter describes emission reduction policies as “futile” and 
with “no identifiable benefit” (Carter, 2007). He calls for climate policy that does not try to 
alter or moderate the physical climate, but instead merely tries to enhance humans’ resilience 
in the face of the natural elements: 
Why is it so difficult for policymakers to understand that, despite its demonization by 
greens and their associated alternative energy rent seekers, carbon dioxide is actually an 
environmentally beneficial trace gas, and that climate change Policy Plan B needs to be 
preparation for and adaptation to all climate hazards, irrespective of cause? (Carter, 2012a) 
These statements capture the logical consistency in the sceptic rationale for an outright 
dismissal of climate policies, in particular those policies aimed at carbon emission abatement, 
whether they include indirect interventions like carbon taxes and trading schemes or direct 
interventions like renewable subsidies and mandatory renewable energy quotas. The 
argumentative logic is clear: because greenhouse gas emissions from human activities are a 
fictitious cause of climate change, climate policies that focus on reducing emissions are 
wasteful and unnecessary. In the puritan position sceptics demand complete consistency 
between their science convictions and policy preferences. 
A more pragmatic story is told by those sceptics who are more acutely aware of the political 
realities driving climate policy. They acknowledge (not necessarily agreeing with) the 
scientific, international and popular momentum behind the mainstream view of ACD and 
demands for climate mitigation policies. They acknowledge that policy inaction might not be 
a realistic objective. Further, they do not perceive mitigation policies as necessarily anathema 
to the continuation of the free market economic paradigm and continued economic growth, 
prosperity and development. Qualified support for a carbon tax, as opposed to an emission 
trading scheme, support for nuclear power generation and support for the development of new 
low carbon energy technologies fit in the more pragmatic story. Instead of discounting the 
climate debate, the pragmatic sceptics engage it. They see themselves as voices of reason and 
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moderation, trying to steer policy development away from perceived radical solutions and 
towards what they would consider as more responsible and conservative options. 
The fact that sceptics frequently argue the costs and benefits of climate policies is further 
indication of a pragmatic stance. When climate change is told as a ‘prices’ story (Thompson, 
2003; Thompson & Rayner, 1998), in which the climate problem is a problem of incorrectly 
priced natural resources which leads to the overconsumption of some natural resources and 
resultant environmental damage, sceptics gain the opportunity to appeal for market based 
solutions. As much as they might dislike both an ETS and carbon tax, sceptics find themselves 
drawn to a debate about the relative merits of different climate policies and how climate 
policies should be calibrated to maximise market efficiency and preserve the competitive 
advantage of the nation. Pragmatic sceptics are eager to engage the cost-benefit debate because 
it gives them the opportunity to defend free market capitalism, which is a core individualist 
value. 
The more pragmatic sceptics are an example of the essential ‘messiness’ that grid-group 
Cultural Theorists see in the climate issue. Although they remain anchored in their individualist 
rationality concerning a resilient natural environment and adaptive human capacity, the 
pragmatists are responding to the other rationalities, in particular the hierarchist rationality that 
sees nature as a finite resource that needs to be carefully managed in gradual, measured ways. 
The pragmatists are doing what grid-group Cultural Theory predicts them to do, namely to 
“constantly update, revise and reinvent their preferred policies” in light of challenges from the 
other rationalities and changing circumstances (Verweij et al., 2006, pp. 821, 827). 
Recognising and understanding this diversity in the sceptic discourse is important for policy 
decision makers and communicators. The climate debate is highly polarised and emotive and 
participants are often guilty of reducing their opponents to uni-dimensional stereotypes. The 
debate is often cast in bipolar terms: believers vs sceptics. This study shows, however, that 
sceptics are not a uniform group. Although much of the “logic schism” (Hoffman, 2011) in the 
climate debate (the mutually exclusive cultural framings of climate issues) derives from 
sceptics’ individualist socio-psychological frame, all sceptics are not fixed at the same point 
on the cultural map. The pragmatic sceptics, as shown above, do employ concepts and 
rationales that are familiar in the ecological modernisation vernacular that presently dominates 
official climate discourses. As such, those conceptual convergences can be exploited to re-
engage pragmatic sceptics in productive and positive policy exchanges. Also, by publicly 
acknowledging and communicating climate policy in terms that are familiar in the sceptic 
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discourse, it might be possible to raise the legitimacy of current and proposed climate policies 
amongst those who remain unconvinced of the seriousness of the climate challenge and who 
could potentially be swayed back to full-blown scepticism of the threat of ACD. This is an 
important task since public opinion surveys show a decline in recent years in the relative 
importance accorded to the climate issue in relation to other societal issues  (Hanson, 2010a, 
2011; McCright & Dunlap, 2011; Matthew C. Nisbet, 2009). 
Based on the conceptual preferences of the pragmatic sceptics, the following areas might be 
communicatively exploited to connect with pragmatic sceptics and their ambivalent/uncertain 
public constituency: 
- Recasting carbon policies as tools for economic modernisation rather than tools for 
climate mitigation would help overcome the false promise problem and would 
accentuate investment opportunities in low carbon technologies. 
- Emphasising the gradual path of economic restructuring implied by the operation of a 
price signal in the economy would resonate with the sceptic (and individualist) 
penchant for evolutionary, cautious and moderate policy development. 
- Emphasising the importance of adaptation as a central climate policy response would 
resonate with sceptics’ essentially optimistic view of humans’ ability to overcome 
challenges. The adaptation agenda as it currently stands looks very much like a 
secondary strategy that is unfolded as a backup for possibly inadequate mitigation 
outcomes. 
- Stressing that economy wide policies like the carbon tax are conducive to ‘no regrets’ 
solutions, i.e. interventions that have economic merit regardless of the onset of 
dangerous climate change or not, would strongly connect with sceptics’ insistence on 
continued growth, prosperity and development. Climate policy could more forcefully 
be explained as a win-win scenario. 
These proposals could help to improve the quality of the climate debate. They are consistent 
with research that indicates the importance of framing climate policies in ways that are friendly 
to the values and risk perceptions of specific climate audiences or “interpretive communities” 
(Leiserowitz, 2005; Moser, 2010), and that shows how support for pro-environmental change 
can be fostered by casting such change as “patriotic and consistent with protecting the status 
quo” (Feygina et al., 2010). This study concurs with the scholarly view that disagreements 
about climate change, particularly in the Australian context, do not have to be intractable or 
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insurmountable but can be alleviated by constructing messages “in ways that appeal to closely 
held values” (Fielding et al., 2012, p. 729). 
At the heart of the approach proposed here is an acknowledgement that sceptics do argue from 
a legitimate socio-cultural perspective. Much of the resentment concerning both the science 
and policies of climate change amongst elite sceptics and the general public emanate from a 
feeling that their queries and concerns are being illegitimised and that they are deliberately 
excluded from the conversation. An open and respectful conversation would give decision 
makers access to the public constituency that has thus far stayed captive to the sceptic narrative. 
  
169 
 
8 SEVEN SCEPTICS 
8.1 Introduction 
Sceptics reject, dispute or doubt the core scientific claims about ACD, which in turn underpins 
much of their criticism of prevailing climate policies. In the sceptic logic, if current and 
foreseeable climate change is actually insignificant and primarily caused by natural forces 
outside of human control, to try to constrain carbon emissions would serve no purpose. Also, 
if negative impacts from climate change are vastly over-estimated, as sceptics argue, costly 
policies to decarbonise the global economy and prepare for climate impacts would be untimely, 
misplaced and harmful considering other pressing human needs. These basic arguments are 
fairly standard in the sceptic discourse. However, as shown in the preceding chapter, closer 
examination of the sceptic discourse in relation to climate policy reveals additional complexity 
and nuances that can easily go unrecognised. Many sceptics do not, as a matter of logical 
necessity, oppose all climate policies. There is a difference between criticism of specific 
climate policies and outright dismissal of any response to the climate issue.  
This chapter takes a closer look at the policy views of seven of the sceptics whose texts were 
included in the text sample. Investigating the views of this small select group of sceptics, at 
very close range, allows me to delve deeper into the sceptic discourse and thus add detail to the 
discourse markers previously identified. It also helps to reveal in greater detail variation and 
sophistication in the sceptic discourse. The seven sceptics investigated here are all well-known 
Australians: Bob Carter (academic), Andrew Bolt (media personality), Alan Moran (think tank 
analyst), Barnaby Joyce (politician), Gina Rinehart (business leader), Jo Nova (citizen activist) 
and George Pell (civil society). 
Although this group is not representative of the whole sceptic cohort, they do represent a 
significant part of the sceptic discourse in as much as their views are relatively well publicised 
and they are often quoted by lower profile sceptics. They can indeed be considered as among 
the leading voices in the Australian sceptic scene. These individuals also represent a range of 
professional backgrounds that have been replicated in other investigations of the phenomenon 
(Painter, 2012, p. 200). As such, a wide scope of sceptic opinion is canvassed and analysed. 
The chapter is organised as follows: The policy views of the selected sceptics are first outlined, 
followed by a brief interpretation. The chapter then proceeds to look for common ground 
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between these sceptics’ views and non-sceptic policy positions. An emergent new school of 
thought on climate policy (not sceptical) that stresses innovation, energy security and 
adaptation as keystone climate policy goals, and steers away from policies aimed at achieving 
climate stability through prescribed greenhouse gas targets, is described. The intersection of 
the sceptics’ policy views with this new thinking about climate policy is considered. The 
chapter concludes with an argument that sceptics’ climate policy inclinations can be closer to 
mainstream climate policy discourse than generally acknowledged and that intense contestation 
over the evidence of ACD need not stand in the way of greater climate policy consensus 
emerging in the post-Kyoto era. 
8.2 Seven sceptics’ policy views 
8.2.1 Bob Carter 
Prof. Bob Carter is a palaeontologist, stratigrapher, marine geologist and environmental 
scientist. He has held tenured academic staff positions at the University of Otago (Dunedin) 
and James Cook University (Townsville), and is currently Chief Science Advisor to the 
International Climate Science Coalition and an Emeritus Fellow of the Institute of Public 
Affairs. Carter's views were extracted from Carter (2008a, 2008b, 2011b, 2012b). 
Carter argues for a “national climate policy” as opposed to a “national global warming policy”. 
Whereas a “global warming policy” is aimed at stopping climate change by limiting carbon 
dioxide emissions, an “arcadian fantasy” in his reading of climate science, a “climate policy” 
would be aimed at continuously monitoring climate change (risk appraisal), and responding 
and adapting to it “as it happens” (impact minimisation). Carter sees his policy of adaptation 
as the most prudent and practical response as it is not dependent on the cause (human or natural) 
or the direction of climate change (cooling or warming) (Carter, 2012b). 
Carter does not discount the potential of human influence on the climate, only that it is localised 
and globally weak: “it is … most likely that the human signal lies buried within the noise of 
the natural climate system”. He considers the human contribution to primary warming so small 
and the climate system so variable and unpredictable, that it is impossible to discern which way 
the climate might change (cooling or heating) – “either outcome remains possible”; “cooling 
may be the greatest climate hazard over coming decades”. For Carter, “our lack of 
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understanding” implies that committing to the strategy of constraining carbon dioxide 
emissions “is as likely to harm as to help future climate” (Carter, 2008d).  
His adaptation response is a disaster relief model, where government responds to climate 
changes “in the same way that (it) now deal(s) with hazardous natural events such as bushfires, 
droughts and floods”. He references New Zealand’s national monitoring and response system 
for earthquakes, volcanic and flood disasters, and its parallel compensation and insurance 
system as an operational example (Carter, 2008b). 
Carter’s dismissal of precautionary mitigation policies is grounded in his view that any policy 
should be “prudent” and should “do no harm, especially to society’s most disadvantaged” 
(Carter, 2011b). The costs of climate policy are therefore important to Carter. He argues that 
adaptation is more cost-effective, “orders of magnitude” less expensive than a carbon pricing 
regime, and would avoid “contingent damage to the economy, the standard of living and the 
world food supply” (Carter, 2008b).  
The adaptation argument serves Carter well as global mitigation initiatives are stalled and 
expectations of future climate damages increase. His argument that the climate could change 
in any direction and that human forcing exists but remains undetectable, theoretically leaves 
space for him to revise his position should new evidence come to light, such as calamitous 
climate developments in the form of rapid global temperature rise and/or the collapse of arctic 
ice sheets. 
8.2.2 Barnaby Joyce 
Barnaby Joyce, before the 2013 federal election, was the leader of the National Party in the 
Australian Senate and the L-NP Coalition’s Shadow Minister for Regional Development, Local 
Government and Water. He is a qualified accountant and had worked in a chartered 
accountancy firm, an American multinational, and a major regional bank before setting up his 
own practice. Joyce's views were extracted from Joyce (2009, 2011a, 2011b, 2011c, 2011d, 
2011e, 2011f, 2011g, 2012) 
Joyce’s core argument is that any emission abatement scheme that Australia might undertake 
would have no discernible impact on global temperature and would cause “irreparable harm” 
to the Australian economy (Joyce, 2011b, 2011c). He sees the harm from the carbon tax as 
incipient, draining away the “spare cash” that keeps the economy moving. For him the carbon 
tax is no more than a “gesture” and a “social re-engineering exercise” (Joyce, 2011f). Joyce 
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often argues that the carbon tax is a distraction, taking attention away from pressing domestic 
economic needs like addressing government debt, controlling living costs, improving roads and 
looking after the nursing profession. Getting government debt under control is a particular 
priority for Joyce: “Swan should forget climate change and concentrate on debt” (Joyce, 
2011g). On a practical level, Joyce sees the carbon tax as inflating government bureaucracy, 
intrinsically unpredictable in the way the carbon price would be determined, and open to abuse. 
He foresees that much of the carbon offsets that Australia would be buying from developing 
countries will be “scams” and that those involved with the buying and selling of carbon permits 
would profit massively (Joyce, 2011f). 
Joyce does not think Australia has a leadership role to play in relation to climate change: “don’t 
get too carried away saving the world when it is quite evident that is not the league we play in; 
leave that to the US, China and the 100 million population league” (Joyce, 2012). Instead, 
Australia’s focus should be inward, as reflected in his prioritization of the national debt: “I 
would not be going down the path of a carbon tax … I would do everything to batten down the 
hatches”. “Prudency”, “conservatism” and “providence” are his guiding principles (Joyce, 
2011f).  
In sum, Joyce is fiercely protective of the Australian economy and its citizens. His critique of 
climate policies is grounded in his economic concerns and not so much in his scepticism of the 
science, which gets relatively little attention in his writings and speeches. He respects the 
argument that carbon initiatives could be justified from a precautionary perspective (Joyce, 
2011e) and has on occasion stated that he remains “open to a brief of examining all the facts 
as they come before us” (Joyce, 2009). To a large degree Joyce’s climate arguments amount to 
a prioritisation exercise. The immediate and concrete needs of the country simply trump what 
he perceives as an inconclusive scientific argument and ineffectual policy: “How much oxygen 
has this issue absorbed whilst other far more pressing issues are ignored” (Joyce, 2011a); and 
“When prioritising threats I know which one I would be concentrating on” (Joyce, 2011g). 
8.2.3 Andrew Bolt 
Andrew Bolt is an Australian newspaper columnist, radio commentator, blogger and television 
host. He is a former associate editor of the Melbourne-based Herald Sun. His views were 
extracted from Bolt (2010a, 2010b, 2012a, 2012b, 2012c, 2012f), prior to the 2013 federal 
election. 
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Bolt’s commentary on the climate issue is highly polemical in nature. He has made many 
controversial claims over the years, and not only on ACD. Bolt’s ACD scepticism rests on his 
belief that global warming has paused, and that this proves that mainstream scientists’ 
assessments of current and future trends and impacts are flawed, that the climate problem has 
been exaggerated. Articles he published in February 2012 (Bolt, 2012d, 2012e) in which he 
claimed that global surface warming had “paused”, that the oceans had “cooled”, that sea levels 
had “dipped” and that the Arctic ice retreat had stopped, became the subject of Australian Press 
Council complaints. The complainants believed Bolt was misrepresenting the science. The 
Press Council partially upheld the complaints on the basis that he did not provide sufficient 
context to the observed slowing trends in global warming, i.e. that the pause was consistent 
with a longer term warming trend (Australian Press Council, 2012). 
Bolt’s criticism of climate policies centres on his belief that whatever climate mitigation 
Australia might undertake, it would be ultimately futile in the absence of an inclusive and 
concerted global effort. As both Labor and the L-NP Coalition subscribe to the 5% reduction 
by 2020 target, he is equally dismissive of both’s climate policies: “Abbott’s scheme is as 
pointless as Labor’s” (Bolt, 2012a). Not even the fact that the L-NP Coalition’s policy would 
cap spending on climate mitigation efforts at a lower level than Labor’s receives sympathy 
from Bolt. He also sees the L-NP Coalition’s backing of the renewable energy target scheme 
as pointless as it would force consumers to pay “billions extra for solar and wind power” and 
yet make “zero” difference to the temperature (Bolt, 2012f).  
Bolt is particularly aware of the potential for mismanagement and manipulation of emission 
abatement and energy efficiency schemes. He describes the buying of emission offsets from 
overseas, particularly from developing countries, as “dodgy trading” that would be difficult to 
police (Bolt, 2012f). He is similarly critical of domestic schemes like the subsidies of domestic 
solar installations by the federal and state governments, the home insulation scheme and the 
government’s financial backing of the development of carbon capture and sequestration 
technology. These schemes “achieve nothing” and impose massive costs on the taxpayer. Of 
the L-NP Coalition’s direct action policy, Bolt says that it is also “ripe for rorting, with massive 
grants to be thrown at mad emissions cutting schemes, from burying carbon in the soil to 
turning farmland into forests” (Bolt, 2012f). 
Bolt’s argument that Australian emission abatement policies are futile because they would have 
a minuscule impact on global temperatures is aimed at exposing what he believes is logical 
inconsistency and disingenuousness on the part of all major parties. He does not seriously 
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believe that emission abatement policies have any use, even if applied at a global level and 
with ambitious targets. At heart, he remains unconvinced that significant warming is taking 
place and that greenhouse gas emissions actually drive global temperature. Bolt’s position is 
thus a consistent and principled one. He dismisses all varieties of emission abatement policies 
from all political quarters. 
8.2.4 Alan Moran 
Dr Alan Moran, Director of the IPA's Deregulation Unit, is an economist (PhD in transport 
economics) who has worked in federal and state government departments as well as the private 
sector consultancy ACIL Tasman. He has written extensively on energy, global warming, 
housing, transport, deregulation and competition issues. Moran's views were extracted from 
Moran (2007, 2008a, 2008b, 2009, 2010a, 2010b, 2011). 
Moran argues that decarbonising the economy to the degree required to achieve greenhouse 
gas concentration targets is simply impossible given the state of current technologies 
(excluding nuclear) and that as long as political will is lacking globally to achieve deep 
emission targets, Australia would only undermine its own economy for no real environmental 
gain. He favours the L-NP Coalition’s direct action approach to managing carbon emissions 
because it “provides a sort of insurance policy that can be intensified or abandoned depending 
on future circumstances”. Direct action has “the great merit of avoiding locking in a vast new 
tax and bureaucratic control system” that would accompany a carbon pricing regime. Moran’s 
central concern in his arguments against current emission reduction policies is that they 
increase “irrevocable” costs in the economy that would destroy Australia’s competitive 
advantage (Moran, 2010a). 
Although Moran is an avid campaigner against cost impositions on the Australian economy, 
there is a measure of pragmatism in his arguments. For instance, he argues the case for nuclear 
power, but acknowledges that it is not a low cost energy solution. He also argues that low cost 
technologies need to mature, and that Australia should preserve its competitive advantage 
through “cheap electricity” until low cost-alternatives become available (Moran, 2008b). 
 Moran acknowledges that environmental impacts are the unavoidable outcome of current 
living standards. He makes the argument that the high emissions level in Australia is 
understandable, even if it might have an environmental impact. For him, exploiting Australia’s 
low cost energy supply “does not mean we are an irresponsible ‘polluter’”, but merely reflects 
how Australia uses its low cost energy to produce and export energy-intensive products, 
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thereby locating the emissions in Australia rather than somewhere else (Moran, 2009). 
However, he accepts the general drive to decarbonise the economy. For instance, he calls for 
the rationalisation of the existing raft of emission reduction and energy efficiency schemes, 
which he describes as a “hotch-potch of measures”, not their abolition (Moran, 2007). 
8.2.5 Gina Rinehart 
Gina Rinehart is an Australian business tycoon who has made her fortune in the mining 
industry. She heads Hancock Prospecting, a company she inherited from her father. She is 
considered to be the richest person in Australia and even the richest woman in the world. 
Rinehart's views were extracted from Rinehart (2008, 2011a, 2011b, 2012) 
Rinehart has long been advocating lower taxes (particularly corporate), less government 
regulation and relaxed immigration laws (to allow low skilled temporary migrant workers into 
the economy). Her basic rationale is that the “underlying economy” needs to be healthy and 
strong, encouraging of investment, in order for big businesses to stay competitive in the world 
and for ordinary Australians to benefit from the positive flow-on effects through high rates of 
employment and opportunities to prosper (Rinehart, 2008). She has repeatedly warned that 
given increased competition from resource competitors in India and Brazil and falling 
commodity prices, any added costs in the Australian economy would price Australia out of 
international markets, particularly in China, Australia’s largest trading partner. 
Although Rinehart is widely known for her climate scepticism, her arguments about the science 
are confined to the basic claims made by sceptic scientists and are asserted almost exclusively 
in the context of her calls for keeping costs low in the Australian economy. She sees the carbon 
tax as an unnecessary impost on the Australian economy in light of continued “doubt in the 
scientific community that adding more carbon dioxide to the air will have any significant effect 
on climate change, and especially not from a relatively small country like Australia” (Rinehart, 
2011a). She argues that Australian efforts to combat global warming would be futile because 
other big emitters like China and India would simply continue on their growth paths. Rinehart’s 
invoking of the sceptic scientific argument against the carbon tax, being unnecessary and 
ineffectual, is secondary to her larger argument that costs should be contained in the Australian 
economy for it to remain competitive. Her critique of the carbon tax almost always co-occurs 
with arguments against the Minerals Resource Rent Tax (MRRT), government red tape, and 
restrictions on foreign migrant labour. 
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Rinehart’s vision is uncomplicated – Australia needs to stay competitive in order to grow its 
businesses and create prosperity for its citizens. The carbon tax, like other cost imposts, 
impedes this possibility and should be abandoned. More importantly, Rinehart does not 
advance environmental protection in general. Her view is that the climate system is beyond 
human control, and that natural climate forces surpass any impact that human activities might 
have on the climate. There is, therefore, no environmental impetus in her logic to support 
climate intervention of any kind. Her concern for human welfare is also framed in exclusively 
economic terms. She does not entertain the potential value to human welfare that might be 
derived from the environmental benefits of climate policies. 
8.2.6 Joanne Nova 
Joanne Nova describes herself as a “greenie who grew up” and someone who “wants to save 
the world, but now with logic, reason and the scientific method”. She runs a popular blog at 
http://joannenova.com.au/, has self-published two books on climate science, and acts as a 
professional speaker on the issues of science and “groupthink”. She graduated in the field of 
biology and worked as Associate Lecturer of Science Communication at Australian National 
University. Nova's views were extracted from Nova (2010, 2011a, 2011b, 2013). 
Nova’s interest lies mostly in the science debate and her writings reflect this. She believes that 
climate policy is principally flawed because it is based on a science project that is systemically 
biased to the “dominant paradigm” (Nova, 2010). She states that “bad science makes for bad 
policy” (Nova, 2011b). She argues for a thorough consideration of the true costs and benefits 
of any proposed policy. In her view the costs of trying to mitigate the human impact on the 
climate, the magnitude of which is still unproven and might eventually prove to be unfounded, 
imply that very real and immediate trade-offs would have to be made in the economy. For 
instance, subsidising domestic solar power generation “is not just wasted money, it’s a choice 
that will kill people … instead of spending $1bn dollars on solar panels, we could have spent 
$200 million on cheap electricity and used the other $800 million to double our medical 
research budget” (Nova, 2011b). She argues that a cost-benefit analysis would show that the 
profits Australia could derive from, for instance, medical research (which are guaranteed 
because the demand is already there), would exceed positive spin-offs, if they eventuate, from 
investments in clean carbon technologies, the demand for which might not even exist 10 years 
from now. Nova is not willing to embark on a total transformation of the economy based on, 
in her view, a dominant but unchallenged scientific position. 
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In Nova’s argument, policies that can deliver secure, short term benefits should be preferred 
over policies that are costly and potentially futile, even if the “choice that kills” might in fact 
save many in the longer term. She is not against investment in clean carbon technologies in 
principle, but argues against “inefficient” (solar panels) and potentially unnecessary (carbon 
capture and sequestration) technologies (Nova, 2013). She does not exclude the possibility of 
homegrown clean carbon development and investment, but pragmatically remains open to 
adopting such technologies if and when they prove useful. She claims to be open to reviewing 
her scepticism if and when new evidence comes to light. 
8.2.7 George Pell 
George Pell was until recently the Australian cardinal of the Roman Catholic Church and 
Archbishop of Sydney. He is currently Prefect of the Secretariat for the Economy at the 
Vatican. Pell's views were extracted from Pell (2008, 2010, 2011a, 2011b, 2011c). 
Pell’s interest in the climate issue stems from his investigation during the 1990s of “the anti-
human claims of the ‘deep greens’”. Over the years he became very suspicious of “the climate 
movement’s totalitarian approach to opposing views” (Pell, 2011a), to the point where he now 
believes that the claims of “climate extremists” are vastly exaggerated, amounting to 
“propaganda” (Pell, 2011b).  
Pell’s interpretation of the science and what it means for public policy is centred on the 
following guiding principles: “practical certainty” (one should not “act when in doubt”); and 
decisions should be guided by “common sense” and “prudence”. “Practical certainty” implies 
that the scientific evidence, and in particular what Pell calls the “primary evidence”, should be 
“sufficient” and “adequate” in order to serve as a basis for decisions (Pell, 2011a). 
Pell argues that one should have the “right reason in doing things” (Pell, 2011b). He believes 
the causes of climate change “need to be clearly established after full debates” and “validated 
comprehensively, before expensive remedies are imposed on industries and communities” 
(Pell, 2011a). This means careful consideration of the costs and benefits, “financially, morally 
or humanly, and their level of probability”, for example the long term benefits of emission 
schemes should be clear, and the costs of such schemes should be shared fairly. For Pell the 
“the cost of attempts to make global warming go away will be very heavy” and will eventually 
“trickle down to the end-users” (Pell, 2011c). Despite assurances that the vulnerable would be 
protected, Pell suspects that the burdens of climate action would “fall mainly on the shoulders 
of the poor”, a lesson learnt in history (Pell, 2011b). Pell’s common sense and prudence tells 
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him that “extreme weather events are to be expected” and “that money should be used to raise 
living standards and reduce vulnerability to catastrophes” (Pell, 2011c).  
Although human welfare is a central concern for Pell, he does not see it in complete isolation 
from environmental wellbeing. From his religious perspective, humans have a duty to “respect 
creation”, and from his human-centred perspective the environment should be preserved for 
future generations without “burdening them with huge, unnecessary debts” (Pell, 2010).  
In sum, Pell’s call for “practical certainty” before climate action is taken should not be 
interpreted as an insistence that all scientific uncertainties should be resolved. He concedes that 
there is room for disagreement – “we can agree to disagree” (Pell, 2010). He does not advocate 
that one or the other side should prevail in the scientific argument, but instead calls for 
“adequate” evidence and explanations (Pell, 2011c), in other words evidence and explanations 
that would reasonably address his current causes for scepticism. Pell may be interpreted as 
open to climate policies that might fulfill the requirement of net benefit to the masses and 
equitable sharing of cost burdens. 
8.3 New thinking about climate policy 
A number of observers and scholars have in recent years started pointing out that the narrow 
scientific framing of the climate problem has caused numerous difficulties (e.g. intense 
disputes about the causes, impacts and timeframes of climate change) and failed to galvanise 
political support for the kind of emission cuts required to achieve stabilisation of the climate at 
a ‘safe’ level. The emergent new thinking about climate policy encourages consideration of 
non-market mechanisms (vis-à-vis the familiar carbon pricing strategy), and the adoption of 
mitigation measures that suits a particular national context (tailor made). In this regard, the new 
thinking around climate policy foregrounds mitigation measures such as renewable energy 
targets, energy efficiency regulation, vehicle emission standards, etc., and guards against 
fixation with atmospheric greenhouse gas concentration targets and emission reduction targets 
that are supposed to achieve climate stabilisation. The new thinking stresses portfolio, bottom-
up and practical solutions to the climate problem and centres on the concepts of innovation, 
energy security and adaptation (M.C. Nisbet, 2011, pp. i-ii). 
One of the earliest voices to question the pre-occupation with macro-managing greenhouse gas 
emissions came from science and technology scholar Roger A. Pielke Jr. (Pielke Jr., 1998). 
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However, it took a series of publications from a group of scholars associated with the theory 
of socio-cultural viability (grid-group Cultural Theory) to establish a firm grounding in the 
social sciences for an argument against the excessively techno-scientific and managerial 
framing of the climate problem. A 2003 paper by anthropologist Michael Thompson 
(Thompson, 2003) states that in any policy process “there will always be ... divergent but 
plausible stories that frame the issue, define the problem and suggest solutions”. None of the 
contending stories of climate change are intrinsically wrong, each merely thematises “a 
pertinent aspect of the climate change debate”. As such, “each of the stories represents a 
political voice in the policy process”, and any policy-making process that ignores any of them 
would lead to a loss of legitimacy and would only provide “a partially effective response”. 
Thompson proceeds to argue for “multivocality” in the debate, “the possibility of constructive 
dialogue”. “It will often be a noisy, discordant, contradictory dialogue, but this is the clumsy 
beast that democratic policy makers and regulators must seek to harness and ride”. This idea 
of clumsy solutions to the climate problem was again raised in a 2006 paper (Verweij et al., 
2006) by an extended group of respected social scientists. 
Several similar publications followed from scholars in a range of other disciplines. Economist 
Gwyn Prins and science and technology scholar Steve Rayner, in their 2007 interventions 
(Prins & Rayner, 2007a, 2007b), openly call for an “inelegant approach” to climate policy. 
They argue that because of the “complex nexus of mutually reinforcing, intertwined patterns 
of human behaviour, physical materials and the resulting technology”, there can be no “single-
shot”, “silver bullet” solution. Instead, they propose a “silver buckshot” approach, a “portfolio 
of approaches that would move us in the right direction”. A key element of such a portfolio 
would be massive investment in R&D in emission reduction and renewable energy 
technologies, a cause which “embraces the political spectrum”. Another element, the so-called 
“policies and measures” approach, calls for nations to adopt climate policies that “suit their 
particular circumstances” as a way to “build credible institutions that markets endorse”. The 
emphasis here is therefore squarely on what policies are feasible and acceptable to 
governments, markets and ultimately also the public, rather than what policies are presumably 
dictated by emission trends and global warming targets. 
UK climatologist Mike Hulme, in his 2009 book Why We Disagree About Climate Change: 
Understanding Controversy, Inaction And Opportunity (Hulme, 2009b, p. 334), echoes the 
view that an elegant global solution to the climate problem is misplaced: “(climate change) 
does not lend itself to a solution—whether to elegant solutions or even clumsy ones”. Hulme  
180 
 
believes there is an imperative for communities to be mobilised and solutions to be 
implemented from the bottom up instead of from the top down. He calls for “political projects 
that are pluralist, polycentric and pragmatic”. Hulme does not see his pragmatism as a 
compromise, but rather as a prerequisite for achieving a new popular consensus on a 
decarbonised future.  
The scholarly critique of Kyoto-style approaches to the climate problem gained further 
momentum after the perceived failure of the Copenhagen Conference at the end of 2009. A 
group of 14 international scholars brought out the Hartwell Paper (Prins et al., 2010) in which 
the authors concluded that “it is not possible to have a ‘climate policy’ that has emissions 
reductions as the all encompassing goal”. Instead of focussing on emission reductions, which 
is implicitly a punitive approach, they argued for an approach premised on “human dignity”. 
They called for a “radical reframing – an inverting – of approach” in which the decarbonisation 
of the global economy is pursued in “politically attractive” and “relentlessly pragmatic” ways. 
This implies greater autonomy and popular participation in climate policies at the sub-national 
level. The authors propose that climate policies focus on energy security, sustainable 
development and adaptation. In this regard the authors propose “very substantially increased 
investment in innovation in noncarbon energy sources in order to diversify energy supply 
technologies”. 
2010 saw two major contributions to the new discourse on climate policy. In his book The 
Climate Fix: What Scientists and Politicians Won’t Tell You About Global Warming (Pielke 
Jr., 2010a), Pielke Jr. offers a number of practical suggestions for a revised climate policy. His 
proposals are underpinned by his “iron law of climate policy”: 
When policies on emissions reductions collide with policies focused on economic growth, 
economic growth will win out every time. Climate policies should flow with the current of 
public opinion rather than against it, and efforts to sell the public on policies that will create 
short-term economic discomfort cannot succeed if that discomfort is perceived to be too 
great (Pielke Jr., 2010b). 
He emphasises adaptation (lifting the “taboo” on adaptation) and calls for “practical policies 
that are consistent with a narrative of promise and possibility”. Such policies need to include a 
moderate price signal in the energy market coupled with public investment in clean energy 
technologies. In similar vein, communication scholar Maxwell Boykoff and colleagues, in their 
2010 paper (Boykoff, Frame, & Randalls, 2010), question the feasibility and practicality of the 
goals and objectives associated with the prevailing framing of the climate problem as one of 
“climate stabilisation”. Efforts to design and implement an effective “equillibrium response” 
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have not only failed thus far, but, more importantly, have “stymied short term action” and 
downplayed the important tasks of climate adaptation and decarbonisation of energy systems. 
They argue for an expansion of the “range of possible policy framings” and to “explicitly move 
to more productive ways” of minimising climate impacts. They call for fresh consideration of 
the political and ethical questions related to the “timescale, actors and costs” of climate 
policies.  
In a 2011 paper (Rayner, 2010) Steve Rayner calls for a “bottom-up” approach to climate 
policy. He places “an immediate emphasis on adaptation” and the development of “a diverse 
range of policy actions” that originate from the “bottom up” within nations, based on their own 
institutional, technological, economic and political capacities. Adaptation has the advantage of 
delivering “real, immediate and visible benefits to humanity”. As far as climate mitigation is 
concerned, Rayner sees much potential for “smaller bilateral and multilateral arrangements” 
among countries and cities. In addition he argues for major public investment in carbon-neutral 
energy R&D, which would deliver “clean, affordable and reliable” energy to the masses. He 
also points out that non-carbon dioxide contributors to global warming (e.g. nitrogen oxides, 
methane and volatile organic compounds) could be attacked as a public health objective, rather 
than the “distant and nebulous” climate change objective. Rayner describes his approach as 
“modest” and “practical”. 
One of the latest voices in the call for greater inclusiveness in climate policy formulation comes 
from the communication scholar Matthew Nisbet (2011). On the basis of the US experience, 
he argues that two identifiable coalitions, both pro-environment, compete to drive the climate 
agenda: The left of centre “Green” network and the left/centrist/right “Innovation” network 
(M.C. Nisbet, 2011, p. viii). The “Green” network focuses on the threat posed by ACD and the 
imperative to mitigate its impacts through addressing its root cause, excessive greenhouse gases 
in the atmosphere. The emphasis for “Green” network players is on directing national and 
global economies towards low-carbon consumption and production behaviours, primarily 
through emission trading schemes and carbon taxes. The “Innovation” network, in contrast, 
focuses on energy security and technological solutions to the problems associated with climate 
change. Their portfolio of policies include increasing research spending, creating hubs for 
technology development, as well as promoting specific technologies like small scale nuclear 
reactors, carbon sequestration, biofuels and wind, solar and geothermal power. Although these 
two coalitions have quite different ideological, professional and social compositions, Nisbet 
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argues that they are not mutually exclusive, and that the challenge for the future is to ensure 
that they “collaborate to achieve closely linked goals”. 
8.4 Common ground? 
The new thinking about climate policy is signified by a number of concepts and terms, shown 
in Table 8-1.  
Table 8-1: Markers of the new thinking about climate policy 
Organising 
principles 
clumsy, inelegant, pluralist, multiple voices, suites, portfolios, bottom 
up, tailor-made (‘policies and measures’) 
Preferred 
objectives of 
climate policy 
Adaptation, resilience, energy security, sustainable development, 
economic growth, human dignity, public health 
Preferred 
mechanisms of 
climate policy 
moderate price signal, low cost, technological innovation, public 
investment, R&D, and specific technologies (nuclear, CCS, wind, 
solar, geothermal) 
Preferred 
qualities of 
climate policy 
realistic, pragmatic, practical, modest, feasible, acceptable, attractive, 
promise, short term action, real, immediate, visible, productive 
 
The conceptual markers of the new thinking about climate policy are reflected in the sceptic 
thinking in the following ways. 
- Adaptation: The adaptation agenda does not receive detailed attention from the 
sceptics (with the exception of Carter) because the climate policy debate has been pre-
occupied with proposals for emission reduction measures that are aimed at climate 
stabilisation. However, the idea of natural climate change, which is unavoidable and 
beyond human control, is a cornerstone of the sceptic argument. As such, support for 
adaptation fits naturally in the sceptic logic. Sceptics’ pre-occupation with economic 
prosperity and living standards is in fact, as explained by Pell, vital to “reduce 
(human) vulnerability to catastrophes”. 
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- Feasibility: The sceptics are unanimous in their critique of current climate policies as 
being unfeasible, either because they erroneously target a fictitious (in their view) 
cause of climate change, or, if the human attribution is hypothetically accepted, 
because they fall hopelessly short of achieving any real relief from projected climate 
change impacts. 
- Low cost: The sceptics are united in their concern about the cost implications of 
current climate policies. Without exception, they argue that current climate policies 
impose unacceptable constraints on the Australian economy.  
- Economic growth: The unacceptability of a cost impost on the economy is not only 
argued from the wrong science, wrong policy vantage point, but significantly also 
from a critical evaluation of the economic implications of climate policies. The 
sceptics are all fiercely protective of the Australian economy, and strongly advocate 
preserving Australia’s prosperity. 
- Human dignity: The corollary argument, namely that the disadvantaged members of 
the population should be protected from economic hardship, is explicitly made by 
Carter, Nova, Pell and Rinehart, and strongly implied by Joyce and Bolt. 
- Technological innovation: Moran openly supports the development of low carbon 
technologies, whilst Nova is receptive to the idea, as long as they are efficient and 
needed. Both believe that low carbon energy solutions should also be low-cost. 
- Energy efficiency: Moran argues for the retention and rationalisation of the existing 
raft of emission reduction and energy efficiency schemes. 
- Public investment: Moran supports direct public investment (the L-NP Coalition 
model) in the development of low carbon technologies. For him it is a flexible 
mechanism that avoids the “irrevocable” costs associated with a carbon tax or 
emission trading regime. 
- Promotion of specific technologies: Moran supports nuclear power as a potential low 
carbon energy solution. 
- Bottom up: Joyce articulates a strong inward looking approach to the climate 
challenge (“batten down the hatches”). Joyce is not entirely dismissive of climate 
mitigation policies, but believes they should be left to “the 100 million population 
league”. He clearly prioritises “other far more pressing issues”. One could argue that 
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the pre-occupation of the sceptics with protecting the Australian economy’s 
international competitiveness is equally an inward looking ethic that prioritises local 
and national interests over the global commons. 
- Sceptics place a high premium on policy integrity. Joyce, Bolt and Moran explicitly 
denounce the current emission centred climate policies as prone to mismanagement 
and corruption. The creation of bloated and inefficient bureaucracies, carbon trading 
corruption and carbon price volatility are listed as flaws in both the carbon tax and 
emission trading schemes. These types of critiques are as much an expression of 
unease with policies that are macro-managerial in nature, as they reflect concern 
about the quality of policies. 
- Tailor-made: Sceptics are unwilling to see Australia adopt climate policies that will 
not fit its unique economic limitations and strengths (Moran – exploiting “cheap 
electricity”; Joyce – global initiatives not our “league”, and the need for “prioritising 
threats”; Nova – spin-offs from “medical research”). Carter’s disaster relief model for 
climate change adaptation also reflects a preference for policies that have concrete, 
immediate and local benefits.   
As a general, overall assessment of the climate policy stances of the seven sceptics, four 
(Carter, Joyce, Nova and Pell) could be described as open to revise their scientific and policy 
positions, one (Moran) is willing to accept carbon constraining policies, and two (Bolt and 
Rinehart) are dismissive of climate policies of whatever kind. 
8.5 Conclusion 
Without disputing any aspect of the mainstream scientific view of climate change, scholars 
from a range of disciplines increasingly argue that climate policy cannot be solely predicated 
on considerations of technical efficacy (what emission and greenhouse gas concentration 
targets need to be met in what timeframes), but requires a sense of what is realistically possible. 
The new thinking about the climate problem is looking to shift the climate policy discourse 
from an aspirational single factor (CO2) approach to realistic and pragmatic portfolio solutions 
in the areas of adaptation, energy security and technological innovation. It is time to admit, 
they argue, that climate change is indeed a wicked problem and that an elegant solution will 
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evade us for the foreseeable future. Instead, incremental progress should be pursued through 
multiple initiatives at various governmental levels and in different economic sectors. 
This new approach to climate policy is compatible with the policy inclinations of many 
sceptics. Sceptics’ propensity to emphasise the natural and uncontrollable aspects of the climate 
system aligns them with a climate adaptation agenda. The only reason why they are not more 
vocal in their support of adaptation initiatives is because of the low policy prominence such 
initiatives enjoy relative to the climate stabilisation agenda. This might change as climate 
mitigation stalls and climate damages (real and potential) mount. Many sceptics also expressly 
describe themselves as pragmatic, which entails preference for policies that deliver concrete, 
local and immediate results, all of which are qualities that the new climate policy discourse 
emphasises and are consistent with the emerging preference for tailor-made country specific 
policies. Sceptics’ economic protectiveness and concern with the cost implications of policies 
are consistent with Pielke Jr.’s ‘iron law’ of climate policy (economic growth trumps climate 
policy) and the new thinking insight that low carbon energy solutions are preferable because 
they are affordable, and not because fossil fuels have been made artificially expensive. Some 
sceptics are openly supportive of or receptive to pro-active public investment in the 
development of low carbon energy solutions, again with the proviso that these should be 
mature, efficient and affordable options. 
These findings suggest that sceptics are in some respects closer to mainstream climate policy 
discourse than is generally realised or acknowledged. Sceptics of the realist and pragmatic kind 
are already conceptually aligned with Nisbet’s ‘innovation’ discourse, making it possible to 
envision a climate dialogue that is more inclusive and productive than generally thought 
possible. It is time to recognise that intense contestation over the evidence of ACD has been 
obscuring the potential common ground between sceptics and the new climate policy discourse. 
Greater climate policy consensus is achievable in the post-Kyoto era. Such consensus needs to 
be initiated by a deliberate and perceptible retreat from the prevailing emphasis on climate 
stabilisation and a willing embrace of a more inclusive dialogue around the goals and strategies 
that will help us move in the right direction with the climate challenge. 
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9 CONCLUSION 
This study started out by describing the dominant prevailing construction of sceptics and 
scepticism, both popularly and in scholarly circles. This construction offers two motivating 
logics for ACD scepticism: A soft logic that holds that sceptics are oriented by deeply held 
worldviews and values that predispose them to question scientific findings that challenge the 
survival of their worldviews and values. In this logic ideological/worldview drivers are acting 
in the background, invisible to even the sceptics themselves, and are often reinforced by various 
cognitive and psycho-sociological barriers and heuristics, like cognitive-dissonance avoidance, 
affect, in-group/out-group dynamics, etc. In the soft interpretation the ideological/worldview 
drivers are reduced to dispositional influences on individuals. A hard logic of ACD scepticism 
holds that scepticism is a contrived phenomenon, where sceptics are seen as deliberately and 
deceitfully manufacturing doubt about the core claims of mainstream climate science in order 
to defend their worldviews and values, as well as the interests that benefit most from the 
prevailing neo-liberal capitalist status quo. In the hard interpretation sceptics are knowingly 
and willingly taking up an ideological battle to preserve the existing social and economic order. 
In the case of scepticism at the elite level, the two logics are interwoven to form a compelling 
narrative that explains the scepticism of the elites and sets the background for understanding 
the scepticism of laypersons. The narrative describes how ideologically conservative elites 
interpret climate science and its societal implications as a threat to the prevailing neo-liberal 
capitalist status quo. Through challenging mainstream climate science and its clamour for 
incisive economic restructuring around the need to contain carbon emissions, conservatives 
believe they are balancing the scales in a contest between two fundamentally opposing value 
systems. The narrative describes how conservative ideologues see the climate change issue 
merely as another arena for the battle between on the one hand those who value a sustainable 
human-nature relationship and government intervention to achieve the greatest good for all 
people (broadly speaking the liberal or progressive ideological position), and on the other hand 
those who have a human-centric view of the world and life, who have faith in technology to 
overcome all aspects of the human-nature conundrum, and who value individual freedom, the 
free market and small government (broadly speaking the conservative ideological position). In 
this narrative the main contrarian actors are ideologically driven individuals acting in a strategic 
manner. They have calculated that climate change science and its implicit requirement for 
massive intervention to save both nature and humankind, poses a grave threat to the 
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conservative values they adhere to. For instance, national carbon emission reduction policies 
will require (in their view) government intervention and regulation, all of which would severely 
restrict the free market and individual freedom. The climate change issue, in the view of the 
conservatives, have handed liberals and leftists a golden opportunity to advance their agendas 
of social engineering, both at national and international levels. The new environmentalism 
spurred by the threat of climate change is nothing other than the previous Western/communism 
ideological contest being continued under new auspices. The narrative continues to cast 
conservative ideologues as manipulative agents, utilizing willing corporates to finance their 
efforts to discredit the mainstream climate science and promote contrarian positions, and 
exploiting media values in order to gain disproportionate exposure of their views.  Helpful as 
the sympathetic corporate sponsors and media might be to the conservative ideologues, they 
are not totally reliant on them. Conservative think-tanks and politicians in their own right 
provide much of the impetus for stalling any progress with climate change mitigation policies, 
and ultimately protecting the economic and political status quo. In whatever ways 
conservatives are choosing to balance the scales in the climate debate, the narrative sees 
informed public opinion as a casualty. Any evidence of public indecision on the climate issue 
or public resistance to progressive climate policies is, without fail, traced back to the elites who 
have sowed the seeds of uncertainty through their challenging of mainstream climate science. 
In combination, the soft and hard constructions of ACD scepticism provide a grand theory of 
the phenomenon that has become universal (in the sense that it is widely accepted wherever 
ACD scepticism has been observed), as well as inclusive (in the sense that anyone who 
questions mainstream climate science and progressive climate policies stand to be labelled a 
sceptic). However, when one considers the way observers have treated elite scepticism, as 
opposed to public scepticism, some ambiguity is evident in the application of the constructions 
to the two groups. The hard interpretation is often applied to sceptic elites, who observers 
assume should know better, while the soft interpretation is reserved for lay sceptics, who are 
seen as incapable of negotiating the complex terrain of the climate issue. This study goes some 
way to redressing this imbalance by investigating the conceptual world of elite sceptics with a 
view to identifying soft drivers of scepticism. It, therefore, challenges the prevailing 
assumption that elite sceptics must have ulterior motives – that their sceptic arguments are 
instrumental rather than organic, that their arguments serve a more sinister purpose. 
The study also goes some way to questioning the underlying implication of both constructions 
of ACD scepticism, namely that scepticism is an aberrant position. In the two constructions 
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sceptics are seen as cynical manipulators of public opinion, as gravely mistaken and misguided, 
or both. And given the urgency of the climate problem, many observers consider sceptics’ 
resistance to progressive climate interventions as a serious public threat. Many observers 
believe that sceptics and scepticism should be battled – exposed, discredited, shamed and 
suffocated in the public agora. This is a questionable approach, and certainly not fair to a large 
number of serious minded and well-intentioned people who happen to find themselves in the 
sceptic camp. 
9.1 Key findings 
This study’s key findings in relation to the research questions posed in chapter one are as 
follows: 
RQ1: Belief locale: How can ACD scepticism be conceptually demarcated? Subsidiary 
questions: What does the broad category ‘scepticism’ mean? What classes and centres of 
belief can be distinguished in the broad category? How can sceptic beliefs be variegated 
according to the intensity with which they are held? 
Chapter 4, A CONCEPTUAL RE-EVALUATION OF THE CATEGORY, takes stock of 
existing scholarly demarcations of the category and argues for a refinement of the extra-
epistemic centres of scepticism. It explains the importance of sceptics’ critiques of the 
procedural circumstances in which the scientific basis of ACD is established and promoted, as 
well as their critiques of the policy decision-making processes that follow on from the scientific 
enquiry. For many sceptics, these critiques overshadow their misgivings about the veracity of 
the evidence and constitute a principled stance, from their point of view, in favour of due 
process, deliberation and fair treatment. The chapter proposes that the category ACD 
scepticism can be demarcated into two classes of scepticism (core and concomitant) and three 
centres of scepticism (evidence, process and response). These distinctions are important in 
order to enable observers to more accurately assess the nature and depth of an individual’s 
scepticism. The chapter also considers the problems associated with some of the labels assigned 
to sceptics, such as ‘denier’, and proposes a set of labels that is neutral and more accurately 
describes the different intensities of belief amongst sceptics. The broad spectrum of sceptics is 
best described as unconvinced of the evidence, procedural integrity or merits of pro-active 
climate responses. Under this umbrella label, sceptics separate into two categories: those who 
are uncertain, and those who actively dismiss or reject the mainstream wisdom. The uncertain 
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category again sub-divides into agnostic, doubtful and disputing. These refined demarcations 
help to differentiate the most extreme sceptics from the rest.  
RQ2: Cultural locale: What worldviews/ideologies are evidenced in the sceptic discourse? 
Subsidiary questions: What cultural worldviews are espoused in elite sceptic discourse? 
What assumptions do sceptics hold about human nature and physical nature? Are sceptics 
unified in their worldview orientations? 
Chapter 5, CULTURAL MARKERS, utilises the well-known grid-group Cultural Theory to 
test the cultural identity of sceptics. The theory posits a cultural map consisting of four cultural 
archetypes, each of which is characterised by distinct myths of human and physical nature. The 
sceptic discourse is analysed with a view to locating sceptics’ core beliefs about human and 
physical nature and to correlate these with the cultural types posited by the theory. It finds that 
sceptics’ worldviews are strongly biased towards the individualist cultural type, and sometimes 
approach the hierarchist type. They have very little if anything in common with the egalitarian 
type. An important implication of the cultural treatment of the sceptic phenomenon is that it 
normalises sceptic arguments, in other words when people adopt a seemingly irrational 
position, it is not necessarily a duplicitous or cynical act, but rather a reflection of how their 
values and worldviews bias their reading of the evidence and society’s response to the issue. 
From this view ACD scepticism is neither unexpected nor abnormal – no different to any other 
domain of social life in that it reflects the fundamental conflict between people adhering to 
“primary ways of organising, perceiving and justifying social relations” (Verweij et al., 2006, 
p. 819). 
RQ3: Concept/semantic locale: What are the semantic and conceptual features of the 
sceptic discourse? Subsidiary questions: What is the semantic/conceptual range of elite 
sceptic discourse? What themes dominate the discourse? 
Chapter 6, DISCOURSE MAP, undertakes a qualitative investigation of the non-evidence 
related semantics employed by sceptics and finds six distinct concept clusters. A closer 
investigation of the underlying meaning at each of the clusters reveals that sceptics are 
substantively ideologically biased, especially in their preference for neo-liberal type responses 
to the climate issue. They are very critical of interventions that would interfere with the 
presumed efficient allocation of resources by a free market, that would engender greater 
government encroachment through regulation and taxation, that would endanger jobs and 
prosperity, and that would harm the nation’s competitiveness internationally. The discourse 
markers also reveal evidence that sceptics opportunistically employ a raft of counter-arguments 
against the mainstream wisdom, some of which are not necessarily consistent with or derived 
from scepticism of the scientific evidence. However, there is also evidence of a strong strain 
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of thought in the sceptic discourse that there is intrinsic value in criticising the prevailing 
wisdom. They argue that an open and free debate is important for the integrity and quality of 
the science and climate policies. Many sceptics warn against over-confidence and haste in 
climate decision-making. These are potentially valuable norms that mainstream proponents 
need to consider seriously if they want to enhance the public’s confidence in climate science 
and policies. 
RQ4: Policy locale: What policy views are evidenced in the sceptic discourse? Subsidiary 
questions: What substantive policy preferences are expressed by elite sceptics? Are elite 
sceptics fixed in their policy views or are there pragmatic tendencies amongst them? 
Chapter 7, POLICY MARKERS, zooms in on the climate policy views of sceptics, again with 
the aid of a quantitative investigation of the policy related semantics employed in the sceptic 
discourse. The chapter reports two key observations: first that sceptics are relatively united in 
their preference for an inclusive and deliberative style of policy decision-making, for policy 
goals that would ensure prosperity and growth, and for gradual and careful policy evolutions. 
These style and goal preferences were also evident in Chapter 6, DISCOURSE MAP. The 
second key observation from Chapter 7 is that sceptics generally fall into one of two camps in 
relation to their preferences for specific climate policies. The first group might be called 
puritans. They are sceptics who are principally opposed to any climate response because it is 
not, in their view, supported by the evidence. The second group might be called pragmatists, 
for they realise that the momentum behind the climate issue is unstoppable and that their 
challenge is to ensure that the inevitable policy choices would not undermine their core values, 
namely a free market, growth, limited government and national self-interest. 
Chapter 8, SEVEN SCEPTICS, undertakes an in-depth investigation of the policy views of 
seven high profile sceptics. This is done to corroborate the findings resulting from the whole 
discourse quantitative investigation in Chapter 7, and also to reveal further nuances in sceptic 
opinion. Consistent with the previous chapter, Chapter 8 replicates the puritan vs pragmatist 
distinction. However, the detail of the pragmatist persuasion revealed in this chapter shows that 
these sceptic views are remarkably compatible with a school of thought that emphasises realism 
and incrementalism in climate policies. This latter approach is pursued by respected scholars 
who are not sceptics, but claim that the aspirational approach to climate policy making has 
failed. This new thinking emphasises the clumsiness of the climate problem, the need for a 
pluralist approach, the need for feasible policies that will be supported by the public, and the 
importance of technological innovation in the search for solutions. These notions resonate with 
the pragmatic sceptics who place a high premium on adaptation as an appropriate climate 
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response, who wish to protect growth and prosperity, and who favour tailor-made policies that 
fit the national requirement and are not merely derived from international agreements or the 
aspirational rhetoric of environmentalists. In this, many sceptics are aligned with an emergent 
innovation network that emphasises energy security and technological solutions to the climate 
problem, and opposed to the Green network that wants to macro-manage the problem through 
wholesale economic restructuring. 
9.2 Meeting the sceptic challenge 
9.2.1 Value in discordancy 
How should policy makers and communicators wishing to forward progressive climate policies 
and behaviours respond to the sceptic challengers? A first step is to concede grid-group 
Cultural Theory’s claim that climate decision-making is inherently and necessarily conflictual 
(Verweij et al., 2006, p. 838). It should be acknowledged that the sceptics and other opponents 
of pro-active climate intervention policies do argue from legitimate cultural perspectives. Much 
of the resentment amongst sceptic elites and the general public emanate from a feeling that 
their queries and concerns are illegitimised and that they are deliberately excluded from the 
conversation. An open and respectful conversation would give decision makers access to the 
wider individualist constituency that has thus far stayed captive to the sceptic narrative. It is 
not argued here that policy makers and communicators should seek compromises with sceptics 
and withdraw from their principled positions. Instead, policy makers and communicators need 
to improve the quality of the debate by fostering greater inclusivity and receptivity. Grid-group 
Cultural Theorists envision constructive dialogue with sceptics as follows: “It will be a noisy, 
discordant, contradictory dialogue, but this is the clumsy beast that democratic policy makers 
and regulators must seek to harness and ride” (Verweij et al., 2006, p. 839). They insist that 
policy making in sophisticated democratic polities can only be legitimate if all the voices (from 
each of the four cultural types) are heard. If some of the voices are blocked, a protracted, often 
acrimonious struggle for legitimacy would ensue, delaying effective decision making 
(Thompson, 2003, pp. 5110-5111).  
9.2.2 Worldview awareness 
Policy-makers and communicators would also benefit from more carefully considering the 
worldviews/cultural rationalities of sceptics. Grid-group Cultural Theory scholars are careful 
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not to emphasise the core differences between the four archetypical cultural rationalities at the 
cost of understanding that these are orientations rather than fixed positions, that people are able 
to adapt to changed realities, that people are able to reinterpret the fit between their worldviews 
and the changed realities, and that the interstices between cultural rationalities can be important 
locales of identity and personal preferences.  
The interstices between the cultural rationalities are particularly important for policy makers 
and communicators because it is there that opportunities for a more inclusive and mutually 
intelligible dialogue are to be found. Those sceptic logics at or close to the interstices combine 
concepts and arguments from different rationalities, and as a result become culturally 
accessible to individuals rooted in and overexposed to the partial truth of just one rationality. 
Different notions about the robustness of nature are a case in point. If one is able to concede 
the fragility of nature at local and regional levels (as do the individualists), the possibility of 
acceding similar fragility at the global level becomes viable. But instead of trying to convince 
the sceptic listener that a global catastrophe is unmistakably pending, the skilful communicator 
would re-affirm the familiar individualist contentions of a robust ecosystem and carefully 
position global climate fragility as no different, in principle, to local and regional environments 
that were also once considered robust but then pushed beyond their limits. By acknowledging 
and incorporating the core individualist notion of a robust nature in the discourse, the discourse 
becomes intelligible to the sceptic listener.  
Sceptics’ objection to what they perceive as privileged and biased scientific institutions and 
processes provides another example of how an interstice between individualism and 
hierarchism could be exploited to connect to the sceptic mindset. Climate communicators have 
made the mistake of trying to convince sceptic listeners that the sceptic persuasion is 
discredited and that the mainstream persuasion amounts to authoritative consensus. The result 
has been predictable. Sceptics have drawn on the individualist aversion to rules and hierarchies 
to condemn the scientific bodies as closed fiefdoms, and continued to think of themselves as 
the lone and brave defenders of intellectual freedom and integrity, which are core individualist 
values. A more productive outcome could have been achieved by tapping into sceptics’ 
inherent respect for expert knowledge (albeit of their own choice) and the high value they place 
in institutions where expert knowledge resides (universities, academic journals, think tanks, 
etc.). Sceptics are hugely concerned to remedy what they consider the distorted managerial 
output of climate authorities, which is a hierarchist concern. By more publicly and humbly 
acknowledging the value of scientific critique, from whatever quarter, acknowledging evident 
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scientific errors and denouncing misplaced or exaggerated climate claims, mainstream 
scientists and communicators would have connected with the individualist notion that 
hierarchies are fallible and that freedom of thought and speech are vital to the release of 
individual creativity. Many sceptics are willing to admit that they might in fact be wrong about 
their climate assessments, but that their mere independence of thought remains important to 
improve the eventual quality of scientific knowledge. These values could be unproblematically 
combined with the climate mainstream’s position that its science is rigorous. 
9.2.3 Wicked problem – clumsy solutions 
Sceptic critiques of large scale climate mitigation policies and the mainstream scientific 
justification for such policies assume a new significance in the context of the super wicked 
status of the climate problem. A super wicked framework of analysis dictates that solutions 
would not be self-evident or straight forward. Levin et al.’s (2009) analysis of ACD as a super 
wicked problem warns that “one shot, large-scale responses” to the climate problem are 
unlikely to be politically accepted. They apply the theoretical insights of path dependency 
scholarship to the climate issue and concludes that policies that are “fragile at first and/or apply 
to only a small segment of the population … may trigger important path dependent 
mechanisms”. In this view, climate policy interventions are more likely to be accepted and 
endure if they follow a “progressive incremental” pattern (Levin et al., 2009, p. 4). They 
propose that climate policy initiatives have focused too much on “policy goals and instruments, 
and not nearly enough on the calibrations and settings that can, and do, sow the seeds of 
considerable behavioral change” (Levin et al., 2009, p. 11). These sentiments echo the 
conclusions of observers, as outlined in the previous section, which focus on 
worldview/cultural cleavages that underlie climate disputes. Hulme (2009b) infers that the 
discordance of voices in the climate debate necessitates a different climate policy approach, 
one that privileges responses that enjoy community support, i.e. bottom-up rather than top-
down initiatives. Similarly, Pielke Jr. (2010a) recognises the constraints imposed by the 
opposing political, economic and social forces at play, and calls for pragmatic responses that 
might gain broad acceptance. Nisbet (2011) calls for practical solutions, and Prins (2007a, 
2007b) sees no alternative to an “inelegant approach” to climate policy, an approach that 
preferences “silver buckshot” responses over “silver bullet” ones. 
The particular policy options that these observers believe are realistically feasible centre on 
concepts like innovation, investment in R&D, clean energy, energy security, energy efficiency 
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and adaptation.  These concepts appeal to sceptics because they are consistent with their 
worldview orientation that privileges individual achievement, free enterprise, progress, 
prosperity and growth, and de-emphasise notions of government control, taxation and social 
re-engineering. None of the policy concepts advocated by the wicked problem-clumsy solution 
school of thought pretend to solve the climate problem, and thus are, to some degree, immune 
to the sceptic critiques that large scale climate policies would be inconsequential to the 
environment, that they would be economically harmful, and that they are the products of a 
presumed leftist ideological agenda. Yet, they can be important seeds that could progressively 
be ratcheted up and, in time, “overwhelm existing path dependencies that increase greenhouse 
gas emissions” (Levin et al., 2009, p. 23). 
9.2.4 Strategies for engagement 
The findings of this study that the sceptic rationale is rooted in a legitimate worldview/cultural 
rationality, that the extreme complexity of the climate problem can be a strong source of 
uncertainty and doubt, and that many sceptics are ostensibly concerned about the protection of 
worldview/ideology-neutral personal values and norms, have important implications for how 
mainstream climate scientists, policymakers, commentators and communicators choose to 
meet the sceptic challenge. As a general guide, I concur with Ranalli’s (2012, p. 202) caution 
that one can make “too reflexive judgments” about the character (read intentions) of sceptics, 
and that a more “charitable reading” of sceptics might open up “opportunities for improved 
understanding”. Such an approach favours engagement over disengagement and is consistent 
with scholarly work that indicates a need for greater “social robustness” in scientific 
deliberations (Gibbons, 1994). The argument for greater openness and public engagement rests 
on a new conception of the public, which includes a significant sceptic constituency, as 
intelligent, supportive and scientifically capable (Burchell et al., Davies, Young & Matthews, 
as cited in Tøsse, 2013, p. 35). 
A number of practical strategies for meeting the sceptic challenge emerge from the more 
neutral assessment of ACD scepticism achieved in this study: 
- Accept debate. Mainstream climate exponents can avoid much suspicion and derision 
from sceptic quarters if they are willing to engage the sceptic arguments. True, climate 
sceptics would gain public exposure in the process, and the opportunity to propagate 
their scepticism, but equally, mainstream exponents would gain invaluable 
opportunities to convincingly put their case. It is a fallacy to believe that the sceptic 
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challenge could be neutralised by denying it public breathing space. Given the 
complexity, uncertainties and vast array of climate related scientific fields, sceptics 
have an almost endless well of bits of seemingly contradictory evidence they can 
exploit. Only by winning the contest of arguments repeatedly could those that are 
vulnerable to sceptic views be turned permanently from scepticism. 
- Exploit sceptics’ core worldview tenets. It is necessary to acknowledge that the 
worldviews on which sceptics draw for their interpretation of the climate issue have 
contributed much to the public traction sceptics have enjoyed over the years. The 
apprehensions voiced by sceptics do seem logical and sensible for people who share 
their values and core assumptions about human and physical nature. It stands to reason, 
then, that if mainstream climate practitioners wished to sell their product to the sceptic 
constituency, they would need to invoke the same personal values and worldviews in 
their communication strategies and counter arguments. 
- Anticipate and pre-empt debate. Mainstream climate science and policy 
communications tend to only relay the affirmative arguments. This creates 
opportunities for sceptics to claim that the science and policies are presented in a one-
sided fashion and that key uncertainties are underplayed. If climate communications 
included responses to anticipated critiques it would create an impression of even-
handedness and critical reflection. It would also help prepare communicators 
themselves for the inevitable challenges from sceptics. 
- Acknowledge the uncertainties in the science and the risks in the policies. There 
should be nothing to fear from debating the scientific uncertainties because they are 
peripheral to the core trend, attribution and impact claims of mainstream climate 
science about which almost complete scientific certainty exists. It is precisely because 
public engagement with sceptics is avoided that the sceptics have been able to elevate 
some scientific uncertainties to undeserved prominence. This has allowed sceptics to 
maintain the mantra that the science is not settled. Similarly, communicators need not 
be defensive about attacks on carbon pricing as the primary tool for managing 
greenhouse gas emissions. The case for carbon pricing is inherently strong, and by 
acknowledging its risks (e.g. carbon leakage, corruption and bureaucratic 
encumbrance) communicators have the opportunity to explain how those risks can be 
managed. 
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- Repudiate/correct overstatements. Climate science typically presents its assessments 
in terms of ranges and probabilities. When climate communicators accentuate the worse 
scenarios, often with good reason, sceptics perceive this as premature and overconfident 
treatment of the science. In their estimation, climate knowledge needs to mature more 
and bold claims about the climate amounts to human hubris. This is an appealing charge 
in the public domain and science communicators would do well to thoroughly qualify 
all their claims. This means clearly acknowledging the varying levels of certainty of 
different climate claims. In the rare cases where mainstream exponents misrepresent or 
overstate the scientific evidence, communicators would enhance the legitimacy of the 
science by publicly repudiating such misrepresentations.  
- Maintain a respectful tone. Sceptic complaints of acrimony need to be taken seriously. 
The label ‘climate denier’, to name but one example, evokes deep resentment amongst 
sceptics, and merely distracts the debate from the science issues. Sceptics range from 
the entrenched to the seriously conflicted. It is the last group that would be most 
responsive to patient and respectful engagement. 
Credible and lasting victories in the climate debate will only come through the continuous 
testing of arguments in the public sphere. The battle will not be won in the first round. On the 
contrary, a long, hard-fought and honourable victory is necessary. In this endeavour, it behoves 
those who wish to advance the climate cause to take note of the considerable reservoir of 
constructive values and norms in the sceptic rationale that could potentially be used to break 
down sceptics’ misconceptions and apprehensions. In doing so, it will be not only the small 
group of sceptic elites that might be swayed to accept progressive climate interventions, but 
also the much larger public constituency to which their arguments have appealed. 
9.3 Future research  
9.3.1 Scepticism in other countries 
This study focuses on scepticism in the Australian context, and Australian elite sceptics. There 
is reason to believe that comparable findings would be made in studies of scepticism in other 
Western countries. Observers have pointed out that especially the work and activities of US 
based sceptics have affected sceptical thought in other countries, including Australia. Personal 
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and organisational links between US based think tanks and individuals, and their Australian 
equivalents, have been detailed in the literature. 
However, there is room to expand the particular approach (conceptual analysis) and method 
(computer assisted textual analysis) undertaken in this study to studies of scepticism in other 
national contexts. The benefit of replicating this study in for instance the US or UK is that the 
sceptic populations in these nations are naturally much larger, which means that text samples 
representing the sceptic discourses there would be potentially much larger, and would 
potentially produce results with a higher degree of confidence. 
If the results of this study were to be substantively replicated in studies of scepticism in other 
countries, it would signal the need for global re-evaluation of the thesis that sceptics and 
scepticism are primarily inspired by the manipulative actions of politically conservative and 
fossil fuel invested corporate players. Further, differences in rationale and emphasis might be 
found between sceptics from different nationalities, which might raise interesting questions 
about how scepticism manifests, given a particular set of national circumstances. A plausible 
theory that could be tested in this regard is that scepticism lags mainstream climate science and 
policy by a predictable margin. For countries with more advanced national climate policies, it 
could be hypothesised that scepticism might be more sophisticated and focused on critiques 
that reside in the concomitant class of controversies, rather than the core mainstream scientific 
claims. Such a finding would have implications for the notion that sceptics and scepticism 
represent an entrenched ideological counter-movement that is essentially unresponsive to 
advances in climate science and policy. 
9.3.2 Belief shift 
There have been cases of sceptics who have changed their climate sceptical views over time. 
Many sceptics now concede that the climate is changing as a result of human emissions of 
greenhouse gases, and has shifted their critiques to the scale of the climate changes and the 
seriousness of the projected environmental and human impacts. It is conceivable that as the 
evidence mounts of demonstrable physical impacts, sceptics would shift the focus of their 
scepticism to deficiencies in the decision-making processes and the specific climate responses 
being proposed and implemented. 
It would be useful to gain an understanding of how sceptics shift their views over time and 
what triggers such shifts. It can be hypothesised that some views might be are relatively easily 
adapted or altered over time whilst others might be resistant to change. Insights about how 
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sceptic beliefs evolve and the triggers associated with changes in belief would help climate 
communicators to frame their arguments appropriately for a sceptical audience and to target 
the triggers of belief shift in their communications. It is difficult, however, to capture belief 
shift because of the anonymity of public opinion surveys and the inaccessibility of elite sceptics 
for the purpose of periodic surveying. It might be useful to target a small and constant sample 
of lay sceptics for repeated surveying over a period of time. 
9.3.3 The role of folk psychology 
Capstick and Pidgeon’s (2014) recent investigation of the ACD scepticism concept detected a 
latent construct in the general population’s view about climate change which they call “folk 
psychology”. This construct includes intuitive lay assumptions about human nature, such as 
“people are too selfish to do anything about climate change” and “it is not in human nature to 
respond to problems that won’t happen for many years”. Van Rensburg (2013) identified a host 
of myths of human nature that are particularly recurrent in sceptic discourse, like humans are 
intelligent, resourceful, resilient and able to adapt to changing environments, yet are also 
limited in their true ability to understand, let alone influence or control, the complex and 
powerful global climatic system. It is not surprising that these notions are present in the context 
of climate sceptical thought for they serve an integrative purpose, and provide continuity 
between received information and innate information. However, it could be argued that folk 
psychology constructs are independently important, i.e. that they immediately orient people 
when they are confronted with the climate issue, and that they powerfully colour received 
information about the evidence, processes and responses to do with climate change. If that were 
the case, folk psychology might be identified as a key centre of climate scepticism (fourth 
centre?), with implications for our conceptual understanding of the phenomenon. There is 
merit, therefore, for an in-depth investigation of the folk psychology beliefs of a sample of the 
general population and to correlate these with those who are sceptical of ACD. If a distinct set 
of beliefs can be associated with sceptics, as would be expected, it might be possible to pinpoint 
the deep-seated triggers of scepticism, which would, in turn, elucidate productive ways for 
engaging the sceptic mindset. 
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11 APPENDICES 
11.1 List of sceptics included in the sample 
NAME PROFESSIONAL BACKGROUND 
Don Aitkin Academic (social sciences) 
Piers Akerman Journalist 
Janet Albrechtsen Journalist 
D. Weston Allen General practitioner (medical sciences) 
David Archibald Business leader and researcher 
Cory Bernardi Politician 
Tim Blair Journalist 
Andrew Bolt Journalist 
John Carroll Academic (social sciences) 
Bob (Robert M) Carter Academic (earth sciences) 
Anthony Cox Lawyer 
Sinclair Davidson Academic (economic sciences) 
Frank Devine Journalist 
Miranda Devine Journalist 
Alexander Downer Politician 
Michael Duffy Journalist 
David Evans Engineer 
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Steve Fielding Politician 
Stewart Franks Academic (earth sciences) 
Craig Isherwood Civil society activist 
Dennis Jensen Politician (earth sciences background) 
William Kininmonth Researcher (earth sciences) 
Mark S. Lawson Journalist 
Jenny Marohasy Researcher (biological sciences) 
Terry McCrann Journalist 
John McLean IT professional 
Nick Minchin Politician 
Des Moore Researcher (economics and legal background) 
Alan Moran Researcher (economic sciences) 
Maurice L. Newman Business leader 
Joanne Nova Journalist and Researcher (biological sciences) 
Garth Paltridge Academic (earth sciences) 
Christopher Pearson Journalist 
George Pell Cleric 
Ian Plimer Researcher (earth sciences) 
Tom Quirk Researcher (earth sciences) 
Alex Robson Academic (economic sciences) 
Greg Sheridan Journalist 
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John Spooner Artist 
Tom Switzer Journalist 
Len Walker Engineer 
Dick Warburton Business leader 
Alan Wood Journalist 
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11.2 Leximancer software settings 
The following changes were made to the default software settings in Leximancer and to the 
initial list of discovered concepts. Due to the diverse nature of corpora that could be subjected 
to automated content analysis and the diverse analytical objectives of researchers, it is not 
uncommon to change the default settings and/or modify the concept lists (Stockwell et al., 
2009, p. 434).  
Setting Justification 
Discovered concepts: 200 It was established through trial and error that a 200 
concept map provides the greatest amount of detail 
without an overcrowding effect.  
Sentences per block: 3 Three sentence blocks reveal a greater amount of 
context in which concepts of interest appear and 
facilitate the interpretation extracts. 
Prose test threshold: 5 The prose test threshold was increased to filter out non-
prose text segments, like the metadata at the beginning 
of each article. 
Identify Name-like concepts: Off The analysis does not require the distinction or 
privileging of entities represented by names. 
Duplicate text sensitivity: 8 Due to the large size of the dataset and the fact that it 
contains multiple documents from single sceptics, it 
can be expected that sceptics might repeat their views 
and cross-quote each other. The duplicate text 
sensitivity setting was increased in order to maximize 
the programs ability to find and negate duplicate text 
segments. 
Merge word variants: On This setting allows the lemmatization of words, i.e. 
variants of stem concepts would be included in the 
thesauri of such concepts. This would help eliminate 
close variants appearing as separate concepts on the 
concept map. 
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Boilerplate cut-off: Very strong This setting controls the inclusion of words that appear 
repeatedly in specific contexts as concepts, e.g. words 
from the metadata repeated at the beginning and end of 
each article, like ‘copyright’ and ‘all rights reserved’. 
Because the Factiva database contains a significant 
amount of such metadata the boilerplate setting was 
increased to ‘very strong’. 
Concept generality: 6 Concept generality indicates the ‘fuzziness’ of each 
concept, i.e. the number of words included in its 
thesaurus definition. In order to ensure that captured 
concepts are sufficiently unique for a fine-grained 
analysis of the sample, the setting has been lowered. 
Concept seeds list: [climate], 
[change], [global], [greenhouse] 
and [warming] removed. 
These terms merely reflect the selection criteria used 
for the compilation of the sample. 
Concept seeds list: [carbon] and 
[emissions] removed. 
‘Carbon emissions’ is a common denominator in the 
climate debate and the inclusion of these two concepts 
on the map is unlikely to contribute to a deeper 
understanding of the discourse.  
Concept seeds list: [david] 
removed. 
The term [david] refers to various persons with that 
first name. 
Concept seeds list: [Australian] 
unmerged. 
The term [Australian] includes the terms [australian’s] 
and [Australians] and needs to be disambiguated from 
its variants for exclusion. The individual term 
[australian] refers to the newspaper The Australian and 
predominantly appears in the metadata sections of the 
news articles, and is thus irrelevant to the 
investigation. 
Concept seeds list: [ipcc] and 
[intergovernmental] and [panel], 
[co2] and [dioxide], [kevin] and 
These terms are variant labels for identical entities and 
should be represented by only one concept each. 
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[rudd], [al] and [gore] were merged 
to form unitary concepts. 
Concept seeds list: [australian], 
[copyright], [english], [factiva], 
[features], [herald], [inc], [john], 
[ltd], [morning], [news], [page], 
[reserved], [rights], [sydney], [td] 
and [words] removed. 
These are metadata remnants. 
Concept seeds list: [dr], [minister], 
[president], [prime] and [professor] 
removed. 
Titles are not relevant.  
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11.3 List of meaningful concepts shared by two or more sceptics 
MEANINGFUL CONCEPTS 
SHARED BY 2 OR MORE 
SCEPTICS 
Number of sceptics sharing 
the concept 
% of sceptics sharing the 
concept 
world 22 51% 
debate 21 49% 
ipcc 20 47% 
research 20 47% 
australia 18 42% 
government 17 40% 
past 15 35% 
report 15 35% 
public 13 30% 
models 12 28% 
policy 11 26% 
rudd 11 26% 
computer 10 23% 
energy 10 23% 
political 10 23% 
human 9 21% 
sceptics 9 21% 
century 8 19% 
environmental 8 19% 
history 8 19% 
real 8 19% 
scheme 8 19% 
fact 7 16% 
future 7 16% 
period 7 16% 
truth 7 16% 
abc 6 14% 
consensus 6 14% 
ets 6 14% 
paper 6 14% 
stern 6 14% 
tax 6 14% 
copenhagen 5 12% 
decade 5 12% 
economic 5 12% 
media 5 12% 
natural 5 12% 
analysis 4 9% 
coal 4 9% 
cost 4 9% 
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countries 4 9% 
economy 4 9% 
electricity 4 9% 
green 4 9% 
international 4 9% 
money 4 9% 
opinion 4 9% 
predictions 4 9% 
projections 4 9% 
theory 4 9% 
trend 4 9% 
uncertainty 4 9% 
wrong 4 9% 
activists 3 7% 
alarmist 3 7% 
alarmists 3 7% 
article 3 7% 
believers 3 7% 
business 3 7% 
china 3 7% 
correct 3 7% 
doubt 3 7% 
environment 3 7% 
experts 3 7% 
facts 3 7% 
faith 3 7% 
financial 3 7% 
forecasts 3 7% 
governments 3 7% 
humans 3 7% 
ignore 3 7% 
industrial 3 7% 
industry 3 7% 
journal 3 7% 
market 3 7% 
nations 3 7% 
newspaper 3 7% 
orthodoxy 3 7% 
papers 3 7% 
peer-reviewed 3 7% 
plimer 3 7% 
politicians 3 7% 
review 3 7% 
standards 3 7% 
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trading 3 7% 
treaty 3 7% 
academic 2 5% 
alarmism 2 5% 
australians 2 5% 
author 2 5% 
coast 2 5% 
csiro 2 5% 
dangerous 2 5% 
decades 2 5% 
dire 2 5% 
discussion 2 5% 
dissent 2 5% 
editor 2 5% 
election 2 5% 
experienced 2 5% 
federal 2 5% 
funding 2 5% 
garnaut 2 5% 
geological 2 5% 
gillard 2 5% 
gore 2 5% 
growth 2 5% 
hadley 2 5% 
india 2 5% 
integrity 2 5% 
knowledge 2 5% 
labor 2 5% 
lindzen 2 5% 
long-term 2 5% 
medieval 2 5% 
model 2 5% 
monckton 2 5% 
positive 2 5% 
published 2 5% 
religion 2 5% 
sceptical 2 5% 
settled 2 5% 
spending 2 5% 
studies 2 5% 
theories 2 5% 
trade 2 5% 
warmist 2 5% 
 
